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LEGAL AND POLICY STANDARDS FOR ADDRESSING
WORKPLACE RACISM: EMPLOYER LIABILITY AND
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR RACE-BASED
TRAUMATIC STRESS
ROBERT T. CARTER, PH.D.*
THOMAS D. SCIEUERMANN, M.A., J.D.**
With the celebrated election of the first African-American
President, the United States has come a long way from the ugly days
of Jim Crow,' but there is a paucity of evidence that we are living in
anything approaching a "post-racial" America. 2 While overt bigotry
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1. For a brief history of the Jim Crow imagery and related laws, see David Pilgrim,
Who was Jim Crow?, FERRIS STATE UNIVERSITY JIM CROW MUSEUM (Sept. 2000),
http://www.ferris.edu/news/jimcrow/who.htm; For a contemporary view of Jim Crow, see
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2011).
2 Commentator Matt Bai notes that "any hope that Mr. Obama's election might
magically erase the tension of recent decades has faded, as the N.A.A.C.P. and the Tea Party
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may have receded in recent decades, rumors of its demise as an
ongoing social problem are greatly exaggerated. 3 "Race," as Comel
West eloquently advised a decade and a half ago, still "Matters." 4
Despite progress in the half century since Brown v. Bd of
Educ.5 and the demise of the "separate but equal"6 doctrine, harmful
and costly levels of discrimination, racism, and racial harassment
continue to exist, including in the workplace. 7 Attempts to redress
these ills, particularly in the employment setting, have been
cumbersome and often ineffective for aggrieved employees as they
have sought redress either administratively through the U.S. Equal
Emplo rent Opportunity Commission (EEOC), or in the federal
courts. One indication of the dismal prospects for employees injured
by racial discrimination and harassment is that, in spite of diligent
efforts (and until recently a shrinking staff), the EEOC backlog of
cases numbered 86,338 as of September 2010.9 Furthermore, when
employee-plaintiffs seek to pursue their cases through state or federal
administrative agencies or courts, the standards established in federal
statutes and court rulings present a daunting "web" of choices for
them. The choices are complex for defendant employers and their
respective counsel as well.'0 This confusion is most acutely felt in the
traded accusations over race. Black leaders have discovered that you still can't raise legitimate
questions about racism without being accused of 'playing the race card."' Matt Bai, Still Too
Hot to Touch, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at WKl.
3. See TIM WISE, BETWEEN BARACK AND A HARD PLACE 18 (2009) ("For while the
political ascent of Barack Obama . .. certainly says something about race, what it says is far
from that which most . .. seem to believe. Yes, it suggests that blind and irrational bigotry of
the kind that animated so much white opinion for so long in the United States may well have
receded . . . But given the evidence regarding entrenched racial inequities in
employment... housing and elsewhere - and studies indicating these are due in large measure
to discrimination, either past, present, or a combination of the two - it most definitely does not
suggest that racism has been truncated as an ongoing social problem for persons of color
generally.").
4. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 9 (1993).
5. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. In all, it is estimated that African American workers alone lose over $120 billion in
wages each year thanks to labor market discrimination of one kind or another; monies they
would be paid if opportunity were truly equal, but which they do not in fact receive, much to
their detriment, and much to the benefit of the mostly white employers for whom they work
who get to retain the unpaid amount in their own coffers. WISE, supra note 3, at 44 (citing JOE
R. FEAGIN, SYSTEMATIC RASICM: A THEORY OF OPPRESSION 196 (2006)).
8. Robert T. Carter & Jessica M. Forsyth, A Guide to the Forensic Assessment of
Race-based Traumatic Stress Reactions, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L., 28, 30 (2009).
9. Jenna Greene, On Borrowed Time, THE NAT'L L.J., Nov. 29, 2010, at 42.
10. Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Untangling the Web Spun by Title VII's Referral and
Deferral Scheme, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 427, 430 (2010). Taylor analogizes the aggrieved
employee-plaintiffs path to a "spider's web." She summarizes the web this way: "First the
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case of employees who have experienced severe injuries such as race-
based traumatic stress (RBTS) resulting from workplace harassment,
as they seek just compensation for their injuries and for the harassment
11to cease.
This Article proposes a legal and policy framework for more
effective prevention of and legal redress for workplace harassment and
discrimination. 12 This approach focuses on employees who have
suffered a severe, demonstrable emotional and psychological injury
due to harassment or discrimination, i.e. race-based traumatic stress
(RBTS).13 The Article begins with the assertion that America is not in
a "post-racial" stage and that racism and racial harassment, both
intentional and more subtle, are unfortunately still present in various
settings including the workplace. A brief overview of current federal
employment law related to racial harassment and discrimination, and
its deficits, is provided, and the use of tort concepts to complement and
strengthen current avenues to legal redress is proposed and discussed.
Finally, this Article proposes a comprehensive approach to workplace
harassment and discrimination.
A more comprehensive and multifaceted approach to
workplace harassment and discrimination is needed, because attempts
by aggrieved employee-plaintiffs to achieve redress under established
[Supreme] Court has drawn a line between state administrative proceedings and any
subsequent judicial review by state courts, so that the state-agency determinations on un-
reviewed claims covered by Title VII have no preclusive effect in a subsequent suit asserting
the same claims in federal court. Thus, a claimant whose grievance receives full consideration
by the relevant state or local agency but does not reach the state courts may, without facing a
preclusive bar, assert that same claim to the EEOC and in a subsequent federal lawsuit. This
scenario is most likely to arise when the claimant does not prevail in the state or local
administrative forum. Having failed to convince the local administrative authorities of his
claim's merit, he may turn to the federal system with the hope of obtaining a better result. Of
course, he could also seek direct review of the state agency's determination by filing an appeal
with the appropriate state court. However, a claimant receiving sound legal advice should be
wary of following this course in light of the risk that it carries of a binding adverse
determination." Id. (citing Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 795-96 (1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 4-183(a) (West 2009); 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC.AND
PROC. § 4471.3 (2d ed. 2002)) (alteration added). Taylor goes on to caution: "[t]he law affords
plaintiffs a choice to pursue relief under state law, under federal law, or under both, but it does
not allow them to manipulate the system by seeking separate remedies in sequence. A plaintiff
cannot have his cake and eat it too." Id. at 478.
11. See Robert T. Carter, Race Based Traumatic Stress, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Dec. 1,
2006, at 1-5 [hereinafter Carter, Race-based Traumatic Stress]; see also Robert T. Carter,
Racism and Psychological and Emotional Injury: Recognizing and Assessing Race-Based
Traumatic Stress, 35 THE COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 13 (2007) [hereinafter Carter,
Recognizing and Assessing Race-based Traumatic Stress].
12. See infra Sections V, VI.
13. See Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11,
at 87.
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law have had relatively little success; recent research on more than a
decade of federal employment discrimination cases underscores the
deficits in current legal approaches.14 A more robust approach to
prevent and respond to racial harassment would benefit employees and
their employers. A legal and policy strategy, "Employer Liability, and
Shared Responsibility for Race-Based Traumatic Stress," is presented
in Section VI; which calls for a three-pronged approach:
(1) Legal scholars and courts developing more effective
applications of established emplpyment law, primarily
Title VII to cases of race-based traumatic stress;
(2) Courts and judges making available and viable tort
remedies such as intentional infliction of emotional
distress to employees who have suffered race-based
traumatic injuries in the workplace; and
(3) Development, education on, and implementation of
clearer workplace policies on workplace harassment
and discrimination to prevent and to respond to
employee RBTS.
In the area of workplace harassment, the development and
application of clearer, more viable, and fairer legal standards are
needed to advance fundamental racial justice for employees and foster
the duty of employers to provide a harassment-free workplace. Access
to a more comprehensive and effective approach to redress, through
both federal and state legal systems, is long overdue in situations
involving employees who have experienced RBTS. This Article aims
to raise the awareness of employers and employees to the realities and
harms of RBTS. Adoption of the shared responsibility approach
proposed herein would benefit the employers who have the
responsibility to provide workplace environments free of
discrimination and harassment: employees who work in them;
businesses, organizations, and society, who benefit from their
productivity, services, and products.
Racial discrimination and harassment still exist in the
employment setting; we are not living and working in environments
that evidence the existence of a "post-racial America," but rather the
continuation of racism and racial harassment albeit sometimes in
14. See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 53-54 (2006).
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different forms. In Section II, we note that some employees who are
members of protected classifications (e.g., race, ethnicity, or
nationality) continue to experience real discrimination and harassment
that harms them (and their fellow employees, and their employers).
Current approaches to responding to and remedying racial harassment
are outlined in Section III, and an overview of workplace harassment
and discrimination law is provided in Section IV. A more focused
approach to addressing workplace harassment is addressed in Section
V - specifically how to deal with the psychological impairment and
RBTS injuries and their broader impact on workplace environment and
productivity. A proposal for a comprehensive approach to this aspect
of the problem, involving both policy and law considerations - and a
call to reflection and action for employers, courts, employees, and
legal scholars - is detailed in Section VI.
I. "PosT-RACIAL" AMERICA: CONTEMPORARY RACISM, INJURIES,
AND LIMITED REDRESS
A. Contemporary Racism and the Resulting Workplace Injury: The
Negative Health Effects of Psychological and Emotional
Impairment and Race-Based Traumatic Stress Injury
All Americans, regardless of race or ethnic origin, share a
range of common values, aspirations and emotions. We all feel fear
and worry about things that are beyond our control, and we feel anger
and dismay toward people who do not show respect, treat us unfairly,
or interact with some form of bias toward us. When we encounter
daily hassles we feel stressed and frustrated. North America has a long
and painful history of racial stratification and unequal rights and
treatment based on skin color, physical features, and language. While
national polls have found that 69% of White and 59% of Black
Americans believe that race relations have improved over time,15 the
historical legacy of racism remains in the memory of those who
survived or witnessed the segregation and racial terrorism of the Jim
Crow years, and in some instances it is possible to find racism alive
and well today.
Many respected social and government organizations have
identified racism as a social-political issue that contributes to health,
15. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Hold Improving View of Race Relations in U.S.,
GALLUP POLLNEWS SERVICE, 1-14, Wash., D.C., June 30, 2003.
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mental health, educational, and other types of disparities.16 These
reports do not question the existence of racism as a current feature of
everyday life in the United States.
Black Americans have been and continue to be stereotyped as
amoral, unintelligent, lazy, violent, and criminal.17 These pervasive
stereotypes, which originated during slavery, persist to this day and
have been shown to influence a variety of social perceptions and
political opinions including support for punitive policies and
penalties. Racism is evident when a person harbors negative feelings
and attitudes towards Blacks or other racial minorities and expresses
these feelings and attitudes through behavior or action on an
interpersonal or institutional level.
Racism may take several forms, many of which have been
investigated in research that examines the impact of racism on mental
and physical health. One form of racism is discrimination that is
characterized by avoidance or social exclusion wherein people are
rejected or ignored because of their race or ethnicity. Another form is
racial harassment, which includes verbal and non-verbal acts directed
at people to demean, intimidate, silence, or communicate inferior
status based on their race (e.g., that the person is stupid). Racial
harassment can also involve potential or actual damage to one's person
(psychological, emotional or physical injury). A third kind of racism,
aversive-hostility can occur in schools, organizations or in the
workplace when people encounter barriers, lack of opportunity and, in
some instances, a racially hostile environment, because of their race or
ethnicity.' 9 These forms of racism can be expressed overtly as in the
use of racial slurs, intimidation and threats, or they can be covert, 20
and can occur in a variety of contexts. Whatever form it takes, racism
16. See UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES IN
HEALTHCARE 9-13 (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, MENTAL HEALTH: CULTURE, RACE, AND ETHNICITY; A SUPPLEMENT TO
MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 11-15 (2001).
17. Jones, supra note 15 at 10; Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime,
and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876 (2004); Francis J. Flynn,
Having an Open Mind: The Impact of Openness to Experience on Interracial Attitudes and
Impression Formation, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 816 (2005).
18. Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of
Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 AM. J. Soc. 717, 723 (2001);
James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, The Racial Divide in Support for the Death Penalty:
Does White Racism Matter?, 85 Soc. FORCES 1281, 1283-84 (2007).
19. See infra note 20.
20. Elizabeth Brondolo et al., Coping with Racism: A Selective Review of the Literature
and a Theoretical and Methodological Critique, 32 J. BEHAV. MED. 64, 65 (2009) [hereinafter
Brondolo, Coping with Racism]; Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race-based Traumatic
Stress, supra note 11, at 37.
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is a significant stressor whose adverse health and mental health effects
on Black Americans and other racial minorities has been well
documented in the empirical research literature. 2 1
B. Prevalence of and Injuries Resulting from Racial
Discrimination
Research on racism shows that many Americans continue to
experience racial discrimination in various areas of life (e.g., housing,
school, work, etc.). 22 Studies of 233 Black, Asian, Biracial, and
Hispanic peoples' experiences with racial discrimination, found that
89% of the participants had experienced perceived racial
discrimination. Recent studies have found that African Americans, in
particular, face high rates of exposure to racial discrimination. For
example, using data from a national probability sample from a
longitudinal study (conducted over a fifteen-year period) that included
Whites (1,813) and African Americans (1,507), Borrell and colleagues
(2007) found that most (89%) African Americans experienced racial
discrimination in one of several life domains (e.g., school, getting a
job, at work, housing, medical care, public settings, and with
police/courts) and 34% experienced racial discrimination in at least
three of the domains. 24 In comparison, only 1% of White Americans
reported experiencing racial discrimination in at least three of the
domains. 25 Similarly, in a study of the prevalence of workplace abuse
(i.e., verbal aggression, disrespectful behavior), sexual harassment and
racial discrimination in a racially diverse sample of 1200 low-income
workers, high levels of exposure to racial discrimination was reported
by 37% of the workers of Color, as compared to 10% of White
21. See generally Brondolo, Coping with Racism, supra note 20; Carter, Recognizing
and Assessing Race-Based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11, at 14-15; see generally John F.
Dovidio et al., Why Can't We Just Get Along? Interpersonal Biases and Interracial Distrust, 8
CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 88 (2002); David R. Williams & Selina
A. Mohammed, Discrimination and Racial Disparities in Health: Evidence and Needed
Research, 32 J. BEHAV. MED. 20,21 (2009).
22. Robert T. Carter et al., Racial Discrimination and Race-based Traumatic Stress: An
Exploratory Investigation, in HANDBOOK OF RACIAL-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY AND
COUNSELING: TRAINING AND PRACTICE VOL. 2, 467 (Robert T. Carter ed., 2004) [hereinafter
Carter, HANDBOOK]; Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra
note I1, at 19.
23. Id.
24. See generally Luisa N. Borrell et al., Self-reported Racial Discrimination and
Substance Use in the Coronary Artery Risk Development in Adults (CARDIA) Study, 166 AM.
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1068 (2007).
25. Id.
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workers. Among the workers of Color, Black Americans reported the
highest level of exposure at 44%.26
Recent research focusing only on African American samples
provided similar results to those found in mixed race samples. A study
using data from the National Survey of Black Workers found that the
majority (71%) of the sample reported having had an experience of
racial discrimination in their lifetime.27 In a study examining the
frequency of racial discrimination in health care settings, Lewis and
colleagues found that most (85%) of the African American women in
their study experienced "everyday" forms of discrimination (i.e.,
minor, everyday insults that individuals may experience as members of
a minority group), and 76.9% of them reported that the discrimination
they experienced was related to their race. 28 Williams and Williams-
Morris suggest that racism and racial discrimination affects mental
health through multiple pathways.29 One is the restriction on
socioeconomic opportunity and access to care.30 Another is exposure
to poor living conditions. 3 1 A third is being subjected to negative
stereotypes that contribute to justifications for racial disparities or bias,
and that can lead to the internalization of the stigma of inferiority and
cultural deprivation. 32 These pathways may lead to impaired health
and psychological functioning due to the repeated and daily stress they
produce. 33
The pathways that effect health have been investigated for
nearly three decades using a variety of methods (i.e., cross-sectional,
longitudinal, experimental), various measures of different types of
racism and discrimination (i.e., major, acute events versus chronic
26. Nancy Krieger et al., Social Hazards on the Job: Workplace Abuse, Sexual
Harassment, and Racial Discrimination - A Study of Black, Latino and White Low-Income
Women and Men Workers in the United States, 36 INT'LJ. HEALTH SERV. 51 (2006).
27. Jack K. Martin et al., Problem Drinking Patterns Among African Americans: The
Impacts of Reports of Discrimination, Perceptions of Prejudice, and "Risky" Coping
Strategies, 44 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 408, 415 (2003).
28. Tene T. Lewis et al., Chronic Exposure to Everyday Discrimination and Coronary
Artery Calcification in African-American Women: The SWAN Heart Study, 68
PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 362, 363-65 (2006).
29. David R. Williams & Ruth Williams-Morris, Racism and Mental Health: The
African American Experience, 5 ETHNICITY & HEALTH 243, 251-62 (2000).
30. Id. at 248.
31. Id. at 251.
32. Id. at 255-56.
33. Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11, at
26-27; Rodney Clark et al., Racism as a Stressor for African Americans: A Biopsychosocial
Model, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 805, 811-13 (1999); Chalmer E. Thompson & Helen A.
Neville, Racism, Mental Health, and Mental Health Practice, 27 THE COUNSELING
PSYCHOLOGIST 155, 191 (1999).
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daily hassles; single items versus multidimensional scales), different
timeframes for exposure to racial experiences (i.e., last month, last
year, last three years, lifetime), and an assortment of outcome
variables (i.e., measures of mental health, self-report and objective
measures of health) with a variety of racial minority groups at various
stages of life (i.e., adolescents, younger and older adults) has found
that racism has a negative impact on a range of indices of health and
mental health.34
1. Health Effects
Researchers consistently show the negative effects of racism on
the physical health of racial and ethnic minorities. Researchers
studying the physiological effects of discrimination have explored
these relationships within the context of stress, such that racial
discrimination is viewed as a form of stress that triggers physiological
responses (e.g., elevated blood pressure, heart rate, cortisol secretions),
resulting in health-related problems. 35 Self-reported experiences or
perceptions of racial discrimination have been linked to risk factors for
hypertension, coronary heart disease;36 smoking;37 illicit substance
use;38 alcoholism; 39 and risk factors for many other diseases. 40
Chronic experiences of discrimination have also been shown to
have negative health outcomes. For example, Lewis et al.4 1 examined
the relationship between chronic experiences of discrimination and
coronary artery calcification (CAC) among 181 African-American
women between 42 and 52 years of age 42 The researchers examined
"everyday" forms of discrimination described as minor, everyday
34. Id.
35. See generally Elizabeth A. Pascoe & Laura S. Richman, Perceived Discrimination
and Health: A Meta-Analytic Review, 135 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 531 (2009).
36. Brondolo, Coping with Racism, supra note 20, at 64; Lewis et al., supra note 28 at
362.
37. See generally Hope Landrine & Elizabeth A. Klonoff, Racial Segregation and
Cigarette Smoking Among Blacks: Findings at the Individual Level, 10 HEALTH PSYCOL. 211
(2000); Barbara J. Guthrie et al., African American Girls' Smoking Habits and Day-to-Day
Experience with Racial Discrimination, 51 NURSING RESEARCH 183 (2002); Gary G. Bennett
et al., Perceived Racial/Ethnic Harassment and Tobacco Use Among African American Young
Adults, 95 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 238, 238-39 (2005).
38. See generally Luisa N. Borrell et al., Self-reported Racial Discrimination and
Substance Use in the Coronary Artery Risk Development in Adults (CARDIA) Study, 166 AM.
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1068 (2007).
39. See generally Martin, supra note 27.
40. Williams & Mohammed, supra note 21, at 21, 34.
41. Lewis, supra note 28, at 363.
42. Id.
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(chronic) insults that individuals may experience as members of a
racial minority group.43 Information was gathered at annual doctor
visits over a five-year period.44 Most (85%) of the participants
reported having experienced discrimination either sometimes or often
and most of them (76.9%) reported it was related to their race or
ethnicity at some point in the five year period. 5 The researchers found
that chronic exposure to discrimination was significantly associated
with the presence of CAC, cardiovascular risk factors, and increases in
Body Mass Index (BMI), and that even after adjusting for
demographic variables, the association among chronic exposure and
CAC remained significant among the women in their study.46 The
relationship between discrimination and exaggerated cardiovascular
responses to stressful events are important to highlight because the
exaggerated physiological responses associated with stress are
indicators of coronary heart disease and hypertension. 7
Other studies have found an association between racial
discrimination and low-birth weight deliveries as well as a variety of
other health risks.48 In summary, these empirical studies show that
racial discrimination can have a powerful impact on physiological and
biological systems. This physiological stress-related impact provides
strong evidence that racial discrimination and harassment can also
have powerful and significant impact on one's psychological and
emotional state.
2. Mental Health
The negative effects of discrimination and racial harassment on
mental health are well documented. The psychological and emotional
responses to racial discrimination and harassment are similar to other
experiences of people who are unfairly targeted (e.g., psychological
abuse, physical or sexual assault, etc.) that can be immediate and
43. Id. at 362.
44. Id. at 363.
45. Id. at 365.
46. Id. at 365-66.
47. See, Nancy L. Marshall et al., The Changing Workforce, Job Stress, and
Psychological Distress, 2 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 99, 99-100 (1997); Sheldon
Cohen et al., Social Support and Coronary Heart Disease: Underlying Psychologic and
Biologic Mechanisms (1994) (found in Soc. SUPPORT AND CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE 204
(Sally A. Shumaker & Susan M. Czajkowski eds. 1994)).
48. Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11, at
58; Yin Paradies, A Systematic Review of Empirical Research on Self-reported Racism and
Health, 35 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 888, 894 (2006); Williams & Mohammed, supra note 21, at
30.
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intense.4 9 Even relatively minor race-related experiences can result in
a great deal of suffering, particularly when efforts to co e and adapt
fail, resulting in a stress response that can lead to trauma.5
Empirical studies have found significant links between self-
reported experiences of racial discrimination and negative mood,
depressive symptoms, feelings of hopelessness, anxiety and
psychological distress.5 ' Pascoe and Richman conducted a
comprehensive meta-analysis of studies conducted from 1986 to 2007
on the relationships between perceived discrimination and mental
health outcomeS. 52 The researchers found 110 studies examining the
relationship between perceived discrimination and symptomotology
(e.g., depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress, etc.), psychological
distress, and well-being (e.g., self-esteem, life satisfaction, stress,
happiness, etc.). 53 Their statistical meta-analysis of the results of these
studies indicated that perceived discrimination was significantly
related to negative mental health outcomes. 54
Carter, R.T. and other researchers55 have written extensively on
the trauma associated with racism and racial harassment.56 The costs to
the individual who has experienced emotional and psychological
impairment or who was traumatized have been well-documented;
these include both physical and pschological injuries, some of which
can be severe and long-standing.5 In the work setting, the costs also
include those to individual employees as well as their co-workers, and
the employer.s Lowered productivity from ill or absent employees
who have been traumatized, as well as damage to group and team
efforts due to the trauma of one or more members are also costly to
businesses and organizations as well as their employees.
Communication and creative capabilities, both individual and
49. Thema Bryant-Davis & Carlota Ocampo, Racist-Incident-based Trauma, 33 THE
COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 479, 485-86 (2005); Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race
based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11, at 58; Carter & Forsyth, supra note 8, at 36.
50. Id.
51. See generally Paradies, supra note 48; Pascoe & Richman, supra note 35, at 537.
52. Pascoe & Richman, supra note 35, at 536-37.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 537-38.
55. See, e.g., Pascoe & Richman, supra note 35; Williams & Mohammed, supra note
21.
56. See, e.g., Carter, HANDBOOK, supra note 22; Carter & Mazzula, infra note 83;
Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11
57. See generally infra note 82.
58. Pascoe & Richman, supra note 35.
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collective, are also arguably damaged by racism and racial harassment
in the workplace.59
Banks, Kohn-Wood, and Spencer investigated the relationship
between everyday (chronic) discrimination, anxiety, and depressive
symptoms among 570 African Americans adults using data from the
1995 Detroit Area Study.60 Discrimination was significantly related to
symptoms of depression and anxiety.6' Similarly, in a longitudinal
study (1996-2001), Schulz et al. examined the relationship between
experiences of discrimination over time and depression among 343
African American women living in Detroit. 62 The researchers found
that women who reported increased experiences of discrimination over
time also reported increases in depressive symptoms and decreases in
self-rated general health, irrespective of age, education, or income.63
Thus, the study provides support for the assertion that everyday
encounters with racial discrimination are associated with poor mental
health outcomes. 64
Racial discrimination has also been significantly associated
with clinical symptoms and diagnoses. For example, Gee, Spencer,
Chen, Yip, and Takeuchi examined the relationship between self-
reported racial discrimination and DSM-IV disorders among Asian
Americans using the 2002-2003 U.S. National Latino and Asian
American Study (n=2047).65 After controlling for several confounding
variables (e.g., SES, physical conditions, social desirability, etc.),
having experiences of racial discrimination increased the likelihood of
having a mental disorder.66 Specifically, individuals who experienced
racial discrimination had twice the risk of having one disorder and
three times the risk of having at least two disorders.67 They also found
that the association was stronger for depressive disorders.6
59. Pascoe & Richman, supra note 35; Williams & Mohammed, supra note 21, at 34.
60. Kira H. Banks et al., An Examination of the African American Experience of
Everyday Discrimination and Symptoms of Psychological Distress, 42 CMTY. MENTAL
HEALTH J. 555, 560-61 (2006).
61. Id at 566.
62. Amy J. Schulz et al., Discrimination, Symptoms of Depression, and Self-rated
Health Among African American Women in Detroit: Results From a Longitudinal Analysis, 96
Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 1265 (2006).
63. Id. at 1267.
64. Id. at 1269.
65. Gilbert C. Gee et al., The Association Between Self-reported Discrimination and
12-month DSM-IV Mental Disorders Among Asian Americans Nationwide, 64 Soc. Sci. &
MED. 1984, 1986-87 (2007).
66. Id. at 1986-87, 1992.
67. Id. at 1993.
68. Id.
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Landrine and Klonoff reported that Black study participants'
encounters with perceived racial discrimination were related to low
self-esteem as well as a variety of stress-related somatic symptoms. 69
Contrada et al. reported that racial discrimination was related to
symptoms of depression. 70 Schneider et al. found that respondents who
experienced racially harassing events reported symptoms of
psychological distress. 71 Utsey and Payne explored the relationshi
between race-related stress, anxiety and depression in Black men.
They found that race related stress predicted anxiety and depression
scores.7 3 Klonoff, Landrine and Ullman found that racist events were
predictive of three types of symptoms, total mental health severity
scores, somatization and anxiety. 4 They tested whether stress from
racial discrimination added to general life stress and contributed to
psychological symptoms and found that race-based stress contributed
to all psychological symptoms above and beyond social class and
general life stressors.75 Broman et al. found that, of the adults studied,
targets of racial discrimination exhibited lower levels of mastery
(control and problem solving) and hifher levels of psychological
distress (feeling depressed, restless, etc).
Researchers have shown that Blacks who experience acts of
racial discrimination report these incidents as painful, damaging and
distressful in the moment, but more importantly, they argue that such
incidents have a lasting psychological and emotional impact on
individuals. 7 7 Blacks are, as a result of racial stereotypes, in many
ways limited and often are demeaned for expressions of anger and
69. Hope Landrine & Elizabeth A. Klonoff, The Schedule of Racist Events: A Measure
of Racial Discrimination and a Study of Its Negative Physical and Mental Health
Consequences, 22 J. BLACKPSYCHOL. 144, 154-56 (1996).
70. Richard J. Contrada et al., Measures of Ethnicity-related Stress: Psychometric
Properties, Ethnic Group Differences, and Associations with Well-being, 31 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1775, 1802 (2001).
71. Kimberly T. Schneider et al., An Examination of the Nature and Correlates of
Ethnic Harassment Experiences in Multiple Contexts, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 3, 10-11
(2000).
72. See generally Shawn 0. Utsey & Yasser. Payne, Psychological Impacts of Racism in
a Clinical Versus Normal Sample of African American Men, 5 J. AFRICAN Am. MEN 57, 63
(2001).
73. Id. at 69.
74. Elizabeth A. Klonoffet al., Racial Discrimination and Psychiatric Symptoms Among
Blacks, 5 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 329,332 (1999).
75. Id.
76. Clifford L. Broman et al., The Experience and Consequences of Perceived Racial
Discrimination: A Study ofAfrican Americans, 26 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 165, 177-79 (2000).
77. See, JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-
CLASS EXPERIENCE 23 (1994).
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frustration when subjected to racial encounters and these social and
interpersonal restrictions may result in further emotional and
psychological harm when they experience perceived racial hostility. In
another study, participants' reported that their experiences were hurtful
and came with psychological costs such as lack of trust and harm to
one's sense of self and personal confidence.
Studies by Carter et al. found that 74% (173) of the
respondents who had encounters with perceived racial discrimination
reported lasting psychological effects and many of the symptoms
reported were consistent with trauma reactions. 79 Across all events and
for all racial groups, extreme emotional distress (36%) was the most
frequently reported emotional effect, followed by arousal or hyper-
vigilance (15%), lowered self-worth (9%), avoidance or withdrawal
(8%) and distrust (8%).80 In a follow-up investigation, Carter et al.
sought to determine whether individuals who experienced racially
hostile acts were more likely than individuals who experienced less
hostile discrimination to experience psychological injury.81 The results
indicate that the participants who experience racially hostile acts are
significantly more likely to report injurious lasting mental health
effects.82 Carter and Mazzula examined the mental health effects of
racial profiling and found that Blacks and Latinos had the most
frequent lasting psychological and emotional effects.83 Blacks reported
more avoidance symptoms and Latinos reported more arousal.84
The danger in (falsely) presuming that we are in a "post-racial
America" in the employment setting is that employers could,
unwittingly or even negligently, miss or diminish their employees'
concerns and complaints regarding racial harassment and
discrimination that are real and that can result in injury to the
employee. Racism in any setting, including the workplace is costly,
and not only to those who are the targets of it. The reasons for
addressing racism include respecting the dignity of all persons, and
78. Jennifer Lee, The Salience of Race in Everyday Life: Black Customers' Shopping
Experiences in Black and White Neighborhoods, 27 WORK & OCCUPATIONs 353, 361, 368
(2000).
79. Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11, at
43.
80. Carter, HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 463-64.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Robert T. Carter & Silvia L. Mazzula, The Menial Health Effects of Racial
Profiling, 6 L. ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE FORUM 11 (2006).
84. Id.
85. See supra n.7.
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affording them equal protection under the law. 86 But the interests in
combating workplace racism are broader. Beverly Tatum, in her book
Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?,7 asks
the provocative question: "[w]hy should Whites, who are advantaged
by racism want to end that system of advantage?"" Tatum cites a
Money magazine article called "Race and Money," which chronicled
the many ways the American economy was hindered by institutional
racism, including lost productivity, wasted talent, and fear of others
who are different. 89
Speaking to the costs of racism in our educational system,
Cecilia Fisher and her colleagues contended that Institutional and
interpersonal acts of racism via discrimination or harassment create
psychological distress for students, which negatively impact their
academic lives and their sense of self-worth.9U The harassing acts,
which seem far more perverse, are more troubling because they can
lead to psychological disengagement from academic achievement and
success.' Both racial discrimination and racial harassment have
serious psychological outcomes for youth being educated in
America.
Each year, a disturbing number of African Americans and other
employees of underrepresented groups - primarily racial and ethnic
minorities - report being injured emotionally and psychologically in
the workplace due to direct (both overt and subtle) acts of racial
harassment and/or a work environment that is hostile to them as
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
87. BEVERLY D. TATUM, WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER IN THE
CAFETERIA?: AND OTHER OBSERVATIONS ABOUT RACE 13 (1997) (emphasis in original).
88. Id. at 13.
89. Id. at 14. Tatum notes that, "[w]hether one looks at productivity lowered by racial
tensions in the workplace, or real estate equity lost through housing discrimination, or . .. the
warehousing human talent in prison, the economic costs of racism are real and measurable ...
As a psychologist, I often hear about the less easily measured costs. When I ask White men
and women how racism hurts them, they frequently talk about their fears of people of color,
the social incompetence they feel in racially mixed situations . . . and the interracial
friendships they had as children that were lost in adolescence . .. White people are paying a
significant price for the system of advantage. The cost is not as high for Whites as it is for
people of color, but the price is being paid." Id.
90. Celia B. Fisher et al., Discrimination Distress During Adolescence, 29 J. YOUTH &
ADOLESCENCE, 679 (2000).
91. Id. at 690.
92. Id. at 687, 690-93; Toni Schmader et al., Coping with Ethnic Stereotypes in the
Academic Domain: Perceived Injustice and Psychological Disengagement, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES
93, 94-96 (2001).
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minorities.93 Derald Wing Sue discusses the cumulative injurious
effects of "microaggressions" on members of racial minority groups in
his book of the same title.9 4 A notorious example in recent national
news is the case of Shirley Sherrod who, according to the New York
Times "became an instant celebrity . .. because of a speech she gave to
an N.A.A.C.P. convention in March [2010] in which she explained the
evolution of her attitudes on race. A conservative blogger triumphantly
circulated an edited clip in which Ms. Sherrod seemed to suggest that
she had declined to help a white farmer in need of aid. (She hadn't, to
which the farmer attested). From there, Ms. Sherrod was renounced by
a jittery N.A.A.C.P., exploited by right-wing commentators, and fired
and the unfired from her job, before at last receiving a conciliatory call
from the President of the United States." 95
A contrast can be drawn between the treatment of Shirley
Sherrod, an African American woman who was unjustifiably fired
from (and then reinstated in) her job with the federal government, and
the historical view of racial harassment law and the tort of "outrage,"
which served to protect white plaintiffs. Whereas Sherrod could be
justifiably outraged by her treatment in the work setting-which was
based on her race, i.e. her status in an under-represented class-the
"outrage" experienced by whites in the historical view of the tort often
stemmed merely from affronts by non-whites to the privilege they
enjoyed as members of the majority.96
93. See also DERALD W. SUE, MICROAGGRESSIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE: RACE, GENDER,
AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 128-32, 214-16 (2010) (describing the Psychological Cost of
Oppression (Microaggressions) to perpetrators; and ten Psychological Implications in the
workplace to those being oppressed, including: depression, sleep difficulties, and loss of
drive.).
94. Id.
95. Bai, supra note 2, at 7.
96. Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to
Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2115, 2121 (2007). Chamallas notes, "[i]n its early days,
the abuses of power addressed by the infliction tort did not encompass the power of white
racial privilege [or conferred dominance (as restated by Macintoch)]. The infliction tort
provided little protection against severe emotional distress inflicted by racist behavior, nor was
it used to recognize the extreme vulnerability of racial minorities to suffering at the hands of
whites. During this period, the protection against racial insult or race-based humiliation was
more likely to be afforded to white rather than minority plaintiffs." Id. at 2167-68. Particularly
pertinent to the thesis of this article, Chamallas notes that the pretext of privilege was actually
a mantle of white supremacy: "On issues of race, tort law tended to reinforce white supremacy
by providing white claimants damages for the 'outrage' of being treated with insufficient
deference by black attendants or for mistakenly being assigned to a 'colored' facility. Until the
injustice of racial hierarchy was challenged by the civil rights movement, few recognized that
discriminatory treatment of racial minorities might qualify as intolerable and outrageous
conduct and form the basis of a tort claim for emotional distress. Before civil rights, tort law
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Cases that involve incidents like the one in which Ms. Sherrod
was involved constitute more than just losing one's job or harm to
one's reputation, although those are certainly deleterious effects. Of
even greater concern, the research on the mental health impact of
racism has found that targets of racial discrimination and harassment
experience a range of negative effects as measured by a variety of
mental health outcome measures. Many of these studies show that
some people suffer psychological distress such as clinical depression,
anxiety disorders, PTSD, or some personality disorders as a result of
exposure to racism-related stress. 97 Despite the strong empirical
evidence indicating that racial minorities who report experiencing
racial discrimination or harassment find these encounters to be sources
of stress, and the evidence that this stress is related to psychological
harm in the form of anxiety, depression, lower self worth, and trauma,
the mental health impact of racial incidents is not specifically
considered in psychiatric assessment.98 Moreover, currently, there is a
lack of robust theory to draw from in seeking meaningful and timely
legal redress for racial discrimination, racial harassment, or racially
hostile work environments. 99
C. Workplace Harassment and Traumatic Injury-Implications for
Employers and Employees
Injuries suffered by employees who experience racial
harassment and discrimination may have physical as well as
psychological manifestations, particularly if they involve traumatic
stress or psychological impairment, which is referred to as "race-based
traumatic stress."100 This type of harassment, and the hostile
workplace environments in which it occurs, are the result of both
intentional and unintentional (including negligent) acts or omissions
on the part of fellow employees, and/or managers and supervisors.
was more engaged in vindicating wounded feelings of white racial pride than in compensating
for harms of racial subordination." Id. at 2168 (emphasis added).
97. Hugh F. Butts, The Black Mask of Humanity: Racial/Ethnic Discrimination and
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 336, 336-39 (2002); Gee,
supra note 41, at 1985.
98. See generally DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 345-
428 (4th ed. 2000).
99. DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 806-906 (3d. ed. 1992);
Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra note 12, at 87; Chew
& Kelley, supra note 14, at 109.
100. Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11, at
25; see also infra Section IV.
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These acts may also involve and implicate the employer of the
business or organization of the injured employee.
These injuries can occur even as those same
businesses/organizations may espouse "inclusive" work environments
that cite diversity as "part of our success," and "integrate diversity into
... business strategies and decisions."10' These statements could be
construed as implied contracts with the company's employees, and the
employer could arguably be liable if they failed to reasonably and
consistently deliver on them. Workplace environments that evidence
race-based discrimination and harassment and that produce race-
based traumatic stress or psychological impairment would seem, to
even the ordinary observer, to be antithetical to these public, published
corporate statements.102
Workplace harassment can have effects that far surpass
annoying employees of color or merely making them feel
uncomfortable. Real injury can result from such negative behavior,
whether from a peer or supervisor. The Supreme Court noted some of
these harms in Harris v. Forklift Systems.103 The injuries are
101. See e.g., Walmart's Corporate Statement on Diversity, WALMARTSTORES.COM,
http://walmartstores.com/Diversity/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) ("Diversity and Inclusion -
It's part of our success. Our commitment to Diversity and Inclusion helps us serve our
customers better. And, it helps us provide a positive work environment for our associates - 2.1
million worldwide"); Why 3M Invests in Diversity, 3M,
http://solutions.3m.comlwps/portal/3M/enUS/us-diversity/diversity/#M/3m-invests-
diversity/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) ("We are committed to providing an environment where
all employees thrive, and Human Resources policies, employee education and executive
leadership support this goal. 3M is continuously focusing on building and maintaining an
inclusive culture. An inclusive culture at 3M is built on our Human Resource Principles - to
respect the dignity and worth of individuals; encourage the initiative of each employee;
challenge individual capabilities; and provide equal opportunity."); AMERICAN RED CROSS,
DIVERSITY VIsIoN STATEMENT, available at http://www.redcross.org/www-
files/Documents/pdf/Diversity/DiversityMissionStatement.pdf ("The American Red Cross
empowers people in America to perform extraordinary acts in the face of emergencies and
disasters, [t]o ensure full benefit of this experience by all, we deliver our products and services
in a culturally sensitive and appropriate manner to all we serve. We fully embrace and
promote inclusion across our people, products and services, and we integrate diversity into our
business strategies and decisions.") [hereinafter Workplace Diversity Policies]. The authors
include these three statements as examples of corporate messages on diversity that could
constitute legally-binding commitments, with no implication that these particular
organizations condone or permit harassment of employees.
102. While this article does not address contract law as a means to redress for aggrieved
employees, a contract remedy could be advanced by an employee who experience harassment
in the workplace of an employer whose published statements in effect promise the opposite in
treatment by supervisors and fellow employees. Further, employees should expect that the
business or organization will consistently deliver on not only the spirit, but more importantly
the clearly-stated intent and specifics of these corporate pronouncements.
103. 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). "A discriminatory abusive work environment, even one that
does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can and often will detract from
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experienced by individuals directly, but also infect the workplace
environment for all.104 Racism and racist attitudes, while not as overt
as in decades preceding the Civil Rights Act,' 05 continue to manifest
themselves, albeit subtly. 06
There may be a perception among some that African
Americans use their status as historical victims to further their cause
for justice and respect in the workplace. This is the perspective shared
by Gerald Early in his opinion piece, "The End of Race as We Know
It," written the month before President Obama's election.'07 While it is
arguable that an attitude of victimization may be present in some
causes of action for racial harassment, the authors assert that in many
employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them
from advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects, the
very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work
environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin
offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality. The appalling conduct alleged in
Meritor, and the reference in that case to environments 'so heavily polluted with
discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers,' merely present some especially egregious examples of harassment. They do
not mark the boundary of what is actionable." Id. at 22 (internal citations omitted).
104. MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE,
GENDER, AND TORT LAW 82 (2010). Chamallas & Wriggins note that "[s]cholarship on the
distinctive harms produced by workplace harassment, using both subordination and
antistereotyping theories, has revealed the social dimension of harassment: it can effectively
devalue its target and reinforce that person's inferior status in the workplace . . . racial
minorities are subjected to bullying behavior that trades on symbols of slavery and
segregation. The ubiquity and the everyday nature of sexual, racial, and other forms of
workplace harassment may make it particularly hard for individuals to define and contest their
treatment, the more it is naturalized and seems indistinguishable from just the way things are."
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
105. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88-352) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 2011).
106. Kenneth B. Nunn, Diversity as a Dead-end, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 705, 729 (2008).
Nunn notes that, "Much social science research since the commencement of widespread
affirmative action policies in the 1960s suggests that racist attitudes persist and have in fact
simply been driven underground. John Dovidio, a Yale psychology professor and former
Colgate University researcher, has found that nearly half of all whites demonstrate what he
calls 'modern racism,' defined as a 'surface belief in racial equality that masks latent although
unconscious prejudicial feelings.' Dovidio's studies show that 'modem racists subconsciously
find ways to rationalize their biases on the basis of factors that seem on the surface to be
unrelated to race . . .' Dovidio is not alone in his assertions. Other researchers have identified
covert forms of racism using concepts such as subtle racism, aversive racism, modem racism,
and symbolic racism." Id. (internal citations omitted).
107. Gerald L. Early, The End of Race as We Know It, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, Oct. 10, 2008, at BI 1, B13. Early, a Professor of African and African-American
Studies, suggests that: "Black Americans have survived, persevered, and even thrived despite
the enormous obstacles thrown in our way. In a way, the black American narrative revealed
American hypocrisy but simultaneously reinscribed American greatness, for blacks were
heroic victims, and only in America could the heroism of the weak win a victory able to
humble a nation into recognition of its wrongs." Id.
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more cases, the harassment is not only real, but the resultant injuries
are demonstrable and can be supported by expert testimony in those
cases if they can hurdle motions for summary judgment and are
allowed to proceed on their merits.'08 Gerald Early posits that the
suggestion that United States culture has evolved to a "post-racial
state" actually exacerbates the problem of racial discrimination.' 09
The first step in addressing a problem, in this case the
continued existence of racism in various aspects of American life
including racial harassment in employment, is to recognize that a
problem does in fact exist. This article focuses on a particular aspect of
continuing racism - racial harassment and discrimination in the
workplace that result in employee injury, specifically race-based
traumatic stress (RBTS).11 0 Pat Chew and Robert Kelley note that:
Many in American society imagine that racial
discrimination and harassment are no longer prevalent
in the workplace ... A common assumption is that
blatant racist insults, such as using racial epithets or the
flaunting of nooses, no longer occur - and in the rare
instances in which they do, judges and juries certainly
would conclude that they are illegal . .. Despite these
societal beliefs that the workplace is not racist,
evidence to the contrary is mounting."'
108. See Carter & Forsyth, supra note 8, at 37; Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 77.
109. Girardeau A. Spannnotes that "by pretending not only that the phenomenon of race
is particularized rather than systematic, but that even particularized instances of discrimination
have now largely disappeared. In fact, the Supreme Court itself is one of the social institutions
that has historically been responsible for promoting systematic discrimination against racial
minorities. Moreover, the contemporary Court has continued that practice by incorporating
post-racial assumptions into its equality jurisprudence. Those post-racial assumptions do not
simply misidentify the nature of our discrimination problem, they deny that a problem even
exists."Girardeau A. Spann. Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1137 (2010); Ian F. Haney
Lopez (professor at the Boalt School of Law at the University of California at Berkeley)
asserts "[c]ontemporary colorblindness loudly proclaims its antiracist pretensions. To actually
move toward a racially egalitarian society, however, requires that we forthrightly respond to
racial inequality today. The alternative is the continuation of colorblind white dominance. As
Justice Harry Blackmun enjoined in defending affirmative action in Bakke: 'In order to get
beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way."' Ian F. Haney
Lopez, Colorblind to the Reality of Race in America, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION,
Nov. 3, 2006, at B9.
110. Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11, at
66.
111. Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 51.
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This problem is real, it is costly, and it warrants more attention from
employers, legal scholars, and the courts. 112
D. Race-Related Acts in the Workplace: Limited Paths to Redress
Race-related acts are recognized in the law as racial
discrimination that may take the form of disparate treatment, disparate
impact (group experiences) and hostile work environment."' The
analyses presented by Chew and Kelley and Carter and Forsyth show
that racial minorities who file race-related claims often do not prevail
(they lose about 80% of the time), and it is argued that the process of
pursuing legal or organizational complaints might add to the harm
experienced by targets of racism given the difficulties in pursuing
redress. 114
Patricia Chew and Robert Kelley, in their recent research on
the rulings of judges in racial harassment and racial discrimination
cases, describe a troubling pattern of disparate treatment of plaintiffs
in discrimination lawsuits. Their findings regarding these patterns are
based on the nature of the plaintiff's claim and the race and sex of the
respective judge, across both federal and state cases.' 15 Their research
results do not support the notion of a "post-racial America."' 16 Nor do
the observations of a law professor, speaking at the Third National
People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference at Seton Hall
University School of Law in September 2010:
The media are always talking about how we are in a
post-racial era and how discrimination has really
decreased, how it's really less of a problem and how
African-Americans and minorities are doing better than
ever because we have a Black president - so that kind
of takes care of the problem. . . Obviously, we don't
believe that. . . So we thought we should really analyze
112. See generally Chamallas & Wriggins, supra note 104; Carter, Recognizing and
Assessing Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11.
113. Bell, supra note 99, at 834-57 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973)).
114. See generally Chew & Kelley, supra note 14.
115. WILLIAM J. FORD, REPORT: ETHNICITY INFLUENCES JUDICIARY DECISION-MAKING
(Apr, 6, 2010), available at http://diverseeducation.com/article/136/3c3/report-judiciary-
decision-making-swayed-by-race-and-ethnicity.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
116. See generally Chew & Kelley, supra note 14; see also infra notes 119-121.
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all of the legal areas from the perspective of whether we
really are in a "post-racial" area.117
If one believes that he or she has been subjected to acts of
racism that are legally prohibited in various societal domains (work,
school, shopping, seeking housing, etc.), she or he may have to
navigate a complex set of dispute resolution processes prior to seeking
relief in the courts, depending upon where the incident occurs.118 If the
incident took place at work or school, and falls within the area of what
is called in the law disparate treatment racial discrimination, she or he
must learn about and use internal organizational grievance procedures.
Many organizations do not have explicit procedures for filing
such claims and complaints. For the most part, policies simply state
that discrimination is prohibited based on race and other protected
characteristics. Furthermore, in the majority of organizations,
procedures are not outlined, and the types of actions and behaviors that
constitute race-based bias are seldom defined. If the issue is not
resolved within the organization, litigation may be considered. If the
complaint is work related then the person must follow the procedures
established by the EEOC. In this instance, there are strict time limits
within which one must file a complaint (i.e., 180 days), after which the
EEOC notifies the employer, conducts an investigation and tries to
settle the issue.'1 9 If the issues are unresolved, litigation might be an
option (the EEOC issues a letter authorizing legal action) assuming
that the dispute has not exhausted or taxed the person's psycholo ical
and emotional resources or has not resulted in financial losses.' As
the process moves on through dispute resolution the number of legal
claims based on race declines.12 1
As claimants in work-related racial harassment cases move
from the EEOC process to the courts, the number of cases declines.122
Between 1980 and 1999, 56,000 racial harassment charges were filed
with the EEOC, but there were only 735 judicial opinions regarding
117. Angela P. Dodson, Rev. Jackson Debunks 'Post-racial' Idea at Minority Legal
Scholar Conference, DIVERSE (Sept. 13, 2010),
http://diverseeducation.com/article/14119c4/rev-jackson-debunks-post-racial-idea-at-
minority-legal-scholarconference.html.
118. Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 61-63.
119. See EEOC Process and Procedures, EEO 21 LLC, available at
http://www.eeo21.com/EEOC.html.
120. See EEOC Process and Procedures, EEO 21 LLC, available at
http://www.eeo21.com/EEOC.html.
121. Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 62 (intemal footnote omitted).
122. Chew & Kelley, supra note 15, at 62 (intemal citations omitted).
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racial harassment during the same period, which is estimated to be
about 1.3% of the possible EEOC charges.123 Though it is not possible
to know the specific reasons for the low number of judicial opinions in
relation to the EEOC charges, one might infer that the number is low
because of the legal and social obstacles associated with racial
harassment claims. It is possible that the low number of judicial
opinions could be a reflection of the fact that some cases were resolved
or settled, perhaps in the plaintiffs favor. Another possibility is that
some cases may have been dismissed by the EEOC or the courts. Be
that as it may, it is not possible to track every outcome since many are
not documented in public records.
Nevertheless, given the possible odds against prevailing, as
well as the stress of litigation in general, it seems that pursuit of the
avenues of redress might become another source of emotional and
psychological distress for non-dominant group members. This
inference can be made because racism as a stressor has been
documented in social science research on stress, discrimination and
race-related stress. 124 Research evidence shows that in addition to
blatant racist conduct, ambiguous, subtle, and perhaps unintended
experiences with racism can produce stress, and that stress, when
coping fails, can produce trauma.1 25
There is limited scholarship and jurisprudence regarding the
definitions and legal understanding of race-based incidents. Empirical
and legal scholars and social science researchers have focused more on
sexual discrimination and harassment. As a consequence, what is
understood to be "harassment" is still not clear because legally defined
race-based harassment is often not differentiated from racial
discrimination. Thus, the causes, characteristics, and consequences of
the two (racial discrimination and racial harassment) are
confounded.12 6 Racial harassment is also often confused with sexual
harassment and other types of acts of hostility, such as hate crimes.
123. Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 63 (internal citations omitted).
124. Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11, at
14; David R. Williams et al., Racial/Ethnic Discrimination and Health: Findings from
Community Studies, 93AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 200, 202 (2003); see generally Williams &
Williams-Morris, supra note 25; Max Guyll et al., Discrimination and Unfair Treatment:
Relationship to Cardiovascular Reactivity Among African American and European American
Women, 20 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 315 (2001).
125. Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race Based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11, at
37.
126. Carter, Recognizing and Assessing Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11, at
5; Carter & Mazzula, supra note 83.
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Moreover, there is considerable confusion regarding the
various forms and types of acts that constitute race-based harassment
because race-based acts can be blatant, overt, subtle, and indirect.
Considerable academic discourse exists on the varied ways to
conceptualize sexual harassment and sexual harassment jurisprudence,
yet not one major legal article exists to conceptualize racial
harassment (or the effects of racism) as a unique social phenomenon
and harm deserving its own jurisprudential framework.1 7 One might
argue that it would be useful to use what is known about sexual
harassment and discrimination to build an understanding of racism,
racial harassment, and race-related issues. Yet to do so would divert
our attention from the inquiry into whether a novel legal or social
perspective on racial harassment and racism, that is not linked in any
way to sexual harassment, is necessary. Although some parallels exist,
other issues seem more apropos to one or the other form of
harassment. Despite the important and impressive work on sexual
harassment laws, that jurisprudence cannot substitute for work on
racial harassment laws.
David Glenn, in his opinion piece,129 raises a number of serious
questions about how bias research may be applied in legal decision-
making, including by judges.' 30 Similarly, the a plication of Fair
Employment Law, including § 1981 and Title VII, 3 and its impacts
on and implications for persons (employees), has been less than fair.132
Bell's interpretation of how these laws actually apply (or do not apply)
to protect employees of color is cause for concern about their
efficacy. 3 Bell's view lends credence to our proposal for a new
127. See generally Carter, Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11; but see
Chamallas, supra note 98, and Chamallas & Wriggins, supra note 104, for more recent
commentary on this issue.
128. Carter, Race-based Traumatic Stress, supra note 11, at 37.
129. David Glenn, Our Hidden Prejudices, on Trial, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, Apr. 25, 2008, at B12, B14.
130. Id. In the employment area specifically, Glenn notes that "...implicit-bias research
[has been cited to] argue that federal employment-discrimination laws should not require
plaintiffs to demonstrate that managers have a conscious animus or conscious intent to
discriminate. Instead, Krieger and Fisk have argued, the law should use a simple 'causation'
standard that looks at patterns of differential hiring and promotion. If women appear
statistically less likely to be promoted within an accounting firm, for example, they would be
able to bring forward an argument that implicit biases might have shaped the personnel
evaluations they received from their superiors. They would not need to cite a 'smoking gun'
comment that revealed their bosses' conscious sexist bias." Id. at B14.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et. seq. (2011); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (2011).
132. See Bell, supra note 99.
133. Id at 834. Bell notes that "In the [Supreme] Court's view, § 1981's major thrust is
banning the use of race as a consideration in employment, rather than ensuring that blacks
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approach to achieving redress for racial discrimination and harassment
in the workplace; one that includes but goes beyond reliance on federal
anti-discrimination statutes alone. Similarly, in "How to Read a
Noose,"l 34  Troy Duster, the past president of the American
Sociological Association, notes that employment-related racism,
which can manifest as challenges to "affirmative action," stems from
the fear and rage that white men and women experience as their lives
are being disrupted by unemployment and outsourcing.135
Rina Wang, in a working paper on jury bias, advocates that
"juries should receive special instructions about implicit bias, and that
"[o]nce jurors are aware of the common and insidious nature of
implicit bias, they may exert conscious control to actively override the
unconscious operation of implicit bias." 36 Such instructions may work
to counteract racial bias as identified by Wendy Parker in her research
involving 102 jury trials in cases of racial discrimination. Parker found
strong evidence that shows that these trials were not race-neutral, and
achieve equality in the job market. For the many blacks who are unemployed or underpaid, the
equal treatment strategy of fair employment laws such as Title VII and § 1981 provides only
faint hope for achieving their ultimate goal - fair employment." Id.
134. Troy Duster, How to Read a Noose, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Nov. 9,
2007, at 69. The title refers to several instances of nooses that had been hung at various
universities, workplaces, and other settings in 2006-07, including those in Jena, La. that
received national media attention.
135. Id. "In 21 st-century America," Duster states, "where jobs are being outsourced and
the manufacturing sector is in decline, and where 12 million to 15 million immigrants have
moved into the labor force, white people frequently feel threatened by competition with
African-Americans and Latinos. Many white men and women have a simmering rage over
large, economic changes disrupting their lives, but they often explain what is happening to
them as the result of affirmative-action hiring and preferential admissions policies. Indeed,
white people have continuously and overwhelmingly opposed affirmative action from the first
opinion polling on the topic in the late 1960s. Whether from the National Opinion Research
Council, Gallup, or Newsweek, every national poll has shown white opposition to be about
two-thirds across the nation - and even higher in the south." Duster goes on to note that "In
June [2007] the [then] recently appointed chief justice of the United States, John Roberts,
presented a decision much more far-reaching than any symbolic noose. 'The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race.. .is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,' [saying this
to] justify his deciding vote in a 5-4 decision to revoke a plan to increase racial integration of
the heavily segregated Louisville, Ky. School system. Dissenting from this reasoning, Justice
Stephen Breyer discussed the tragic irony of Roberts's use of the language of colorblindness to
overrule any practices or policies that limit the historic privilege of whites. Without using a
noose, the Supreme Court's defenders of white privilege successfully appropriated rhetoric
from the civil-rights movement, morphing the symbolic language to effectively sustain the old
racial order." Id. (alterations added).
136. Rina Wang, Using Jury Instructions to Correct Implicit Racial Bias (Sept. 18,
2010), available at http:\\ssm.com\abstract= 1679130.
26 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 12:1
neither were the juries involved.'37 Indeed, not only juries of one's
peers, but the Supreme Court itself may have adopted the view that we
are in a post-racial America in its recent decisions, arguably ignoring
its own history in sacrificing the interests of racial minorities to those
who would engage in "post-racial discrimination:"
The Supreme Court has always been complicit in the
practice of sacrificing racial minority interests for the
benefit of the white majority. In its more infamous
historical decisions, such as Dred Scott, Plessy, and
Korematsu, the Court's racial biases have been
relatively transparent . .. More recently, the Court has
invoked three tacit post-racial assumptions to justify
the contemporary sacrifice of minority interests in the
name of promoting equality for whites. First, current
racial minorities are no longer the victims of significant
discrimination. Second, as a result, race-conscious
efforts to benefit racial minorities at the expense of
whites constitute a form of reverse discrimination
against whites that must be prevented in the name of
racial equality. Third, because the post-racial playing
field is now level, any disadvantages that racial
minorities continue to suffer must be caused by their
own shortcomings rather than the lingering effects of
now-dissipated past discrimination. I consider actions
that are rooted in these assumptions, and that adversely
affect the interests of racial minorities in order to
advance the interests of whites, to constitute a form of
discrimination that I refer to as "post-racial
discrimination." 39
Given the perspective of so many Americans, particularly
white Americans, it is not surprising that discrimination and racism, as
well as disparate treatment and even harassment, continue to be
137. See Wendy Parker, Juries, Race, and Gender: A Story of Today's Inequality, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 209, 211 (2011) (noting that African Americans and Latinos claiming
race discrimination have the lowest jury win rates.) (internal footnote omitted).
138. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
139. Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L. J. 1133, 1134-35 (2010); but cf
Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 621, 625 (2011).
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disturbingly and stubbornly prevalent in the United States and its
workplaces. 4 0
While not always based on the victim's race or gender, another
type of harassment, "workplace bullying," has received more attention
in scholarship and in state-level legislative efforts.141 While bullying
has consequences for the bully's victim (e.g. stress disorder, increased
risk of heart disease, and even suicide), secondary victims (e.g. those
witnessing bullying at work) are also at risk, reporting "increased
levels of 'destabilizing forces at work, excessive workloads, role
ambiguity and work relationship conflict."' 1 42 David Yamada's
research further shows that "[w]orkplace bullying can have serious,
even devastating, effects on targeted individuals. Psychological effects
include stress, depression, mood swings, loss of sleep (and resulting
fatigue) . . . [M]ore severe effects can include Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, which if left untreated, may cause an individual to react
violently against either the bully or anyone else who happens to be in
the vicinity." 4 3 The health and safety - and liability - implications for
both employee and employer are obvious.
The shared responsibility framework advocated in this article
is consistent with the work of Chew and Kelley, Carter, and others,144
although it focuses specifically on employees who have been
emotionally and psychologically injured - traumatized - by workplace
harassment. The type of injury addressed by this approach goes well
beyond "being offended" or "being treated rudely" by supervisors or
140. See Greene, supra note 9, at 4 (noting that 2010 produced a record number of
complaints of workplace discrimination to the EEOC).
141. See e.g. Gary Namie & Ruth Namie, Workplace Bullying: How to Address
America's Silent Epidemic, 8 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 315 (2004) ("Workplace bullying is
repeated interpersonal mistreatment that is sufficiently severe as to harm a targeted person's
health or economic status. Further it is driven by the perpetrator's need to control others while
undermining legitimate business interests. Bullying keeps work from getting done."); see also
Michael Chaplin, Workplace Bullying: The Problem and the Cure, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 437,
439-40 (2010) (noting that "[t]he Workplace Bullying Institute, in cooperation with Zogby
International, released a comprehensive survey measuring the prevalence of workplace
bullying in the United States . . . [and that] [t]hirty-seven percent of American workers,
approximately 54,000,000 workers have been bullied at work, and forty-nine percent of
workers have been affected by workplace bullying, either through direct contact with the bully
or by witnessing one or more bullying acts") (internal citations omitted) (alterations added).
142. Chaplin, supra note 141, at 440 (citing Pamela Lutgen-Sandvik et al., Burned by
Bullying in the American Workplace: Prevalence, Perception, Degree and Impact, 44 J.
MGMT. STUD. 835, 845 (2007)) (internal citations omitted).
143. David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying" and the Need for
Status-blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L. J. 475, 483 (2000) (citing Gary
Namie &Ruth Namie, BULLYPROOF YOURSELF AT WORK 69 (1999) [hereinafter Yamada,
Phenomenon]; Harvey A. Hornstein, BRUTAL BOSSES AND THEIR PREY 74 (1996)).
144. Carter, supra note 11; Chew & Kelley, supra note 14.
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fellow employees. The shared responsibility approach, a basic
framework for many aspects of employer-employee relations, is
designed primarily to benefit those employees who have experienced
psychological impairment or race-based traumatic stress. And while
the approach outlined in this article is not focused on statutory
remedies, it is also consistent with that of Chaplin, David Yamada, and
the Workplace Bullying Institute, who have proposed model state
legislation that is narrowly crafted to serve specific, serious incidents
of bullying.145
This Article seeks to advance the argument for applying tort
law to cases involving employees from underrepresented groups who
are subject to harassment in the workplace, building on the work of
Martha Chamallas and Reina Austin who also advocate that tort law
be applied to such cases. An early argument for revising tort law to
address harassment on a more universal basis was proposed by Austin
in her 1988 article, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort
of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.147 The article was
prescient in identifying multidimensional harassment as a major
problem that tort law should target. 148 The comprehensive approach to
workplace racial harassment proposed in this article includes more
than a simple recommendation to permit lawsuits in tort and broader
application of tort remedies; the principles and logic of tort law (e.g.
duty, injury, causation, affirmative defenses) can inform the policy
aspects of this proposal as well.149
145. See David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying and American Employment Law: A Ten-
year Progress Report and Assessment, 32 CoMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 251, 280-84 (2010)
(proposing The Healthy Workplace Bill).
146. Chamallas, supra note 96, at 2170. Chamallas notes that Regina Austin "described
how the law imposed few penalties on supervisors who routinely intimidated and ridiculed
workers under their control, provided only that they refrained from doing so in transparently
racial or sexual terms. She maintained that because class oppression was not included among
Title VII's prohibited bases, supervisory '[m]istreatment that would never be tolerated if it
were undertaken openly in the name of white supremacy or male patriarchy is readily justified
by the privilege of status, class, or color of collar."' Id. (alteration in original).
147. 41 STAN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1988).
148. Id. at 4. Austin was mainly concerned with abuse suffered by low-income workers
that disproportionately affected racial and ethnic minorities. Id. at 3.
149. See infra Section VI.
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II. CURRENT APPROACHES AND REMEDIES FOR RACE-BASED
TRAUMATIC STRESS, AND THEIR DEFICITS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. The EEOC's Capacity Challenges
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) is the federal agency at the forefront of ensuring that
allegations of workplace discrimination and harassment are fully and
fairly addressed. The agency has diminished over the past decade in its
capacity to address racial discrimination and harassment, as well as the
variety of other complaints it is charged to review. According to its
annual report issued in November 2010, "EEOC staffing levels fell
25% during the Bush administration to a near-historic low of 2,176
employees in 2008. At the same time, the workload has steadily
increased. In fiscal year 2010, the agency received 99,922 charges of
alleged workplace discrimination, a record high."150 While the agency
has been adding employees more recently, it has not returned to its
previous level of lawyers and staff.'51
B. Racial Harassment not Adequately Addressed by Sexual
Harassment Remedies
A significant challenge in advancing claims for racial
harassment is that they are often viewed through the lens of sexual
harassment law, particularly complaints and resultant lawsuits under
Title VII - even though Title VII was enacted to rectify racial
discrimination. The last-minute inclusion of gender discrimination
was reported as a desperate attempt to defeat the proposed
legislation.152 According to Patricia Chew, the lack of a distinctive
150. Greene, supra note 9, at 4.
151. Id; see also EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, FY 2009 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, 6 (2009), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2009par.pdf ("Fiscal Year 2009 was a time for the
EEOC to regroup and rebuild. During the previous eight years of flat funding and hiring
freezes, the Commission's staff had declined by nearly 25 percent. This severely hindered its
ability to carry out its critical enforcement functions. However, this past year, as a result of
increased appropriations, the EEOC was able to begin replenishing its depleted ranks. During
FY 2009, the agency set out to hire an additional 125 investigators, 22 trial attorneys, 50
support staff, 10 paralegals and five expert statisticians and labor economists to support the
agency's systemic enforcement and litigation programs. By the end of FY 2009, the
Commission had brought on board 155 net new hires.").
152. See Pat K. Chew, Freeing Racial Harassment from the Sexual Harassment Model,
85 OR. L. REv. 615, 616 (2006) (emphasis added). Pat Chew also notes that "[a]n extensive
and impressive array of other scholars continued to develop the legal and public policy issues
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jurisprudential model for racial harassment has not prompted jurists or
others to propose one. 153 Instead, judges simply apply the legal
principles developed in the context of sexual harassment to complaints
of racial harassment. It appears as though judges view the
jurisprudential model for workplace harassment as monolithic, and
that the monolithic model should be the one designed for sexual
harassment.154 Chew goes on to speculate on why there is a disparity
in the success rates of sexual harassment versus racial harassment
cases, and concludes with the assertion that "[t]he reality is that
individuals of different races perceive discrimination and harassment
differently, and there is no reason to think that judges would be any
different." 55
Legal remedies have been available for decades to women and
men who have been harassed, or subject to hostile environments based
on their sex, particularly followin the landmark Supreme Court ruling
in Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson. 6 The law in this area, while still
being refined, is soundly established, and has been accepted, if not
embraced, as an industry standard by all but the most ill-informed or
rogue businesses and organizations.157  Effective remedies for
employees suffering from racism, racial harassment, or race-based
traumatic stress and related injuries, on the other hand, have been
conspicuously limited or have proven to be ineffective when actually
sought and tested in the legal system.'ss
of sexual harassment, thus further establishing sexual harassment as the paradigm for
harassment in the workplace," and that "a line of important Supreme Court cases began
drawing the jurisprudential principles for harassment law in the context of sexual harassment
disputes, beginning with Meritor [Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)] and
continuing with the Harris [Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)], Oncale [Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)], Ellerth [Burlington Indus., Inc., v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)]; and Faragher [Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
(1998)] cases." Id. at 617 (alterations and emphasis added).
153. Id. at 618
154. Id.
155. Id. at 633 (footnote omitted). Indeed, in research of her own reported in 2006, Pat
Chew (and her co-author Robert Kelley) provide extensive data that suggest a clear overall
bias in the [federal] judicial system against plaintiffs, particularly male members of racial
minorities, bringing causes of action for racial harassment; see Chew & Kelley, supra note 14,
at 65.
156. 477 U.S. 57, 70-73 (1986).
157. The authors recognize that while the successful application of Civil Rights laws,
most notably Title VII, to workplace sexual harassment cases has been well-documented; the
application of other areas of law including tort law principles and the tort of emotional
distress, to cases involving either sexual harassment or racial harassment has been met with
skepticism by the courts and has rarely been successful.
158. See infra Section IV(A)(2).
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A review of recent state and federal claims based on injuries
resulting from racial discrimination or racial harassment reveals that
employees - with the exception in rare instances of those injured by
overt, repeated and egregious racist/hostile acts in the workplace -
have had little success in receiving redress or compensation for their
injuries.'59 With disturbingly few exceptions, plaintiffs in cases
involving alleged injuries from racism, particularly workplace racial
harassment,160 have had little success in progressing ast the summary
judgment or pre-trial motion to dismiss stages.' Indeed, in an
extensive study of racial and sexual harassment cases discussed by
Patricia Chew, the plaintiffs' success rate in racial harassment cases
was less than half that of plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases (21.5%
versus 48.2% success rate, respectively). 162 In racial harassment cases,
significant gender differences were not reported in plaintiffs' success
rates; all plaintiffs, regardless of their gender, lost in approximately
80% of cases.163
Even lawyers and law firms are not free from racial harassment
in the workplace. In discussing a study of African American attorneys'
perceptions of racial harassment in their firms, Chew cites the data
compiled by the study's author, Aravinda Nadimpalli Reeves, which
revealed that African American attorneys are subject to racial
harassment in their organizations more frequently than they would like
to admit.' 64
C. EEOC Developments and Recent Cases
There is evidence that the federal government is taking the
reality of racial harassment seriously and achieving meaningful results
159. Chew, supra note 152, at 629.
160. This includes repeated but more subtle forms of racism often referred to as "micro-
aggressions" or sporadic acts of racism,
161. Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 98-99.
162. See Chew, supra note 152, at 629.
163. Id. at 630.
164. Id. at 637 ("Respondents reported that their experiences are 'a rare incident on the
racial radar screen,' but their interviews in the aggregate reveal a prevalence of racialized
comments. As other social scientists have found, there appears to be a tendency for minorities
to downplay racial incidents in their workplace.") (internal citations omitted); see also Austin,
supra note 147, at 1-2 ("It is generally assumed that employers and employees alike agree that
some amount of [abuse] is perfectly natural, necessary, and defensible prerogative of superior
rank. It assures obedience to command . .. [T]here is little reason for workers to take undue
umbrage at the treatment they receive at work." And noting with a tone of sarcasm that "[t]he
pain, insults, and indignities they suffer at the hands of employers and supervisors should be
met with acquiescence and endurance. That's life.").
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in cases it has pursued. In February 2010, the EEOC sued Pinnacle
Amusements for racial harassment. 65 The case involved charges of a
violation of federal law by Pinnacle for allegedly subjecting black
employees to a racially hostile work environment. According to the
EEOC complaint, African American employees were repeatedly
subjected to derogatory racial comments, slurs including the N-word,
and "jokes;" including by the company owner.1 66 The plaintiffs
complaints were ignored or dismissed, and the harassment
continued.167 In announcing this lawsuit, David Lopez, General
Counsel of the EEOC, stated that "[n]o one should have to endure
degrading racial harassment in order to earn a living .. . The EEOC is
committed to ensuring that all employees have the opportunity to put
in an honest day's work free from discrimination." 6 8 Also in February
2010, a settlement was reached in a racial harassment suit against Big
Lots, Inc.169 The agency alleged that Big Lots violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it subjected a black maintenance
mechanic and other black employees to race harassment and
discrimination at its Rancho Cucamonga, Calif., distribution center. 170
Specifically, the EEOC alleged that an immediate supervisor and co-
workers, all Hispanic, made racially derogatory jokes, comments, slurs
and epithets, including the use of the words "n-r" and
"monkey."171 Despite learning of the harassment, the company took no
steps to prevent or correct it.172 "Working in a job that they valued
highly, the employees in this case rightfully expected to earn a living
free of discrimination," said Anna Park, regional attorney of the
EEOC's Los Angeles District Office. "They should not have had to
endure harassment or discrimination based on their race. The EEOC
165. Press Release, Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Sues Pinnacle




168. Press Release, Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, $10 Million Consent Decree
Ends Racial Harassment Case against YRC/Roadway Express (Sept. 15, 2010), available at
http://wwwl.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/release/9-15-10b.cfm?renderforprint-1. In comments
cited in the press release, the EEOC's General Counsel also noted several significant cases
that the agency had resolved recently, including suits against home appliance manufacturer
Whirlpool ($1 million), and national grocery chain Albertson's ($8.9 million). Id.
169. Press Release, Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Big Lots to Pay $400,000 for
Race Harassment (Feb. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-16-10.cfm ("The EEOC originally filed suit
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will continue to take all steps necessary to ensure that employees at all
workplaces are respected and free from harassment, discrimination and
retaliation." 73 As such, it appears that the EEOC is beginning to take
racial harassment more seriously.
Aggrieved employees pay the greater price for racial
harassment in the employment setting, nonetheless, employers would
also benefit from a clearer understanding of the costs of workplace
harassment, 174 as well as the benefits of policies and practices to
prevent such behavior among their employees, particularly their
supervisors.175
III. EMPLOYMENT LAW: WORKPLACE HARASSMENT AND
DISCRIMINATION LAW
A. Overview
Harassment in the workplace, whether based on race or sex,
constitutes employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Actl76 and other federal law.177 Harassment is defined with
173. Id.
174. See INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, WORLD BANK GROUP, NON-
DISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 14 (2006), available at
http://www.ife.org/ifcextlenviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pNonDiscrimination/$FILE/NonDis
crimination.pdf. (outlining five specific and serious problems that organizations could face if
bullying and harassment are unchecked or badly handled: "poor morale and poor employee
relations; loss of respect for managers and supervisors, absenteeism and resignations, damage
to company reputation, and court cases and awards of damages").
175. Harassment, EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/harassment.cfm ("Employers are encouraged [by the
EEOC] to take appropriate steps to prevent and correct unlawful harassment. They should
clearly communicate to employees that unwelcome harassing conduct will not be tolerated.
They can do this by establishing an effective complaint or grievance process, providing anti-
harassment training to their managers and employees, and taking immediate and appropriate
action when an employee complains. Employers should strive to create an environment in
which employees feel free to raise concerns and are confident that those concerns will be
addressed.")(alteration added).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2011).
177. Harassment, supra note 175 ("Harassment is a form of employment discrimination
that violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, (ADA)"); see also
Informal Letter from Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n to undisclosed recipient regarding
EEOC's Harassment Policy (Sept. 26, 2003), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2003/harassmentpolicy.html ("The policy defines
'harassment' as 'verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion
toward an individual, and that has the purpose or effect . . .' We note that unlawful harassment
does not necessarily denigrate or show hostility toward the target. For instance, sexual
harassment could consist of repeated, unwelcome requests for a date. Therefore, we
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great specificity in federal law, in terms of the conduct itself as well as
its severity and pervasiveness. 17 8 While an employer may take action
based on company policy against employees who make an isolated
comment about a fellow employee based on their race, to pursue legal
action for racial discrimination or harassment, the aggrieved employee
will need to meet a higher standard. 179 The conduct required to rise to
the level of harassment is specified by The United States Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC). 80
The federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have
provided extensive interpretation of these civil rights laws, as related
to sexual and racial harassment, for nearly three decades. Even as
the federal courts have adjudicated an estimated 1,250 cases of racial
harassment during that time - many of which were also reviewed by
the EEOC - the EEOC still recognizes prevention as "the best tool to
eliminate racial harassment in the workplace."l 82  The EEOC
recommend that harassment be defined more broadly as 'verbal or physical conduct based on
race, color, sex, national origin, religion, age, disability, or retaliation, and that has the purpose
or effect . . ."').
178. Harassment, supra note 175 ("Harassment is unwelcome conduct that is based on
race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or
genetic information. Harassment becomes unlawful where 1) enduring the offensive conduct
becomes a condition of continued employment, or 2) the conduct is severe or pervasive
enough to create a work environment that a reasonable person would consider intimidating,
hostile, or abusive. Anti-discrimination laws also prohibit harassment against individuals in
retaliation for filing a discrimination charge, testifying, or participating in any way in an
investigation, proceeding, or lawsuit under these laws; or opposing employment practices that
they reasonably believe discriminate against individuals, in violation of these laws.").
179. Id. ("Petty slights, annoyances, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will
not rise to the level of illegality. To be unlawful, the conduct must create a work environment
that would be intimidating, hostile, or offensive to reasonable people.").
180. Id. ("Offensive conduct may include, but is not limited to, offensive jokes, slurs,
epithets or name calling, physical assaults or threats, intimidation, ridicule or mockery, insults
or put-downs, offensive objects or pictures, and interference with work performance.
Harassment can occur in a variety of circumstances, including, but not limited to, the
following: The harasser can be the victim's supervisor, a supervisor in another area, an agent
of the employer, a co-worker, or a non-employee; the victim does not have to be the person
harassed, but can be anyone affected by the offensive conduct; unlawful harassment may
occur without economic injury to, or discharge of, the victim.").
181. Burlington Indus., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986); Rogers v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, 454, F.2d 254 (5th Cir.
1971), cert denied 406 U.S. 957 (1972). Rogers and its impact on subsequent racial
harassment law are discussed at length by Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 55-56.
182. Harassment, supra note 175 ("Employers are encouraged [by the EEOC] to take
appropriate steps to prevent and correct unlawful harassment. They should clearly
communicate to employees that unwelcome harassing conduct will not be tolerated.")
(alteration added). Indeed, the "shared responsibility" approach advocated in this article is
fully consistent with the EEOC's advice to employees. Id.
ADDRESSING WORKPLACE RACISM
encourages employees to report harassment. Supervisors and
employers can be held liable for harassment, as can non-supervisory
employees and non-employees in circumstances within their control or
knowledge taking into account the entire set of circumstances and
record of the alleged harassment.18 4
Employers can violate Title VII in a number of ways, including
deviating from their personnel policies in ways that result in
discrimination, as well as through engaging in, or allowing employees
to engage in, racial harassment. Specifically, according to the EEOC,
"[a]n employer's deviation from an applicable personnel policy, or a
past practice, can support an inference of a discriminatory motive.
Conversely, acting in conformance with a consistently applied
nondiscriminatory policy or practice would suggest there is no such
motive."1
Harassment on the basis of race and/or color violates Title VII.
Ethnic slurs, racial "jokes," offensive or derogatory comments, or
other verbal or physical conduct based on an individual's race/color
constitutes unlawful harassment if the conduct creates an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment, or interferes with the
individual's work performance.' 86
The table below outlines the major areas of law from which an
employee-plaintiff may draw to state a cause of action in either federal
or state courts (or both). Common means to seeking redress for
plaintiffs include the federal laws as well as State anti-discrimination
183. Id. ("Employees are encouraged to inform the harasser directly that the conduct is
unwelcome and must stop. Employees should also report harassment to management at an
early stage to prevent its escalation.")
184. Id. ("The employer is automatically liable for harassment by a supervisor that
results in a negative employment action such as termination, failure to promote or hire, and
loss of wages. If the supervisor's harassment results in a hostile work environment, the
employer can avoid liability only if it can prove that: 1) it reasonably tried to prevent and
promptly correct the harassing behavior; and 2) the employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer . . . The
employer will be liable for harassment by non-supervisory employees or non-employees over
whom it has control (e.g., independent contractors or customers on the premises), if it knew, or
should have known about the harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate corrective
action . . . When investigating allegations of harassment, the EEOC looks at the entire record:
including the nature of the conduct, and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. A
determination of whether harassment is severe or pervasive enough to be illegal is made on a
case-by-case basis.").
185. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (2006), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html; See also Workplace Diversity Policies,
supra note 93.
186. See Facts About Race/Color Discrimination, EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-race.cfm.(last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
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laws; these are shown in Table 1. While tort and contract law are also
possible options for legal redress, these have either not been often
attempted and/or have been even less effective than claims pursued
under federal anti-discrimination laws.' 87
TABLE 1
FEDERAL LAW STATE LAW PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Proper order for filing
Title VII State anti-discrimination laws claims should be
determined:
42 U.S.C. § 1981 Worker's Compensation laws [intemal/company policy,
dministrative
42 U.S.C. §1983 Tort Law (lIED, NIED) state/federal, agencies;
lawsuit]
Contract Law (express,
implied) Preemption: check to see if




filed in state court.
On the broader issue of workplace bullying, which could
include race-based harassment, Jordan Kaplan explained that there is
not yet a "workplace bullying tort" in the United States,'88 and all
thirteen states which have considered a Healthy Workplace Bill
designed to punish workplace bullies and the employers who tolerate
or encourage them, have failed in their attempts to pass such
legislation.' Kaplan noted, however, that "[d]espite the lack of a
workplace bullying tort in the United States, the Indiana Supreme
Court recently allowed testimony on workplace bullying in Raess v.
Doescher;" specifically suggesting in dicta that bullying could be part
of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 90
The paucity of viable paths of redress for workplace bullying pointed
out by Kaplan mirrors the limited paths for targets of racial harassment
187. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 79.
188. Jordan F. Kaplan, Comment: Help is on the Way: A Recent Case Sheds Light on
Workplace Bullying, 47 Hous. L. REV. 141, 143 (2010).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 143-44; see also Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E. 2d 790, 796-97 (Ind. 2008).
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who may experience psychological and emotional injury such as race-
based traumatic stress in the workplace.' 9 1
B. Federal Law: Title VII, Section 1981 and Section 1983
1. The Law and Its Application to Racial Harassment and
Discrimination Claims
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees in hiring, compensation and
terms of employment, 2 and provides that employers shall not "limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."l193 Title VII covers all private employers, state and
local governments, and education institutions that employ 15 or more
individuals. These laws also cover private and public employment
agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor management committees
controlling apprenticeship and training.' 94
Title VII does not preempt state law,195 which allows
employees who believe they have been discriminated against (or
harassed) because of their race to pursue claims in tort. Although tort
(i.e., injury) claims for alleged employment discrimination are not the
norm, they have been pursued, albeit with very limited results.' 96
191. The authors of this article recognize the difficulty in employee-plaintiffs bringing a
cause of action for workplace bullying, and note in Section IV that the victims of race-based
traumatic stress have had similarly dismal results in pursuing claims of IIED, as well as
limited success in advancing Title VII claims past the summary judgment stage.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
193. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1).
194. See Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Federal Laws Prohibiting Job
Discrimination Questions and Answers, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html.
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7. ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or
relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or
future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment
practice under this subchapter.").
196. See generally Cheeseman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 08-4814, 2009 WL
1351676 (D. N.J. May 13, 2009); See also Bradshaw v. School Bd. of Broward Cnty., 483
F.3d 1205, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 2007). ("Bradshaw also invokes the Title VII anti-preemption
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 [quoted supra note 153][.] Bradshaw claims that by holding
that Fla. Stat. § 768.28(5) limits her Florida CRA award to nothing in light of the $300,000
Title VII award, we would deem Title VII to relieve the School Board of liability under the
Florida CRA. (She could alternatively argue that Florida itself has "deemed" Title VII to
relieve it of liability by adopting § 768.28(5)). The argument continues: because Title VII may
not, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7, be deemed to provide such relief, we must invalidate the
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Some cases involving egregious harassment have managed to get past
the summary judgment stage.' 9 7 The path to redress for the potential
plaintiff can be complex and even risky, given the labyrinth of choices
to be faced in terms of venue and choice of claim.1 98
Plaintiffs claiming a hostile work environment must file a
charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred. The Supreme Court in Nat'1 R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morganl99 was asked to consider whether and
under what circumstances a Title VII plaintiff may file suit on events
that fall outside the statutory period.200 The Court held that:
[T]he statute precludes recovery for discrete acts of
discrimination or retaliation that occur outside the
statutory time period [and the court also held that]
consideration of the entire scope of a hostile work
environment claim, including behavior alleged outside
the statutory time period, is permissible for the
purposes of assessing liability, so long as any act
contributing to that hostile environment takes place
within the statutory time period. The application of
equitable doctrines, however, may either limit or toll
Florida sovereign immunity provisions that have the effect of reducing the potential Florida
CRA recovery by the amount of the parallel Title VII recovery in this case. The argument is
clever but wrong, because our conclusion does not require us to interpret Title VII at all. Like
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4, section 2000e-7 is an anti-preemption provision that allows states
latitude in the design of their own antidiscrimination law. See Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987) (describing §2000e-7 as 'indicat[ing] that state laws will be
pre-empted only if they actually conflict with federal law'); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 101 (1983) (describing § 2000e-7 as 'expressly preserv[ing] nonconflicting state
laws'); Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 335 F.3d 864, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2003); Coal. for Econ.
Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 710 (9th Cir. 1997); Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co. of Md., 595 F.2d 711, 723 n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Title VII will not be 'deemed' (that is,
construed) to prevent states from imposing liability in any way they see fit, so long as the
states do not interfere with Title VII by requiring or permitting acts that Title VII would
forbid. In the present case, Florida does not want to impose liability for compensatory
damages beyond Title VII's cap. We therefore do not deem Title VII to limit Bradshaw's state
law recovery; the relevant state law itself limits the recovery. Bradshaw's argument posits a
nonexistent remedy, then uses I ITitle VII to invalidate the actual law that fails to grant her
that remedy. It is pure bootstrapping.") (1st and 3d alterations added) (2d and 4th alterations in
original).
197. See Austin, supra note 147, at 11 n.45.
198. See Taylor, supra note 10, at 430, 478; see also WRIGHT, supra note 10, at §4471.3.
199. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
200. Id. at 105.
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the time period within which an employee must file a
charge.201
In Rogers v. EEOC, perhaps the first federal court case
involving a claim of racial (in this case ethnic) harassment, the court
held that Title VII was to be applied broadly to carry out Congress's
intent to eliminate discrimination.202 A number of other cases
demonstrated the difficulty of filing a successful claim or lawsuit203 as
well as the necessity of alleging more than broad assertions of a
"hostile work environment." In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,204 the Court
held that:
[A] complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit
need not allege specific facts establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination . .. While a plaintiff is not
charged with pleading facts sufficient to prove her case,
as an evidentiary matter, in her complaint, a plaintiff is
required to allege facts that support a claim for relief.
The words "hostile work environment" are not
talismanic, for they are but a legal conclusion; it is the
alleged facts supporting those words, construed
liberally, which are the proper focus at the motion to
dismiss stage.205
Specifically addressing the issue of potential vicarious liability,
courts have also held that employers may be vicariously liable for the
actions of their managers and supervisors that constitute harassment in
201. Id. (alteration added). The Court held that as long as one act falls within the
statutory period, acts of discrimination or retaliation that are related to that act may also be
considered in determining whether a hostile workplace environment exists. See id.
202. Rogers v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (1971) ("We must
be acutely conscious of the fact that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be
accorded a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate the purpose of Congress to eliminate the
inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of ethnic discrimination.") (internal citations
omitted).
203. See also infra Section IV(E) (drawing from the work of Carter, Forsyth, Chew and
Kelley, and others that elaborate on the challenges of filing a successful racial discrimination
or harassment case in the employment setting).
204. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
205. Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 764-65 (4th Cir. 2003)
(citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 510-11 (2009) (emphasis in original) (alteration
added); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) ("[A] plaintiffs
obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.")
(alteration in original).
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206 207the workplace. Herrera v. Lufkin Indus., Inc. involved a plaintiff
who brought claims under Title VII and state tort law (IIED). In
overruling the district court's grant of summary judgment for
defendant, the appeals court noted that:
To survive summary judgment on a claim alleging a
racially hostile work environment, [plaintiff] "must
show that a rational jury could find that the workplace
is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment," and that the
victim "was targeted for harassment because of
[his] ... race ... or national origin."2 0 8
In this case, plaintiff presented evidence that the workplace
was pervasively discriminatory. "[He] presented evidence of several
discrete incidents of racial harassment occurring during the four years
that [his manager] oversaw Lufkin's Casper service center while
[plaintiff] worked there ... [The manager] would refer to Herrera as
'the Mexican,' or 'the fucking Mexican,' whenever he would speak to
206. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) ("[A]n employer is subject to
vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee."); Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (same). If the supervisor's harassment culminates
in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment,
the employer is liable and has no affirmative defense. Id. at 807-808 . However, "[w]hen no
tangible employment action is taken, the defending employer may raise an affirmative defense
to liability or damages . . .[t]he defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.
While proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy with a complaint
procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy
suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when
litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a
demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the
second element of the defense." Id.
207. 474 F.3d 675 (10th Cir. 2007).
208. Id. at 680 (quoting Sandoval v. City of Boulder, 388 F.3d 1312, 1326-27 (10th Cir.
2004)) (1st alteration added). While the appellate court in Herrera overruled the district
court's summary judgment decision for the Defendant on the Title VII hostile environment
claim, id. at 680, the appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendant
on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Id. at 687.
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Herrera's supervisor. "209 Regarding summary judgment, the court held
that Herrera
[E]stablished a genuinely disputed issue of fact as to the
pervasiveness of the racially-charged hostility in his
work environment sufficient to be entitled to have a
jury decide the issue ... In cases involving state-law
claims, a federal court applies the substantive law of the
state, but applies federal procedural law.2 10
Looking at federal procedural law, Rule 35(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that,
[W]hen the mental or physical condition ... of a
party ... is in controversy, the court in which the action
is pending may order the party to submit to a physical
or mental examination by cause shown and upon notice
to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall
specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope
of the examination and the person or persons by whom
it is to be made.2 11
Unfortunately for the plaintiff in Herrera, he did not respond to
the request by defendant for dates he would be available for an
independent medical examination (IME), and when he responded to
the second request, the deadline for the IME had passed. This is
another illustration of the complexities and challenges inherent in
advancing successful hostile environment claims.
209. Id. at 680-81 (alterations added).
210. Id. at 683 (alteration added). The federal court of appeals, applying Wyoming tort
law standards, drew the distinction between the severity of harm necessary for a valid Title
VII claim and a claim for IIED, noting that the harm necessary to be shown in the tort claim to
be much higher, stating that "When the Wyoming Supreme Court first adopted a cause of
action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, it recognized that '[plarties opposing
the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress typically contend that its
adoption will flood the courts with fraudulent claims and create potentially unlimited liability
for every type of mental disturbance. While these problems are not to be dismissed lightly,
they can certainly be solved without rejecting the action entirely."' Id. at 685-86 (citing
Leithead v. Am Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1065 (Wyo. 1986) (alteration in original). The
court further noted that "'the degree of severity of conduct and harm to the plaintiff required
under hostile work environment and discrimination analyses is notably lower than that
required under [IED],'. In effect, the courts have said that conduct that is actionable under an
employment discrimination theory often does not rise to the level of [IlED]." Id at 688
(quoting Yamada, supra note 143, at 503) (alterations added).
211. Id. at 688-89 (alteration added).
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Similarly, in Smith v. City of Phila.,212 a case involving an
African American correctional officer who sued for race
discrimination under Title VII, and alleging IIED, NIED, and
deprivation of his First Amendment rights (a § 1983) claim, the federal
district court upheld a summary judgment for the individual
defendants noting that "[iindividuals cannot be held liable under Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. §. 2000 et seq. (1994).",213 The Smith court, like the
court in Herrera, noted the limited possibilities for success with an
IED claim, i.e. that success would be extremely rare.214 Plaintiffs
NIED claim was dismissed as no physical injury was alleged.215
While Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment in a
broader range of cases, i.e. those based on race, color, national origin,
sex, and religion, 216 in matters of discrimination in the employment
setting on the basis of race, Section 1981 may have broader application
as it covers all discrimination in all contracts, including employment
contracts - even those of small employers. 2 17 Section 1981 has a
longer statute of limitations218 and does not have a statutory cap on
damages.219 Research conducted by Chew and Kelley noted that
plaintiffs who filed claims of racial discrimination and harassment
under § 1981 had a better chance of getting past the summary
judgment/motion to dismiss stage or pursuing a successful claim.220
An action for discrimination based on race can also be brought
under Title 20 of the United States Code § 1981. This section of the
United States Code provides an alternative remedy to Title VII; a
wholly independent cause of action for a prospective plaintiff to
consider.22 1 "In fact," notes Derrick Bell, author of the seminal text
212. No. Civ.A. 98-CV-3338, 1998 WL 966025 (E.D. Pa Nov. 10, 1998).
213. Id. at*1.
214. Id. (quoting Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1988)
(alteration in original) ("[It] is extremely rare to find conduct that will rise to the level of
outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress."); Smith, 1998 WL 966025, at *1 (quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895
F.2d 1469, 1487 (3d Cir. 1990)) ("[T]he only instances in which courts applying Pennsylvania
law have found conduct outrageous in the employment context is where an employer engaged
in both sexual harassment ... [and] retaliation for turning down sexual propositions.").
215. Smith, 1998 WL 966025, at *2; but see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 4 cmt. d
(2010).
216. Id. at § 2000 et. seq.
217. Id. at § 1981(a).
218. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2011).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(4) (2011).
220. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 93.
221. Bell, supra note 99, at 766. ("The Civil Rights Act of 1870, as codified at 42 U.S.C.
§1981, provides that all persons shall have certain equal rights, including the right 'to make
and enforce contracts.' As interpreted by the Supreme Court, § 1981 applies to both private and
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Race, Racism and American Law, "most race discrimination
complaints contain both Title VII and Section 1981 counts, perhaps to
deal with the possibility that the coverage of one may be broader than
the other."2 22
Proof of the same elements as actions brought under Title VII
are required for an action for racial harassment brought under Section
1981. To state a claim based on a racially hostile work environment
under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege that: "(1) she was subjected to
unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on her race; (3)
the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the
conditions of her employment and to create an abusive atmosphere;
and (4) there is some basis for imposing employer liability." 223
The racial harassment alleged must be "severe and pervasive as
to alter the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs [employee's]
employment and create an abusive working environment."22 The law
does not establish 'a general civility code" nor does it "prohibit all
verbal or physical harassment in the workplace." 225 In Springs v.
Mayer-Brown, the employee-plaintiff was not able to demonstrate
public discrimination, thereby preserving 'the right to contract for employment....' That Title
VII and §1981 are separate, distinct, and independent was confirmed by the Supreme Court in
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency [421 U.S. 454 (1975)]. In holding that the filing of a
claim with the EEOC pursuant to Title Vii does not toll the statute of limitations under § 1981,
the Court noted that Congress clearly indicated its approval of the two statutes as separate
sources of relief for victims of employment discrimination. Clearly, Title VII was not intended
to deprive black workers of other remedies for employment discrimination, such as § 1981.
Nor was it intended that plaintiffs be required to complete Title VII's filing procedures with
the EEOC before bringing an action under § 1981 in federal district court. Thus, the Court in
Johnson established § 1981 as a viable tool in employment discrimination litigation
strategy."). (internal footnotes omitted).
222. Bell, supra note 99 at 766 n. 16.
223. Springs v. Mayer-Brown LLP, No. 3:09cv352, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57554, at
*13 (W.D. N.C. June 9, 2010). Additionally, the Springs court noted that to "show that the
harassment was based on race, a plaintiff 'must show that 'but for' her race . . ., she would not
have been the victim of the alleged discrimination.' In determining whether the working
environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive, the Court must 'look at all the circumstances,
including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance."' Id. at 13-14 (internal citations omitted);
see also Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (determining whether an
actionable hostile environment claim exists requires an examination of all the circumstances,
including the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance").
224. Springs v. Mayer-Brown, LLP, No. 3:09CV352-MR-DSC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97081, at *10 (W.D. N.C. Oct. 20, 2009) (alteration added).
225. Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).
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that the discrimination she experienced was "severe and pervasive"
based on apparent differential treatment alone. 226
In the case of Campbell v. Rock Tenn Co.,227 the plaintiff, an
African American lesbian woman who was a machine operator for a
manufacturer of paper products, alleged that she was subject to racial
and sexual harassment over a period of years that constituted a hostile
work environment and resulted in her experiencing emotional distress.
Among other indignities, the plaintiff was told that the reason others in
the workplace did not get along with her was: "[n]umber one, you're
black. Number two, you're a woman. That's why the guys do not like
you."228 Plaintiffs co-worker also stated that, "[i]f I had it my way, I
would get rid of all women and minorities."2 9 Another co-worker
referred to blacks as "jigaboos" in her presence. 230 The plaintiff
reported that the comments and workplace environment made her sick
and that she felt unsafe in the workplace.
In August of 2005, the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination
with the St. Paul Department of Human Rights.231 Her charge referred
to three 2005 incidents. On May 11, 2006, the Department issued a
finding of probable cause.232 Subsequently, Campbell brought a
lawsuit in federal court, claiming that she was entitled to recover under
both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Minnesota Constitution. The defendant
company stated and the plaintiffs counsel acknowledged that
defendant was not a government entity; as such, it was held to not be
acting under color of state law. And because Rock Tenn is a private
actor employer, the claim under § 1983 was not allowed, and
226. See Springs, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97081, at *10-11. ("At most, Plaintiff
complains that she was assigned to an office away from her peers, refused 'customary'
clerical, paralegal and associate assistance, not offered needed training, excluded from client
lunches and other outreach, and not allowed to work from home or to participate in Mayer
Brown's pro bono efforts as she had been promised. At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff
has not alleged that non-African-American associates were treated more favorably regarding
these matters. As such, Plaintiff fails to plead a prima facie case of racial discrimination."); see
also Skipper v. Giant Food Inc., 68 Fed. App'x 393 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that an employer
could not be liable for racial discrimination or disparate treatment of African-American
workers when workers failed to show that similarly situated co-workers not within the
protected class were treated differently). Springs' "naked assertion' of racial harassment
devoid of 'further factual enhancement' is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss."
Springs, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97081, at *11 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
227. No. 06-CV-4272, 2008 WL 4951464 (D. Minn. Nov. 18, 2008).
228. Id. at *2.
229. Id.
230. Id. at *1.
231. Id. at *3.
232. Id.
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defendant was granted a summary judgment.233 Plaintiffs claim under
the Minnesota Constitution was met with a summary judgment for the
same reason. 234 Finally, the plaintiff claimed that her employer
discriminated against her based on her race and sex, in violation of
Title VII, the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), 235 and 42
U.S.C. § 1981. In its ruling, the court critiqued the plaintiffs
complaint as being unclear, and summary judgment was granted to the
defendant employer on all counts. 236
Plaintiffs and their counsel should take note of the Campbell
court's admonitions, as these appear to be common deficits in racial
harassment complaints - they are not clear, and/or include counts and
legal theories that counsel should know do not apply. 237 The Campbell
court noted that a plaintiff could show a violation of these statutes in
the absence of any tangible adverse employment action if there is
233. No. 06-CV-4272, 2008 WL at *5.
234. Id. (citing State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Minn. 1999)).
235. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363A.01-41 (2011). The plaintiff did not allege discrimination
based on sexual orientation, nor did she allege retaliation. Campbell, 2008 WL 4951464 at *7.
236. Campbell, 2008 WL 4951464, at *5. The court held that "[t]he complaint claims
plaintiff is entitled to recover under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Minnesota Constitution.
Defendant states, and at oral argument plaintiffs counsel acknowledged, defendant is not a
government entity. As such, it is not acting under color of state law. Because defendant is a
private actor, there can be no claim under § 1983. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment
on count 2. For the same reason, plaintiff has no valid Minnesota constitutional claims.
Plaintiff acknowledges - as she must - defendant is not a state actor. 'The Minnesota
Constitution does not accord affirmative rights to citizens against each other; its provisions are
triggered only by state action.' Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on
this count, as well." Id. (quoting Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 801). The court went on to state
that "Title VII mandates filing an administrative charge within 300 days of an allegedly
discriminatory event. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). For the MHRA, the limitations period is one
year. Minn. Stat. § 363A.28 subd. 3 (2006). Racial harassment claims under § 1981 are subject
to a four year limitations period. See Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 383,
124 S. Ct. 1836, 158 L. Ed. 2d 645 (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 1658. Plaintiff filed her administrative
charge August 31, 2005. This may bar some of plaintiffs claims, absent waiver, estoppel or a
continuing violation - none of which has been alleged. As the Court grants summary
judgment, it need not resolve limitations questions. A timely charge is not jurisdictional.
Gordon v. Shafer Contracting Co., 469 F.3d 1191, 1194 (8th Cir. 2006)." Campbell, 2008 WL
4951464 at *5 n.5. Speaking to the complaint, the court noted "[t]he Court explicitly finds
plaintiffs complaint to be considerably less than a model of clarity. Giving the document a
very generous reading, the Court discerns claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Minnesota Constitution, the Minnesota
Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. §363A.01-41 ("MHRA"), as well as state tort claims of
negligent supervision, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
defamation. The Court finds defendant is entitled to summary judgment on each claim." Id.
237. One is left to wonder whether, with a more carefully and narrowly drawn complaint,
the plaintiff may have prevailed, or at least crossed the summary judgment threshold in her
case.
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evidence of a hostile work environment. Each statute applied a
common standard to establish such a claim.238
A hostile work environment exists when "the workplace is
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment." 239 The
Campbell court outlined the basic provisions of § 1981: "[t]o establish
a prima facie case of hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show
(1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was subject to
unwelcome harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive as to affect a
term, condition or privilege of employment; and (3) a causal nexus
between the two." 24
As with Title VII, only "severe or pervasive" harassment is
actionable. 24 1 A court adjudicating a 1981 claim "therefore, must
consider the totality of the circumstances, including whether the
conduct was 'frequent and severe; whether it was physically
threatening or humiliating, as opposed to merely an offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee's
work performance."' 242 The court in Campbell noted that "[i]t is well
established that isolated incidents of harassment, unless extremely
serious, do not rise to this level."243
When an employee alleges harassment by co-workers, a
different standard applies, and the agency or court must determine
whether the employer had knowledge of the harassment and whether
244they took corrective action. Still other standards apply if the
harasser is a supervisor. In that case, the employer may be vicariously
liable for the actions of its supervisors, "unless [the employer] can
establish that it 'exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly
correct any harassing behavior,' and plaintiff 'unreasonably failed to
take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities"' the
employer provided.24 5 This is the so-called "Ellerth-Faragher
238. Campbell, 2008 WL 4951464, at *6; see Ross v. Kansas City Power & Light Co.,
293 F.3d 1041, 1050 (8th Cir. 2002) (Title VII and Section 1981); Hervey v. County of
Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711, 719 (8th Cir. 2008) (Title VII and MHRA).
239. Gordon, 469 F.3d at 1194 (internal citation omitted).
240. Campbell, 2008 WL 4951464, at *6; see Gordon, 469 F.3d at 1194-95.
241. Campbell, 2008 WL 4951464, at *7 (citing Gordon, 469 F.3d at 1195).
242. Campbell, 2008 WL 4951464, at *7 (quoting Brenneman v. Famous Dave's of Am.,
Inc., 507 F.3d 1139, 1143 (8th Cir. 2007)).
243. Campbell, 2008 WL 4951464, at *7 (citing Brenneman, 507 F.3d at 1143).
244. Campbell, 2008 WL 4951464, at *7 (citing Gordon, 469 F.3d at 1195).
245. Campbell, 2008 WL 4951464, at *7 (citing Gordon, 469 F.3d at 1195 (citing
Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998))). "The employer may assert this
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affirmative defense" that can be invoked by employers. The Ellerth-
Faragher246 defense can be difficult for an employee-plaintiff to
overcome at the pretrial stage, as the existence of a company policy
prohibiting harassment combined with a reasonable response by the
employer to an employee's complaint of harassment can constitute a
fulfillment of legal obligation by the employer.
Even though plaintiff was subjected to acts of harassment, the
court in Campbell noted that "[t]hrough all of this, plaintiff knew of
defendant's sexual harassment policy, and had used it successfully in
the past, yet did not report any of these incidents to supervisors."247
The failure of the plaintiff's case in Campbell illustrates four practical
hurdles that must be cleared in order to advance a successful claim (or
at least get to a trial on the merits):
1. The plaintiff must establish that acts or events of
"harassment" be directed at her/him because of
her/his membership in a protected class such as
race or gender,
2. The plaintiff must establish that the acts/events
were severe or pervasive in themselves, and
3. The plaintiff must establish that the acts/events
occurred in a relatively limited timeframe 248
4. The plaintiff must establish that the defendant
company did not have a sexual or racial
affirmative defense only where, as here, 'no tangible employment action' occurs." Campbell,
2008 WL 4951464, at *7 (citing Gordon, 469 F.3d at 1195).
246. This affirmative defense refers two leading Supreme Court cases on sexual
harassment, Ellerth (Burlington Indus.,Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); and Faragher
(Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)); see supra note 170.
247. Campbell, 2008 WL 4951464, at *7 (emphasis added). The Campbell court also
spoke to the issue of the severity and timing of the alleged acts/events of harassment, noting
that even if the acts in question were based on race and sex, they were neither severe nor
pervasive, nor did they constitute a hostile work environment, "spread as they were over more
than half-a-decade." Id These acts included an incident in April, 2003, in which "one co-
worker made the comment about the Oprah Winfrey show," another "sometime in 2004 or
2005, [when] another coworker suggested plaintiffs co-workers had difficulty getting along
with her because she was black and female," on "unspecified dates [when] plaintiff found
adult magazines in her machine," and "[i]n 2006, [when] a co-worker repeatedly told her,
"[g]ive me my prick." Id. (alterations added).
248. While the Campbell court did not state a minimum requirement for proximity in
time of acts/events of harassment, they did note that acts "spread over half-a-decade" were
too diffuse in time to warrant them being "severe or pervasive." Id.
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harassment policy, or if the defendant did, that
the plaintiff attempted to use it to no effect.
This set of legal hurdles illustrates the challenging nature of
filing a successful harassment claim, and provides guidance to
plaintiffs and their counsel on how a successful claim might be
advanced through the appropriate administrative and legal systems.
Plaintiffs may find some hope in knowing that while the odds of
advancing a successful claim are stacked against them, success in the
Title VII context is possible.249
The cases that follow in this section, however, illustrate that
plaintiffs can sometimes be successful with particularly clear and
egregious fact patterns demonstrating racial harassment in the
workplace. For example, in Carson v. Giant Food, Inc.,2 50 a case
involving a § 1981 claim, among other allegations of discrimination by
an employer, the court noted that "[d]irectors or managers can be held
personally liable when they 'intentionally cause a corporation to
infringe on the rights secured by section 1981 .,,251 Referring to the
burden of proof in discrimination cases, the Carson court noted that:
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to
produce evidence that the plaintiff was suspended for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason . . . . "If the
employer meets this burden, the presumption of
discrimination is eliminated, and the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the employer's nondiscriminatory reasons are pre-
textual and that the adverse employment action was
actually taken because of the employee's race or
national origin."252
249. This article argues that plaintiffs advancing claims of racial harassment have had
limited success in the Title VII context, the avenue of redress should not be limited to a federal
statutory approach. Remedies under state law, including in tort, should be not only permissible
in theory but viable in fact.
250. 187 F. Supp. 2d 462 (D. Md. 2002).
251. Id at 483 (quoting Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n. Inc., 517 F.2d
1141, 1145 (4th Cir. 1975)).
252. Carson, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 485 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.
530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (quoting Obi v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 142 F. Supp. 2d 655, 660 (D.
Md. 2001)).
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Betts v. Costco Wholesale Corp.253 involved plaintiffs who
sued their former employer alleging they were terminated because they
were black and that they were subjected to a racially hostile work
environment.254 The court noted that the appeal for review of a
summary judgment motion in diversity cases must apply the standard
of review used by the courts of the state whose substantive law the
court governs. 255 The plaintiffs alleged that their manager made
comments such as he felt like he was working on a "plantation," a
reference to the many black employees on this site; he referred to
plaintiff as a "black widow spider," and called her "so black and ugly
that he would never have her work up front," and "berate[d] her to the
point of tears." 2 56 The court noted that employer-defendant had thus
been put on notice of a hostile work environment. 257
In elaborating on the scope of harassing acts that could be
actionable, the Betts court noted that "[t]his court's case law therefore
makes it clear that the fact finder may consider similar acts of
harassment of which a plaintiff becomes aware during the course of
his or her employment, even if the harassing acts were directed at
others or occurred outside of the plaintiffs presence." 258 Regarding
plaintiff's claim for IED, the ruling of summary judgment in favor of
the defendant was upheld. 259 The Betts court cited, in contrast, Moore
v. KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073 (6th Cir. 1999).
The plaintiff in Moore "testified that he was 'angry' and 'upset' about
the jokes and slurs" he had suffered during his employment in a
racially hostile work environment [and] testified that "'he just couldn't
take it anymore."'260 But he also proffered further evidence of distress
beyond this sparse testimony. In particular, he "'complained to his
supervisors and started looking for a new job,' suffered through 'a
fairly steady stream of racial jokes and slurs during his employment,'
253. 558 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2009).
254. Id. at 464.
255. Id. at 466 (citing Kuezens v. Pascal Co., 448 F. 3d 349, 360 (6th Cir. 2006)).
256. Id. at 464-65 (alteration added).
257. Id. at 471.
258. Id. at 469 (quoting Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 336 (6th Cir.
2008)) (alteration in original). In affirming the district court's decision to decline defendant
Costco's motion for summary judgment the 6th Circuit held that "Given that the question of
whether the challenged conduct was severe or pervasive is 'quintessentially a question of fact'.
. . a jury could reasonably find in favor of the employees on this issue." Id. at 470 (quoting
Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584, 597 (6th Cir. 2006)).
259. Betts, 558 F.3d at 473.
260. Id. at 477.
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and was 'intentionally isolated from co-workers in retaliation for his
filing an EEOC complaint."261
Courts have noted that the standards for a hostile work
environment claim under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 are generally
262the same. These standards require harm that exceeds merely having
a difficult or aggressive boss; "a pervasively toxic environment,
necessarily affecting the terms and conditions under which one is
employed" is required.263 Plaintiffs bringing such claims must also
clearly show that the harassment was in fact racially motivated. 2 64 Just
as "merely an offensive utterance" will not constitute actionable
harassment,265 a series of acts spread over a number of years will also
not be actionable - particularly where they cannot be shown clearly to
be based on the plaintiffs being in a particular group (protected class)
-according to the court in Campbell.266
261. Moore, 171 F.3d at 1082-83 (alteration added). The court noted that the plaintiff
quit his job largely "because he was tired of the racism and isolation." Id. at 1078.
262. See Westbrook v. City University of New York, 591 F. Supp. 2d 207 (E.D. N.Y.
2008) (citing Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2000)). In
Westbrook, the plaintiff sued defendant university alleging race discrimination, retaliation, and
a racially hostile work environment under Title VII, § 1981, § 1983, and the New York State
Human Rights Law (NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296 et. seq. (2011)). Defendants were
granted summary judgment on all of plaintiff-employee's claims; see also Booker v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Systems, 17 F. Supp. 2d 735 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) - Plaintiff alleged race
discrimination under Title VII, and § 1981, and the court held that "Both Title VII and Sec.
1981 claims are governed by the same proof structure." Id. at 742 (citing Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186-87(1989)).
263. Westbrook, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 233 (quoting Meder v. City of New York, No. 05 CV
919, 2007 WL 1231626, at *5 (E.D. N.Y. Apr. 27, 2007)).
264. See Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 1994), in which the court noted that
"The evidence reveals that [plaintiff] was treated very poorly at his job by his coworkers. He
was met with hostility by many of his coworkers. He worked with a group of people who had
very different sensibilities about humor, which Mr. Bolden did not share. He had been the
target of ridicule for a long time, and he was made unhappy by this work environment.
However, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof by demonstrating the 'harassment'
was racially motivated. The workshop was a hostile environment; however, the record does
not show it was a racially hostile environment." Id. at 555. Plaintiffs claim of racial
harassment survived summary judgment, and was deemed to be a question of fact in this case.
Likewise, the court held that a whether the harassment was "severe and pervasive" was a
question of fact. Plaintiff lost in his claim of discrimination for not receiving a promotion, but
claims of racial harassment and discrimination survived summary judgment regarding the
decision to demote him.
265. See Rogers v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (1971).
266. Here again, the Court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie
case. While she belongs to a protected group, the court noted that she failed to establish the
remaining elements, and that the defendant was entitled to the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative
defense. The court in Campbell noted that "...not all incidents of alleged harassment show a
connection to plaintiffs race or gender. For example, coworker comments dating from 2001
and 2002 address only plaintiffs sexual orientation. Other incidents - such as [a] remark that
plaintiff had to return to work because she was 'hungry,' . . . nitpicking, [a] false report and
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Claims for harassment or discrimination under § 1981267 are
generally analyzed using the same standards as claims brought under
Title VII. 268 In addition to protecting employees who are discriminated
against by employers who know that those employees are members of
a protected class, Section 1981 also protects employees who are
perceived to be members of such a class. 69
The case of Lopez-Galvan v. Men's Wearhouse270 involved a
suit brought by a male native of the Dominican Republic who was
employed by the Men's Wearhouse, a national chain of clothing
stores.271 Lopez-Galvan alleged that he had been harassed in the
workplace because of his race and national origin. 272 He also claimed
that he had been constructively discharged, and filed a claim under §
1981, as well as a tort claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress (NIED). The plaintiff also alleged that his employer violated
Title VII and the public policy of North Carolina for subjecting him to
adverse treatment in his workplace.273 Among other incidents, the
court noted that the plaintiff was "[locked] in the store while Smith [,
the assistant manager,] went to the bank to make deposits." 2 74 The
plaintiff claimed that this negative treatment amounted to
"constructive discharge" from his employment. He further noted that
he was referred to as "black" on two occasions, and claimed that this
was due to the fact that others perceived him as being of a particular
shouting, and [a fellow employee's] request to punch him in - lack any obvious connection to
plaintiffs membership in any protected class." Campbell v. Rock Tenn. Co., No. 06-CV-
4272, 2008 WL 4951464, at *7 (D. Minn. Nov. 18, 2008) (alterations added); see also Lopez-
Galvan v. Men's Warehouse, No. 3:06cv537, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53456 (W.D. N.C. July
10, 2008) ("While recognizing the highly offensive nature of such a remark, the Fourth Circuit
has rejected arguments that the use of such a racial slur on one singular occasion is sufficient
to constitute a change in the terms and conditions of employment." Id. at *27 (citing Shields v.
Fed. Express Corp., 120 Fed. App'x 956, 961 (4th Cir. 2005)).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 1981, et. seq.
268. Lopez-Galvan, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53456, at *24 (citing Spriggs v. Diamond
Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 184 (4th Cir. 2001)).
269. Lopez-Galvan, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53456, at *24 (citing Salem v. City of
Pontiac School Dist., No. 81-1508, 1985 WL 12820, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 1988)).
"Accordingly," the court in Lopez-Galvan noted, "Plaintiffs claim that he was perceived to be
black may be cognizable under section 1981 separate from the absence of a claim under Title
VII." Lopez-Galvan, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53456, at *24. The court noted that the plaintiff's
forecast of a hostile work environment based on his "perceived race" was insufficient to
sustain a § 1981 claim. Id.
270. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53456.
271. Id. at *4-*5.
272. Id at*1.
273. Id.
274. Id. at *8 (alterations added). The plaintiff testified that "one time I showed up at
work and they jailed me there. They had me all handcuffed and everything, chained." Id.
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race, and that was their motivation for such statements and treatment.
The court disallowed the claims of "perceived" racial harassment and
constructive discharge, citing insufficient facts alleged by the
plaintiff. 275
The Lopez-Galvan court referred to one other specific occasion
of perceived harassment stated in the plaintiffs case, involving the
store manager who used a racial epithet. The plaintiff testified that
when he complained about his work schedule, the manager replied,
"[w]hy don't you tell the manager? You're being a baby, baby - oh
nigger, nigger."276 The plaintiffs wife complained to the district
manager about her husband (the plaintiff) being harassed at work.
While the plaintiff complained to the manager about his schedule, he
did not mention the racial epithets to the district manager.277
275. Id. at *25-26 ("The Plaintiff cites to only two examples of racially related incidents
in support of his claim. First, the Plaintiff has presented a forecast of evidence that he was
referred to as being black on two occasions. While such evidence may support the Plaintiffs
contention that he was perceived to be black, merely being referred to as belonging to a
certain race does not rise to the level of demonstrating racial animus. The reference to
Plaintiffs race could have completely innocuous and made under innocent circumstances, and
without more facts regarding these incidents, such evidence fails to create an issue as to
whether the Plaintiffs adverse treatment was motivated by a discriminatory bias.").
276. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53456 at *15.
277. Id. at *15. The court in this case attempted to put this incident into perspective.
"While the use of racial epithets is abhorrent and certainly nothing that is or should be
condoned, this one isolated incident does not constitute a sufficient forecast of evidence that
the Plaintiff was deliberately subjected to intolerable working conditions due to his perceived
race." Id. at *26. The Lopez-Galvan court noted several other rulings in which isolated racial
epithets were dismissed as not rising to the level of harassment: "'Mere utterance of an ethnic
or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee would not sufficiently
alter the terms and conditions of employment to violate Title VIl.' Nor is this one isolated
incident of racial animosity sufficient to show that the racial harassment that the Plaintiff
allegedly suffered was so 'severe or pervasive [as] to alter the conditions of employment and
create an abusive atmosphere....' As the Supreme Court has noted, 'simple teasing, off-hand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment."' Id. at 26-27 (quoting Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-8 (1998); E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306,
313 (4th Cir. 2008)) (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original).
The court went to great lengths to condemn the use of the epithet while ruling that it did not
warrant legal redress: "'Perhaps no single act can more quickly alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive working environment than the use of an unambiguously
racial epithet such as 'nigger' by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates.' Spriggs, 242
F.3d at 185 (finding 'frequent and highly repugnant' racial slurs were sufficient severe and
pervasive as to create racially hostile environment) (internal quotation marks omitted). While
recognizing the highly offensive nature of such a remark, the Fourth Circuit has rejected
arguments that the use of such a racial slur on one singular occasion is sufficient to constitute
a change in the terms and conditions of employment. See Shields v. Fed. Express Corp., 120
Fed. App'x 956, 961 (4th Cir. 2005). This is all the more true where the Plaintiff specifically
denies being a member of the racial minority toward whom such epithet would be directed.
Because the Plaintiff has failed to present a forecast of evidence that he was subjected to
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In dismissing Lopez-Galvan's claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress (NIED), the court began by noting the elements that
must be proven for such a claim to be successful:
(1) The defendant negligently engaged in conduct, and
(2) It was reasonably foreseeable that such conduct
would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress
(often referred to as 'mental anguish'), and
(3) The conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe
emotional distress. 278
The court noted that the defendant, Men's Wearhouse, did not
challenge Lopez-Galvan's assertion that he suffered from severe
emotional distress. They agreed with the defendant, however, that the
facts did not support that the plaintiffs injuries were either reasonably
foreseeable or caused by defendant's negligence. 279
In summary, in the cases discussed in this section, as well as
the commentary and cases cited in the law review articles, plaintiffs
and their counsel have been provided guidance by the courts on how to
file potentially successful claims for racial discrimination and
harassment in the workplace. The fact remains, however, that the
avenues available to employees seeking redress for harassment -
resulting in psychological and emotional injuries even as severe as
RBTS-are limited and less than effective in achieving redress for
these aggrieved plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs face significant choices in determining whether to file
discrimination or harassment complaints with the EEOC while
simultaneously bringing successful actions for harassment in state
courts. This complexity stems from that fact that in addition to taking
harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a racially hostile work environment, the
Plaintiffs harassment and constructive discharge claims based upon his 'perceived race' must
be dismissed." Lopez-Galvan, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53456, at *27-28.
278. Id. at *37 (quoting Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates, 395
S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990). "The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined 'severe emotional
distress' in this context as 'any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis,
psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or
mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained
to do so."' Lopez-Galvan, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53456, at *37-8 (quoting Johnson, 395
S.E.2d 85, 97)).
279. "In the present case," the court stated, "the forecast of evidence presented by the
Plaintiff does not support an inference sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the
Plaintiffs emotional distress was a reasonably foreseeable result of any negligence on the part
of the Defendant or its employees." Lopez-Galvan, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53456, at *38.
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the federal route (i.e. through the EEOC), plaintiffs in many states may
also seek recovery in state law. The majority of states have their own
antidiscrimination statutes that can be the basis of a claim,280 and the
choice of whether to seek redress under both federal and state law may
depend not only on the facts of a particular case, but also whether the
state in question in fact has such a statute.281 The next section
elaborates on these complex procedural choices and related challenges.
C. State Worker's Compensation and Possible Preemption of Tort
Claims for Emotional Distress
To add another level of complexity in attempting to advance
claims for racial harassment-particularly on the basis of intentional
(or negligent) infliction of emotional distress (IIED or NIED)-
plaintiffs and their counsel also need to keep in mind that such claims
may be precluded by state worker's compensation law or by state
antidiscrimination law.282
For example, in Jackson v. Lehigh Valley Physician's Grp., a
Pennsylvania case brought in federal district court,283 the court
280. Some state antidiscrimination statutes expand the categories of protected groups.
These states vary immensely in terms of the remedies available for violations of their
particular state antidiscrimination statutes. For example, some state antidiscrimination statutes
cap the amount of compensatory and punitive damages recoverable in an employment
discrimination case along the lines of Title VII. Other state statutes do not allow for the
recovery of compensatory or punitive damages at all. Some state statutes permit the recovery
of compensatory damages but disallow the recovery of punitive damages. Conversely, other
state statutes allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover both compensatory and punitive damages.
Jarod S. Gonzalez, State Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of Common Law
Torts: Valuing the Common Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 115, 116-17 (2007) (intemal citations
omitted).
281. Id. Gonzalez further notes that "As a practical matter, unless an aggrieved
employment discrimination plaintiff is in a state that has an antidiscrimination statute that
allows for a full recovery of compensatory and punitive damages without legislative
restriction, it only makes sense in a case of egregious discrimination for a plaintiff to consider
suing the employer for violating the state's common law. For example, almost all state
jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Egregious employment discrimination in the form of sexual or racial harassment can
potentially satisfy the elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. If such
elements are satisfied, the aggrieved plaintiff may generally recover the full panoply of
compensatory and punitive damages that are available at common law. In addition, some
states also recognize common law 'public policy' claims for employment discrimination
which provide traditional tor remedies. Assault, battery, and negligent employment tort claims
could also potentially apply to allegations of supervisory harassment based on race or sex,
claims which also provide traditional tort remedies." Id. at 117-18 (internal citations omitted).
282. Gonzalez, supra note 280, at 116-18.
283. Jackson v. Lehigh Physician's Grp., No. 08-3043, 2009 WL 229756, at *1 (E.D.
PA. Jan. 30, 2009).
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determined that the plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IJED) based on excessive and unfair reprimands
and discipline, failure to respond seriously to a complaint, omission
from a workplace photo brochure, and termination, fell outside the
"personal animus exception"28 4 to the state's workers compensation
law. A specific allegation that was allowed to proceed under a tort
claim in Jackson involved a fellow employee's personal physical
attack on plaintiff.285
In a separate case involving racial harassment, the court held
that the plaintiffs IIED claim was barred by the Pennsylvania
Worker's Compensation Act because the alleged harassment was done
286by the defendant's employees while they were on the job. Outside of
the sexual harassment context, Pennsylvania courts appear most likely
to find that workplace conduct falls within the personal animus
exception when the conduct involves physical violence, harm, or
threats thereof.287 According to the Jackson court,
These cases demonstrate that the alleged motivation
behind the offending act must be individualized, not
just aimed at every member of a particular class. To fit
within the [personal animus] exception, the third party's
or fellow employee's act must have been motivated by
his animosity against the injured employee. If the third
party would have attacked a different person in the
284. Id. at *6. "The statute recognizes a limited exception, known as the 'personal
animus' or 'third party attack' exception, which permits claims for 'employee injuries caused
by the intentional conduct of third parties for reasons personal to the tortfeasor and not
directed against him as an employee or because of his employment." Id. at *6 (citing
McInerney v. Moyer Lumber & Hardware, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 393, 400 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(quoting Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 160 (3d Cir. 1999)).
285. Jackson, 2009 WL 229756, at *11.
286. See id. at *8 (citing Ahmed v. Lowe's Company Inc., No. 06-4798, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 58568, at *23-24 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2008); Hettler v. Zany Brainy, Inc., No. 99-3879,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14537, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2000) (For an act to fall within the
personal animus exception, the Jackson court noted that it cannot be one which would be
"expected in the workplace.").
287. For instance, the court noted, in Price v. Phila. Elec. Co., 790 F. Supp. 97, 100 (E.D.
Pa. 1992), plaintiffs co-workers allegedly used racial epithets around plaintiff, physically
threatened plaintiff, and deliberately discussed deer hunting and killing deer in plaintiffs
presence, knowing of his aversion to the topic. Id. Following such a discussion, plaintiff found
a deer's head tied to the hood of his car. Id. The court found that plaintiffs allegations of racial
harassment by his co-workers were not barred by the Workers' Compensation Act, stating that
"it cannot be said that the conduct alleged clearly was not a result of personal animosity of
fellow employees toward [plaintiff]." Id. (alteration added).
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same position as the injured employee, the attack falls
outside the [personal animus] exception.288
There have been similar preemption rulings by other state
courts, including for claims of negligent infliction of emotional
distress (NIED) and negligent retention of an employee, 2 89 and for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 290
In one of these cases, Wilson, even though the court dismissed
the plaintiffs claim against his employer the court allowed an IED
claim against individual managers to proceed, stating that a civil rights
claim may be filed against an employer and does not prohibit the filing
of an IED claim against offending individuals against whom no civil
rights claim could have been filed. 29 1 The plaintiffs IED claim in
Wilson was based on allegations stated in his deposition that he was
subjected to racist remarks nearly every day of his employment.292
Examples cited by the plaintiff included the store's managers telling
him that "a black man was hung in his hometown a couple of years
earlier," and in response to Wilson's question as to why, the manager
stated that "they didn't need a reason." 293 Another manager said to
Wilson in front of (the manager's) young daughter and Wilson that "if
you bring one of those home with you, I'll kill you." 294 The comment
was allegedly made in the break room in front of several employees
who all laughed.295
288. Jackson, 2009 WL 229756, at *8 (citing Price, 790 F. Supp. at 100 (internal
citations omitted)) (alterations in original).
289. 116 P.3d 719 (Haw. 2005).
290. 75 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Messick v. Toyota Motor Mfr., Ky.,
Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 (E.D. Ky. 1999)); No. 98-5074, 1999 WL 83934 (E.D. Pa.
1999). "Plaintiff asserted claims against her former employer for a racially motivated and
retaliatory discharge under Title VII, for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and for
[ITED]." Id. at *1. Defendant's motion to dismiss [an amended complaint] was granted.
Defendant contented (successfully) that "emotional distress claims are barred by the
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act (WCA). The WCA is the exclusive source of an
employer's liability for covered injuries . . . The statute, however, excludes from coverage an
injury intentionally caused by a third party motivated by factors personal to the victim...
Courts have generally held that claims for [lIED] resulting from employment discrimination
are barred by the WCA .... A claim for [NIED] is clearly outside the third-party intentional
attack exclusion and is barred by the WCA." Id. at *2 (citing Hicks v. Arthur, 843 F. Supp.
949, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 940
(3d Cir. 1997)) (alterations added).
291. Wilson, 75 S.W.3d at 239.
292. Id. at 230.
293. Id. at 237.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 237.
ADDRESSING WORKPLACE RACISM
The Wilson court concluded that the trial court erred in holding
that the plaintiffs IED claim was not sufficient to survive the
appellee's summary judgment motion, specifically stating that: "[i]f
such conduct occurred, we believe a jury could find such conduct to be
intentional, outrageous, and intolerable. As stated in comment h of the
Restatement, if reasonable minds may differ as to whether the alleged
conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous so as to result in
liability, then the matter is subject to determination by a jury."296 I a
similar case, Hampton, the court also allowed a narrow exception to
the bar to IED claims for workplace harassment, noting that "[The
Pennsylvania Worker's Compensation Statute], however, excludes
from coverage an injury intentionally caused by a third party
motivated by factors personal to the victim." 297
Jarod Gonzalez in his article State Antidiscrimination Statutes
and Implied Preemption of Common Law Torts: Valuing the Common
Law has argued, as we do, that employees who have been
discriminated against or harassed because of their race should be able
to bring a claim for recovery under tort law; he notes that the specific
cause of action could be for IIED, assault and battery, and negligent
employment.298 The common law can be a critical resource for
employment discrimination complainants. Title VII does not stand in
the way of a complainant utilizing state common law to pursue a
recovery against the complainant's employer, but whether state
statutory law stands in the way of the common law is an entirely
different story - this issue is typically anything but clear.299 In cases
where employee-plaintiffs have suffered race-based traumatic stress, a
cause of action in tort where permitted under state law could allow for
recovery for compensatory as well as punitive damages.3 00 Other
advantages of pursuing claims in tort include providing for recovery
from employers that have a small number of employees (and are thus
not subject to Title VII), and a longer time period in which to bring a
296. Id at 238.
297. Hampton, 1999 WL 83934, at *2.
298. Gonzalez, supra note 280, at 117-18 ("As a practical matter, unless an aggrieved
employment discrimination plaintiff is in a state that has an antidiscrimination statute that
allows for a full recovery of compensatory and punitive damages without legislative
restriction, it only makes sense in a case of egregious discrimination for a plaintiff to consider
suing the employer for violating the state's common law. For example, almost all state
jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Egregious employment discrimination in the form of sexual or racial harassment can
potentially satisfy the elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.")
(internal citations omitted).
299. Id. at 119-20.
300. Id. at 117.
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claim (typically one to two years in tort, versus as little as 180 days to
file under a state anti-discrimination statute such as Texas).301
Bringing a cause of action in tort would facilitate justice for
plaintiffs suffering from RBTS, as it would allow for a full recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, which would be appropriate for
302
egregious discrimination. In jurisdictions with state
antidiscrimination statutes that are silent on the preemption question,
Gonzalez's article suggests that the aggrieved plaintiff should be able
to pursue an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in
egregious cases of racial or sexual harassment. And if the claim is
established, the plaintiff should be able to seek recovery from a range
of traditional common law remedies.303
D. Clearing the Summary Judgment Hurdle - Successes, Failures,
Mixed Results
While the plaintiff in Wilson cleared the initial summary
judgment hurdle for some of the allegations, many lawsuits for racial
harassment do not make it past that stage. Even a cursory reading of
the allegations in Wilson would indicate that he experienced conduct
that was "extreme and outrageous" as required to meet that standard in
the Restatement. 304 The outcome for plaintiffs in other cases was not
as clear or favorable. In Smith v. Davidson Transit Org.,305 for
example, the plaintiffs common law tort claim for retaliatory
discharge was dismissed as it "[amounted] to nothing more than a
'bare assertion' with no supporting facts to show entitlement to relief
under Twombly." 306 Yet, plaintiffs claim for a racially hostile work
307
environment under Title VII survived summary judgment.
301. Id. at 118-19.
302. Id. at 117.
303. Id at 145.
304. Wilson v. Lowe's Home Ctr., 75 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
305. No. 3:08-0271, 2008 WL 4722652 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 23, 2008).
306. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
307. Smith, 2008 WL 4722652, at *9 ("The ultimate conclusion as to whether a work
environment is racially hostile is based on a subjective and objective evaluation of whether a
reasonable person would find it 'hostile and abusive' and whether the plaintiff actually found
it so. Here, the plaintiffs allegations, taken as true, do show that, as an African-American, she
was subject to repeated, unwelcome, negative comments about African-Americans, such that
it is more than speculative that an offensive and hostile work environment was created. DTO's
response generally fails to address the plaintiffs allegations of a repeated pattern of racial slurs
and racially insensitive conduct in the workplace. (Docket No. 69 at 8.) . . . Further, the
plaintiff has also alleged that she and other members of her protected class were treated less
favorably in terms of their working conditions while performing rider counts than similarly
2012] ADDRESSING WORKPLACE RACISM 59
The often-cited case of Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. set a
standard for courts in determining whether a workplace environment is
hostile: courts are to look at the totality of the circumstances, and
consider the frequency and severity of the harassing conduct, whether
the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it
308
unreasonably interferes with the plaintiff s work performance.
Similarly, Carter v. New Venture Gear 309 sets a high standard
for surviving a summary judgment motion.3 10 The Carter court noted
that the first element of a hostile work environment claim has both an
objective and subjective component, 3 11  and that a hostile work
environment claim may be based on one incident, but that incident
must seemingly border on the horrific.31 In Carter 3 13 the plaintiffs
situated employees who were not in the plaintiffs protected class (African-American and/or
female) . . . this aspect of the plaintiffs Title VII claim will depend on whether she can show
that she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside of her protected
class, not whether she was 'singled out.' With these allegations and underlying factual
support, the plaintiff has established that her Title VII claim should not be dismissed." Id. at
*9-*10 (citing Faragher v, City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998); Leadbetter v.
Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 691 (6th Cir. 2004)); see also Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129,
147 (2004) (a sexual harassment (hostile environment) case in which the Supreme Court held
that in order for plaintiff to prevail on a constructive discharge claim it was necessary to prove
that working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt
compelled to resign.).
308. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). To constitute a hostile work
environment, the environment must be both subjectively and objectively offensive. See also a
series of related cases cited in Adams v. High Purity Sys., Inc., No. 1:09cv354, 2009 WL
2391939 (E.D. Va. July 2, 2009), including: Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Sunbelt
Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Montano v. INOVA Healthcare Servs.,
No. 1:08cv565, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93042, at *9 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 1998) (quoting
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, (1988)). ("Simple teasing, offhand
comments and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in the terms and conditions of employment."). "The Supreme Court imposed this high
standard to filter out 'the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of
abusive language' so that Title VII does not become a 'general civility code."' Adams, 2009
WL 2391939, at *4 (quoting Montano, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93042, at *3)).
309. 310 Fed. App'x 454 (2d Cir. 2009).
310. Id. at 457 (quoting Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2003)
("To survive a motion for summary judgment on a racial harassment claim relating to a hostile
work environment, a plaintiff must demonstrate: '(1) that the workplace was permeated with
discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
his or her work environment, and (2) that a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct that
created the hostile environment to the employer."')
311. Carter v. New Venture Gear, 310 Fed. App'x 454, 457-58 (2d. Cir. 2009). "'[T]he
misconduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment, and the victim must also subjectively perceive that environment to
be abusive."' Id. (citing Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 148 (2d Cir. 2003)) (alteration
added).
312. New Venture Gear, 310 Fed. App'x at 458 ("'we require that the incident constitute
an 'intolerable alteration' of the plaintiffs working conditions, so as to substantially interfere
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claim that her employer had created a hostile work environment by
allowing racially-related incidents, including her receipt of a note
from co-workers she found that said "get out, we do not want you
here," did not survive summary judgment. The court concluded that
the plaintiffs hostile work environment claim failed because the
conduct was too isolated, infrequent, and did not demonstrate
unreasonable interference in her ability to work, nor did the court find
any reason to believe such conduct was necessarily due to her race.
Thus, Carter failed to satisfy her burden of showing an objectively
hostile work environment. 3 14
To survive a motion for summary judgment on a racial
harassment claim relating to hostile environment, the court in Carter
held that a plaintiff must demonstrate: "(1) that the workplace was
permeated with discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his or her work
environment, and (2) that a specific basis exists for imputing the
conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer." 315
Courts have set the bar quite high for claimants; normally a single
incident of racial harassment, however egregious, will not suffice.
The height of this bar was illustrated in the case of Adams v.
High Purity Sys.,317 which involved behavior on the part of a
supervisor that appeared to be egregiously discriminatory and
harassing toward a subordinate, but for which the court did not provide
relief. Adams is an unusual and complex case involving a white
employee who alleged racial harassment under Title VII.318 The acts of
harassment alleged by the plaintiff Adams in this case included the
foreman wearing a "Free the Jena 6" T-shirt, 3 19 and commenting to
with or impair his ability to do his job.'" Id. at 458 (citing Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d
70, 79 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted)).
313. 310 Fed. App'x 454.
314. Id. at458.
315. Id at 457 (citing Mack, 326 F.3d at 122 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
316. "A hostile work environment claim may be based on one incident, but 'we require
that the incident constitute an 'intolerable alteration' of the plaintiffs working conditions, so as
to substantially interfere with or impair his ability to do his job.'" New Venture Gear, 310 Fed.
App'x at 458 (citing Mathirampuzha, 548 F.3d at 79 (citation omitted)).
317. No. 1:09cv354, 2009 WL 2391939 (E.D. Va. July 2, 2009).
318. There were eleven counts to the plaintiff's claim, including IIED and NIED, against
his employer for the actions of an African American foreman. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendant company and the court of appeals affirmed, in an
opinion that is instructive on a number of fronts. See Adams v. High Purity, Systems, Inc., 382
Fed. App'x 269 (4th Cir. 2010).
319. Adams, 2009 WL 2391939, at *1. For background on the Jena 6, an incident
involving the alleged beating by black students on a white classmate in a town in Louisiana,
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Adams about "paying his white ass back."3 20 These did not rise to the
level of creating a hostile work environment.321 Nor did these acts
constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress 322 or negligent
infliction of emotional distress323 even though the plaintiff became
violently sick when confronted with the foreman wearing the Jena 6 t-
shirt, and subsequently took (unauthorized) medical leave. Even
though the plaintiff was fired for taking this medical leave, his claim
for retaliation under § 1981 also failed.3 4
Commenting on the track record for plaintiffs in racial
harassment cases, Patricia Chew notes that
see the New York Times summary and related resources and stories. The N.Y. Times
summarized the incident this way: "An incident involving a tree, a school, two nooses and six
African-American high school students has made the small town of Jena, La., the focal point
of some of the largest civil rights protests in years, including a gathering that drew more than
10,000 people on Sept. 20, 2007. The protest concerned the so-called Jena Six, six black
students who were charged with attempted murder in the beating of a white classmate in
December 2006. Civil rights advocates, who have called the punishment of the arrested youths
disproportionate, say the case has raised the questions of how much race still plays a part in




320. Adams, 2009 WL 2391939, at *4.
321. Id. "To state a claim for hostile work environment, a plaintiff must allege that: 1) he
was subjected to unwelcome harassment; 2) the harassment was because of his race/color; 3)
the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
plaintiffs employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and 4) there is a basis to impose
liability on the employer." Id. (citing Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 1998)
(Title VII); Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 344 (4th Cir. 2006) (§ 1981
principles are same as those for Title VII)).
322. The court noted that the plaintiffs IIED claim failed because Plaintiffs allegations
"are insufficient to show outrageous conduct on either Defendants' part. Conduct is
'outrageous or intolerable' if it is 'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.'' Adams, 2009 WL 2391939, at *9 (citing Russo v.
White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 162 (Va. 1991)).
323. "There must be a 'clear and unbroken chain of causal connection' between the
negligence, the emotional disturbance, and the physical injury. To succeed on a negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim, a plaintiff must allege 'clear and convincing evidence of
symptoms or manifestations of physical injury, not merely an underlying emotional
disturbance."' Adams, 2009 WL 2391939, at *9 (citing Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp., 523 S.E.2d 826, 834 (Va. 2000); Myseros v. Sissler, 387 S.E.2d 463, 464 (Va. 1990)
(internal citations omitted)) (emphasis in original).
324. "To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that: 1) he
engaged in protected activity; 2) he suffered an adverse action; and 3) there is a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Adams, 2009
WL 2391939, at *6 (citing Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2003) (Title VII)); see
Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d at 344 (Section 1981 standard is the same as Title V1I)).
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[I]n [these] cases, plaintiffs have a higher success rate
when they claim blatant race-linked verbal and
physical harassment than when they claim more
contextual and subtle harassment. For instance,
plaintiffs are successful in 33.3% of their cases when
they report harassers' use of ostensibly race-linked
objects such a nooses, white robes, and pointed hats -
compared to an average plaintiffs' win rate of
21.5% .... Perhaps what is most striking is that
plaintiffs still lose two-thirds of the time in those
cases.325
The current Title VII and § 1981 frameworks appear to provide
plaintiffs avenues (albeit limited) for redress when the racism is direct,
outrageous, and obnoxious. But these frameworks are not sufficient to
provide aggrieved plaintiffs redress against individual co-employees
or supervisors whose harassment results in these plaintiffs
experiencing Race Based Traumatic Stress.326 Additional causes of
action and paths to redress should be made available to aggrieved,
traumatized plaintiffs. These include the application of tort law, as
outlined in the section that follows.
E. Developing More Effective Employment Law and Policy
A challenge to employees and employers, as well as legal
counsel and judges, is developing a shared understanding of what
constitutes racial harassment in the workplace. The generally accepted
standard is that the harassment must be "severe or pervasive" to be
actionable. 327 While this article does not advocate for a new
harassment standard, a new approach to interpreting the meaning and
application of "severe" and "pervasive" in cases involving
psychological injury or impairment or race-based traumatic stress is
warranted.
Heather Kleinschmidt has explored the "severe and pervasive"
standard in depth and points out inconsistencies between its
application in racial harassment versus sexual harassment claims. 328
325. Chew, supra note 152, at 631 (internal footnotes omitted) (alterations added).
326. See generally Carter, Race-Based Traumatic Stress, supra note 12; see also Carter,
Recognizing and Assessing Race-Based Traumatic Stress, supra note 12.
327. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
328. Heather Kleinschmidt, Note, Reconsidering Severe or Pervasive: Aligning the
Standard in Sexual Harassment and Racial Harassment Causes ofAction, 80 IND. L. J. 1119,
1123 (2005). Kleinschmidt relates that the Supreme Court affirmed that the analogy between
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Following the Meritor case, 329 she notes, courts have not been
consistently been applying the severe or pervasive test prescribed by
the Supreme Court, but have applied a severe and pervasive standard
in cases involving sexual harassment. Even as courts have applied an
inconsistent, if not "lower," standard to racial harassment cases,
according to Kleinschmidt,330 plaintiffs in racial harassment cases have
had little success in advancing their claims.33 1
Patricia Chew correctly recommends an approach not based on,
or in reaction to, sexual harassment jurisprudence, but one that is
specifically applicable to racial harassment.332 Chew goes on to raise
key questions that could aid in a more effective jurisprudence for
racial harassment, as distinct from, although in some ways similar to
sexual harassment:
To what extent should the elements of a racial
harassment claim be reinterpreted? To what extent are
the elements of a sexual harassment claim ever
racial harassment and sexual harassment was proper, noting that "[i]n National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, [536 U.S. 101 (2002] the Court decided its first case of racial
harassment. The African-American plaintiff alleged that since the time of his hiring, he had
been subject to consistent harassment, which included utterances of racial epithets by
managers, refusals to allow him to participate in an apprenticeship program, and numerous
'written counselings' for absenteeism. [Id. at 106 n.1]. The Court resolved the case using the
continuing violation theory for Title VII claims. [See id. at 122]. When making its decision,
the Court stated that hostile work environment racial harassment and sexual harassment claims
are reviewed under the same standard. [Id. at 116 n.10]. The Court applied the 'severe or
pervasive' standard it developed for sexual harassment cases involving hostile work
environments to this racial harassment case. [See id.]." Id. at 1123 (alterations added).
329. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
330. Kleinschmidt, supra note 328, at 1139. ("The direction that the courts take in
deciding what standards to use could have implications for open questions of law in future
harassment cases. If courts continue to treat sexual and racial harassment differently when
deciding whether conduct creates a hostile working environment, courts might move away
from the analogy between sexual and racial harassment when deciding open questions of law.
Courts might be less likely to import standards of one type of harassment to the other type of
harassment, making decisions less predictable. However, if courts align the severe or
pervasive standard, they might also be likely to continue the analogy to open issues of law.
This would lead to consistency and predictability for all involved in Title VII litigation.").
331. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 91 (noting the long odds faced by plaintiffs in
racial harassment suits). Consistency in application of the "severe"/"pervasive" standard for
sexual and racial harassment cases is warranted, as is an interpretation of these standards that
would permit a greater percentage of claims of racial harassment and discrimination to be
heard on their merits.
332. See Chew, supra note 152, at 641 ("While research comparing racial harassment
with sexual harassment is still in its early stages, tentative observations indicate significant
dissimilarities between the two. While much attention has been appropriately been focused on
sexual harassment, it is now time to develop a jurisprudential model specifically for racial
harassment that is cognizant of its distinct attributes and complexity.").
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appropriate to a racial harassment claim? As the legal
community begins to puzzle through these major
jurisprudential issues, two relevant issues discussed in
the concluding remarks of this Article should be
considered. Neither issue is easily resolved, but it is
critical that the legal community addresses both.3 33
The status and state of mind of the target of racial harassment,
while sometimes considered by the courts, has not been appropriately
considered or applied to effect remedies or redress for such plaintiffs.
This is an instance in which a "reasonable victim" or target standard
could be applied in cases of alleged racial (or sexual) harassment. 334 A
similar standard could be applied to targets of racial harassment in
determining whether their injuries are compensable under either
statutory or case law.
IV. APPLYING TORT LAW-MORE EFFECTIVELY RESPONDING TO
RACIAL HARASSMENT
A. Tort Law - Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress (IIED),
Direct and Vicarious Liability
The concept that harassment, specifically sexual harassment, is
best resolved in the legal sense through tort law is not new. Indeed, it
333. Id. Chew concludes her article by noting "[a]s employees, employers, judges, and
juries consider the viability of a racial harassment complaint, this Article argues that they
should not feel bound to the sexual harassment model. They should instead affirmatively
question the appropriateness of analogizing one from of harassment to another. In order to
fulfill the goals of Title VII, they should carefully consider the nuances of racial harassment,
rather than rotely assuming that harassing behavior in the workplace is monolithic." Id. at 647.
The approach proposed in the present article seeks to address these questions as well.
334. See Kamla Alexander, Note, A Modest Proposal: The "Reasonable Victim"
Standard and Alaska Employers' Affirmative Defense to Vicarious Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 17 ALASKA L. REv. 297, 318 (2000). ("In the Alaska Supreme Court's inevitable
determinations whether to apply the 'reasonable victim' standard and whether to allow Alaska
employers to claim the EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense, the court should follow the path
of VECO: Alaska's anti-discrimination law 'is intended to be more broadly interpreted than
federal law to further the goal of eradication of discrimination' Applying the 'reasonable
victim' standard not only helps plaintiffs, but also helps the justice system as a whole by
defeating societal stereotypes perpetuated by the application of the 'reasonable person'
standard . .. By allowing defendant employers to claim an affirmative defense to the sexual
harassment claims of their employees, the court would help protect cautious, law-abiding
employers from frivolous claims. The second prong of the defense would require employees to
report sexually harassing conduct to their employers promptly, and at the same time, require
employers to eliminate harassing conduct in the workplace swiftly or risk discipline in court.")
(internal citations omitted).
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was suggested by Mark McLaughlin Hager in 1998, who forcefully
argued that it is superior to discrimination law as an anti-harassment
weapon.33 5 Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins observed that
race has also deeply impacted the assignment of responsibility and
resultant legal outcomes. They argue that tort law can be informative
in a variety of fundamental constructs, and can apply to racial
harassment and discrimination as well.336
Even earlier, Dennis Duffy, in arguing against the
"tortification" of labor and employment law, stated that while "[i]t is
the rare case in which the corporate employer actually orders the
outrageous acts, has advance knowledge of them, or desires them to
take place . . . the typical employer is guilty, if at all, of simply
allowing such actions to take place." 337 Duffy argues that tort liability
335. See generally Mark M. Hager, Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile
Environment Liability Should be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REv. 375 (1998); contra Dennis P.
Duffy, Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case Against
'Tortification' of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387. "Few anti-harassment
lawyers, activists, and theoreticians," Hager states, "have questioned [the] discrimination
paradigm. But that is what I mean to do here. I will suggest that discrimination law as an anti-
harassment weapon is morally and legally confused, dubious in its effectiveness, and deeply
troubling in its unintended consequences. I will suggest that tort law is superior on all of these
counts. My point in a nutshell is that harassment should be met with tort suits against actual
perpetrators." Hager, supra, at 376 (alteration added). Even Duffy would seem to allow for
personal liability for fellow employees [e.g. of an employee alleging harassment] "...if their
conduct or motives are purely personal, and if their conduct rises to the level of
outrageousness. However, the employer itself, should not be liable unless it condoned or
approved of the acts of the offending employee or manager. Duffy, supra, at 333. This article
advocates for employer vicarious liability in cases of harassment resulting in RBTS, if the
employer knew or should have known of the harassing behavior of its employees and that
behavior resulted in serious injury such as RBTS.
336. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 104. It is our contention that race also matters
in everyday judgments of cause and effect and assessments of responsibility for injury. In our
white-dominated society, the lingering cognitive association of blackness with inferiority and
with the lack of value can distort legal judgments, devaluing and sometimes erasing the pain
and suffering of people of color ...
As they operate in institutional contexts, common forms of cognitive bias - particularly habits
of thought that make it harder to imagine different outcomes - can affect expectations about
what is normal and reasonable and therefore ultimately impact legal liability. . . [W]e regard
tort law as a particularly appropriate site for investigating differing "common sense"
understandings of such fundamental constructs as dignity, reasonableness, cause, and injury.
Id. at 7-8 (alteration added); see also infra Section V(B) and discussion of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The proposal in this article also includes tort law as
an appropriate legal strategy in cases of RBTS, and as a body of law that informs the "Shared
Responsibility" approach. See infra Section VI.
337. Duffy, supra note 335, at 420 (emphasis added). In acknowledging that there were
cases in which an employer could (or should) be held vicariously liable for the acts of their
supervisory employees, Duffy cited Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W. 2d 652 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), a
case in which "...the court upheld the jury's finding that the conduct of the supervisor was
extreme and outrageous because it was tantamount to sexual harassment, and ... Although it is
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does have a place in the process for employees to seek redress for
racial harassment in the workplace. Specifically, she argues that
employers should be liable in instances where intentional infliction of
emotional distress perpetrated by acts of supervisors or fellow
employees is apparent. Liability should also accrue when employers
knew or should have known that such acts would be perpetrated that
could result in psychological or emotional injury to the employee.338
Likewise, Jennifer Fox Swain, analyzing employment torts in an ABA
paper notes that: "[s]ome of the most often utilized torts in
employment litigation, and the ones which [are addressed in this
paper] are intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation (libel
and slander), intentional interference with employment contracts,
invasions of privacy, assault and battery, and negligent hiring, training
and retention." 339
B. Cases Involving Claims for IED, NIED, and Related Federal
Law Violations
Advancing a claim in tort for harassment or discrimination in
the workplace is a challenging proposition for plaintiffs who allege
that they have suffered injury as a result of behavior by co-workers
clear that [the supervisor] was acting for purely personal motives (his desire to have an
affair...), the court found that the employer was liable for the supervisor's conduct even
absent proof of ratification because he was acting within his general authority as a supervisor."
Id. at 421 n. 153 (alteration added).
338. The approach proposed in this article is also consistent with Duffy's assertion that
"Courts should allow employers defending intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
to avoid or limit liability if they have established a complaint or appeal procedure reasonably
calculated to encourage employees to come forward and complain to higher management. If
management takes prompt remedial action, or if the employee does not take advantage of the
complaint procedure, employer responsibility should be diminished or eliminated entirely," Id.
at 420-21 (footnote omitted).
339. Jennifer F. Swain, Employment Torts, 2006 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP. L., EMP. RTs.
& RESP. COMM. I ((alteration added). Swain notes that "To establish a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show: (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct; (2) intent to cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe
emotional distress; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and injury; and (4) severe
emotional distress. Id. [(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965))]; [s]ee also
Frank B. Harty & Thomas W. Foley, Employment Torts: Emerging Areas of Liability, 39
Drake L. Rev. 3, 41 (1989) [(footnotes omitted)]. In most jurisdictions, the complained of
conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965); see Soti v. Lowe's Home Centers Inc.,
[906 So.2d 916, 919] (Ala. 2005) [(internal citations omitted)]; Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d
580[, 585] (Ariz. 1987). Further, the distress inflicted must be so severe that no reasonable
man could be expected to endure it. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965)." Id.
at 2 (alterations added).
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and/or supervisors and managers. To state a claim for IIED, for
example, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct was
"extreme and outrageous." One court summarized a common view of
this standard in stating that "'[e]xtreme and outrageous conduct' is an
amorphous phrase that escapes precise definition." 340 In Dean v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit stated that:
Liability [for outrageous conduct] has been found only
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community ....
Generally the case is one in which a recitation of the
facts to an average member of the community would
lead him to exclaim "Outrageous."34 1
Plaintiffs are often not successful in advancing their complaints
because they have not presented facts sufficient to demonstrate
extreme and outrageous behavior, or even because they have not
named specific defendants. 342  In other cases involving alleged
340. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 104, at 78, note that, "Many courts have even
hesitated to declare the 'severe or pervasive' harassment required to prove a hostile
environment claim under civil rights statutes as sufficient to meet the threshold tort
requirement of 'extreme and outrageous' conduct." Id.
341. Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965))) (alterations added); see also Watson v. Dixon, 502
S.E.2d 15 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998), "A claim for [HIED] exists 'when a defendant's 'conduct
exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society and the conduct causes mental distress
of a very serious kind."' Id. atl9 (citing Stanback v. Stanback, 254 S.E.2d 61, 622 (1979)
(quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 56 (4th ed. 1971) (alteration added); see also
JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 23 (4th ed. 2010), "[lIED] exists when the
defendant, by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly causes the victim
severe mental distress. Most states no longer require that the victim suffer physical
manifestations of the mental stress." (alterations added); but see Nelson v. Metro-North
Commuter R.R., 235 F.3d 101, 106 (2000) - Employee sued railroad under Federal
Employer's Liability Act (FELA), alleging NIED because railroad allowed a co-employee
into area of a train station where employee worked after employee had reported coemployee
for sexual harassment. District court granted defendant's motion for SJ, and Court of Appeals
affirmed - because the plaintiff failed to prove that she was placed in immediate risk of
physical harm, although the quantum of evidence of negligence required in FELA cases was
significantly lower than in ordinary tort cases. (internal citations omitted).
342. Gooden v. Dep't of Corr., 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3073, at *Overview (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2007) (suit against a STATE entity) - "Count Four (NIED) failed because
[the plaintiff] (1) named no individual defendants, (2) he identified no statute by which the
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employer racial discrimination, plaintiffs cases have resulted in
summary judgment against them for a combination of procedural and
statutory limitations. Such limitations could include bars to remedies
covered under state law, for example, NIED claims in Hawaii that
have exclusive remedies in worker's compensation statutes.343
To establish a prima facie case of IED, a plaintiff must show
(1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant which
(2) either intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe
emotional distress. 344 In Kassem v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr.,345 the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set the bar quite high for
the specific facts required to establish a viable IIED claim, following
the Laritani3 46 framework. In Kassem, the plaintiff was fired from his
State waived sovereign immunity; and (3) he did not claim a violation of constitutionally
protected rights or that the State acted in excess of its statutory authority." (alteration added).
343. McClane v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 116 P.3d 719 (Haw. 2005)- [summary stmt] On
appeal, the court found that the trial court properly dismissed the claims of race discrimination
. . . because the allegations on which the claims were based were barred by either the
employee's failure to exhaust administrative remedies or the statute of limitations; and
properly dismissed the claims of negligent retention and NIED because those claims were
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Hawaii WC statutes (HAW. REv. STAT. § 386-
5 (1993)); and properly dismissed the claim of IIED because, as a matter of law, the conduct
alleged was not sufficiently outrageous to support a claim for IIED.
344. See Larijani v. Georgetown University, 791 A.2d 41, 43 (D.C. 2002) (citing Howard
University v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 985 (D.C. 1984) (quoting Sere v. Group Hospitalization,
Inc. 443 A.2d 33, 37 (D.C. 1982))). "The conduct must be 'so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to utterly go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Lariani, 791 A.2d at 43 (citing
Homan v. Goval, 711 A.2d 812, 818 (D.C. 1998) (quoting Dreiza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308,
1312 n.10 (D.C. 1984))). That case involved neither racial nor sexual harassment, but provides
a helpful illustration of the standard for stating a successful IIED claim. Plaintiff was harassed
by co-workers who used loud noise devices placed outsider her office door, for a period of
nine months, to harass her. Plaintiff suffered physical and emotional injuries, and defendants
refused to take any corrective action. The Court of appeals reversed the trial court's granting
of a motion to dismiss to the defendants, and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 45; see
also Kassem v. Washington Hosp. Center, 513 F.3d 251, 255 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting King
v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656, 677-78 (D.C. 1983)) ("supervisor's participation in retaliating against
an employee who had complained of sexual harassment supported an IED claim because such
conduct 'cannot be considered merely an instance of typical 'employer-employee
conflicts."').
345. 513F.3d251.
346. Id. at 255. "To establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, a plaintiff must show: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent to cause, or
disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress; (3) a causal
connection between the conduct and injury; and (4) severe emotional distress. . . . It is well
established that criticism of an employee's job performance, abrasive interrogations,
unjustified reprimands, opposition to unemployment benefits, excessive supervision, or
negative evaluations alone do not constitute outrageous conduct on the part of the employer.
Swain, supra note 339, at 2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46; Barber, v.
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position and had a false charge, that he violated company policy and
the law, filed against him by his employer; the defendant-employer
did so knowing that the charge would harm plaintiffs future
employment prospects and also to avoid regulatory action against the
hospital. Given these allegations, the court held that the plaintiffs
claim could not be dismissed at the pleading stage.34  Kassem
illustrates just how egregious employer behavior may have to be, and
how high the bar is for plaintiffs to clear, to move beyond a potential
summary judgment against their claims.
Just as plaintiffs have difficulties in making an IED claim,
plaintiffs have many challenges to successfully assert a negligent
infliction of emotional distress case. Such challenges can be seen in
Snyder v. Med. Serv. Corp., of E. Wash.3 48 In that case, the plaintiff
sued for wrongful discharge and NIED, among other claims. The
Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the court of appeals ruling for
the defendant - even though the state's Industrial Insurance Act did
not bar the employee's claim - because the supervisor's conduct did
not support a claim for emotional distress for several reasons: there
was no evidence that the employer was aware of the employee's
susceptibility to emotional problems, the employee's termination was
lawful, and the employer did not violate the law against discrimination
by failing to grant the employee's request for a new supervisor. 349 The
Washington Supreme Court noted that mental distress is a fact of life,
and that courts cannot guarantee a stress-free workplace. 350
While we agree with the Snyder court that "mental distress is a
fact of life," an employee should be guaranteed redress for fellow
employee/employer race-based actions that result in traumatic stress to
that employee. 35' While workplace disputes are best resolved by the
employer, when the employer is non-responsive or fails to effectively
prevent and respond to their employee's or supervisor's harassing
Whirlpool Corp., 34 F.3d 1268 (4th Cir. 1994); Spence v. Maryland Casualty Co., 995 F.2d
1147 (2d Cir. 1993); Brown v. Freedman Baking Co., 810 F.2d 6 (1st Cit. 1987)).
347. Kassem, 513 F.3d at 257.
348. 35 P.3d 1158 (Wash. 2001).
349. See generally id.
350. Id. at 1165 (citing Bishop v. State, 889 P.2d 959, 963 (Wash. App. 1995)). The court
noted that, "[A] defendant's obligation to refrain from particular conduct is owed only to those
who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct, and only with respect to those risks or
hazards whose likelihood make the conduct unreasonably dangerous . . . The utility of
permitting employers to handle workplace disputes outweighs the risk of harm to employees
who may exhibit symptoms of emotional distress as a result." Snyder, 35 P.3d at 1164-65
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (alteration added).
351. Id. at 1164.
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conduct, the aggrieved employee should be able to seek meaningful
redress in the courts.
An example in which a plaintiff was successful in advancing a
tort claim is Clifton v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth.352 This case involved
an employer that failed to stop ongoing racial harassment, and the
court awarded plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages for
emotional distress, and for defendant's violation of Massachusetts law
(G.L. c. 151B, §§4(1) and (4)). On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court awarded a new trial [on issues of damages only], yet it still
noted that "the evidence at trial demonstrated a pattern of egregious
racial harassment and retaliation, perpetrated on the plaintiff (who is
African-American) by both supervisors and coworkers throughout
nine years of his employment. .. at the MBTA." 353 "The plaintiff
initially complained about the derogatory and unlawful conduct to his
immediate supervisors, but they did nothing to stop it."354 The issue of
continued harassment bolstered the plaintiffs case in Clifton, even in
the face of newly-established federal standards applying Title VII. 355
Regarding claims of NIED specifically, in a case involving a
Title VII claim by an African-American female plaintiff for unlawful
discrimination based on race, national origin and age, 42 U.S.C. §
1983, and Connecticut discrimination law, the federal district court
allowed the NIED claim to proceed, as the plaintiff had been
constructively discharged. Absent discharge, the court would not have
352. 839 N.E.2d 314 (Mass. 2005).
353. Id. at 316. Workplace behavior encountered by plaintiff included".. [a foreman] . . .
and others shot bottle rockets at him. . . set water boobytraps that would fall on him when he
opened his office door, and painted 'fag bait' and 'Sanford and Son' on his locker. When the
plaintiff complained to his supervisor . . . [the supervisor] called the plaintiff a 'rat.' The
supervisor himself soon joined in the harassment, calling the plaintiff 'Roxbury Mayor,'
'fucking banana,' and 'Sanford,' and referring to the plaintiff and another black employee as
'ding and dong."' Id. ". . . The plaintiff became aware of several instances of discriminatory
conduct, including the use of racist epithets such as 'nigger' and 'colored boy' directed toward
other MBTA employees who also were African-American." Id. at 317.
354. Id at 317.
355. Clifton, 839 N.E.2d at 317. "At the time of the trial, the court in Clifton noted that
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, interpreting Title VII, had adopted the
so-called 'revelatory' standard for applying the continuing violation doctrine, which barred a
plaintiff from asserting unlawful conduct beyond the limitation period if the plaintiff was, or
should have been, aware of the existence of unlawful discrimination during the 'untimely'
period. Id. at 320 (citing Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy Div. of Melville Corp., 145 F.3d 5, 14
(1st Cir. 1998); "In our view, the Federal standard 'fail[ed] to recognize fully that an employee
who suffers from recurring acts of abusive . . . conduct that, over time, rise to the level of a
hostile work environment, may be unable to appreciate the true character and enormity of the
discriminatory environment until after it has continued for an appreciable length of time."'
Clifton, 839 N.E.2d at 320 (quoting Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 750 N.E.2d
928, 941 (Mass. 2001)) (alteration in original).
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allowed this claim to proceed.356 The Grey court noted that the alleged
conduct was not sufficiently unreasonable to support an NIED claim,
however, and that the firing of an employee, even though wrongfully
motivated, does not constitute socially intolerable behavior. NIED
arises in the employment context, said the court, only where it is based
on unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination
process.357
C. Vicarious Liability and Respondeat Superior358
Under the theory of respondeat superior, an employer may be
held vicariously liable for an employee's intentional torts (including
intentional infliction of emotional distress) if the employee was acting
within the scope of his employment when he committed the tort.
However, as with many employment torts, the allegedly tortuous
conduct cited in claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
is frequently outside the scope of the offending employee's
employment. 359
If employees act outside the scope of employment, employers
may also be held vicariously liable for the harassing behavior of their
employees if they "ratify" the behavior, although this liability may not
extend to punitive damages against the employer. To establish
ratification, a plaintiff must prove that "the employer (1) had actual
knowledge of the tortuous conduct of the offending employee and that
356. Grey v. City of Norwalk, 304 F. Supp. 2d 314, 332 (D. Conn. 2004) (citing
Perodeau v. City of Hartford, 792 A.2d 752, 768 (Conn. 2002)). The court reasoned that,
"[e]mployees who fear lawsuits by fellow employees may be less competitive with each other,
may promote the interests of their employer less vigorously, may refrain from reporting the
improper or even illegal conduct of fellow employees, may be less frank in performance
evaluations, and may make employment decisions such as demotions, promotions, and
transfers on the basis of fear of suit rather than business needs and desires. All of this conduct
would contribute to a less vigorous and less productive workplace." Grey, 304 F. Supp. 2d at
332 (citing Perodeau, 792 A.2d at 769)) (alteration added). The authors beg to differ, and
would assert that employees who are permitted by their employers to harass each other to the
point of causing traumatic stress would be more likely to "contribute to a less vigorous and
less productive workplace" than if legitimate lawsuits were allowed to be brought in such
cases to redress this behavior and reduce the likelihood of its reoccurrence.
357. Grey, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 333 (citing Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 700
A.2d 655, 667 (Conn. 1997)) (internal citations omitted).
358. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006) ("An employer is subject to
liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their
employment.")
359. Swain, supra note 339, at 3 (citing Busby v. Truswal Sys. Co., 551 So.2d 322, 327
(Ala. 1989)). "Plaintiffs may nonetheless hold employers liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress where it can be demonstrated that the employer adopted or ratified the
tortuous conduct of its supervisory employees." Id. at 3.
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the tortuous conduct was directed at and visited upon the complaining
employee; (2) that based upon this knowledge, the employer knew, or
should have known, that such conduct constituted [a tort] and/or a
continuing tort; and (3) that the employer failed to take 'adequate'
steps to remedy the situation." 360
In Watson v. Dixon,36 1 for example, the plaintiff (Watson) was
subjected to sexual harassment by co-workers in the medical center
where they worked. The harassment included "cruel practical jokes ...
obscene comments and behavior of a sexual nature, which then
escalated into unwanted touching of her person, until finally
culminating in veiled threats to her personal safety . .. [It] continued
virtually unchecked for some seven or eight months . . . [and] several
of her co-workers testified that Watson appeared emotionally upset
while at work."3 62 Eventually Watson had a nervous breakdown, and
brought a lawsuit for assault, negligent hiring, negligent retention, and
IED - alleging that Duke University "ratified" this behavior. 363
Alan 0. Sykes, writing on the boundaries and economics of
vicarious liability, notes that vicarious liability will not apply if an
agent (employee) acts out of personal ill will. Rather, the employee
must act out of a purpose to serve the employer. 364 Recent case law,
however, reflects a more flexible approach. One California court, for
example, upheld the imposition of vicarious liability against a building
subcontractor for his drunken employee's assault of two employees of
the general contractor. "The court reasoned that the tort resulted from
the tortfeasor's perception of his rights as an employee." 365 Employers
will want to keep this in mind as they train and supervise their new and
current employees, particularly management staff, who may perceive it
as a "right" to engage in behavior that is harassing and traumatizing to
their supervisees or fellow employees. Clear policy statements and
360. Potts v. BE & K Constr. Co., 604 So.2d 398, 400 (Ala. 1992).
361. 502 S.E.2d 15, 15 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
362. Id. at 20.
363. Id. at 17-18, 20. The Watson court held that "Duke's liability is based solely on a
jury determination that Duke ratified the actions of its employee, Bobby Dixon. Accordingly,
the jury award of punitive damages against Duke for $500,000, in excess of punitive damages
against Dixon, cannot stand. We therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the
punitive damage award, as being contrary to law, and remand the matter to the trial court for a
trial on the issue of punitive damages against defendants." Id. at 21-22.
364. Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 563, 589 (1988)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
365. Id. Sykes also suggests that "Intrinsically stressful occupations, for example, may
precipitate intentional torts. In such cases, the business enterprise 'causes' the tort even though
the employee's tortious behavior may evince a purely personal motivation." Id. at 588-89.
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swift follow through by employers who become aware of such
behavior will reduce the likelihood of successful claims for emotional
distress - and more importantly prevent or mitigate such distress to
their employees. 366
A racial harassment case decided in the Fifth Circuit, Walker v.
Thompson, 367 exemplifies the high standard of proof some courts
require before allowing a jury to determine whether the defendant has
engaged in outrageous conduct. In that case, the employer's
investigation purportedly revealed no racial harassment or
discrimination whatsoever. The investigating supervisor reached this
conclusion even though he testified that the offending supervisor was
reprimanded for saying to the plaintiff that "her grandmother rubbed a
black child's head for good luck," and that the supervisor had been
informed that she should not have said to Walker that Brazilian nuts
were called "nigger toes." 368 The court in Walker held that based on
the alleged facts, the employer failed to demonstrate as a matter of law
that they "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
[the] harassing behavior." 369
The barriers to an intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED) claim for racial harassment are formidable and are not
overcome by a showing of racist comments directed at the plaintiff,
even repeatedly, according to the Fifth Circuit ruling in Walker.370 In
366. See EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, PUB. No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS
(1999), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ policy/docs/harassment.html.
367. 214 F.3d 615, 615 (5th Cir. 2000).The company's anti-harassment policy statement
in Walker read as follows: 'It is the policy of the company not to discriminate in recruitment,
hiring, compensation, promotion or any other condition of employment on the basis of race,
color, national origin, religion, sex, age, physical or mental handicaps, marital status,
pregnancy or parenthood."Id. at 627 n. 14. The company's handbook "instructs employees who
believe they have been subject to sexual harassment to notify management immediately.". The
handbook also has a section regarding employee complaints in general, instructing the
employee to contact his immediate supervisor regarding the problem, and in the event that the
problem is not resolved, the employee should inform the appropriate manager." Id. at 627
n. 15.
368. Id. at 627.
369. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
370. Walker, 214 F.3d 615 at 616, 619. a case which involved plaintiff s claim for racial
discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the claims of
retaliation and IIED among other claims, and vacated the summary judgment determination
with respect to the hostile environment claim. The Plaintiff was an African-American woman;
Thompson, a defendant, was her supervisor. The Comments made to the Plaintiff by her
supervisor included telling the Plaintiff that "her grandmother would rub a little black boy's
head for good luck, much like the slave masters did to slaves," that she "did not look like she
swung from the trees," and that "I thought you looked like one of my grandmother's slaves."
Another manager told the Plaintiff that "he would send her back to Africa with her family if
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Walker, the Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for defendants on
plaintiffs IED claim, citing the Restatement 2nd of Torts: "Insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, or petty oppressions, without more, do
not rise to the level of [IIED]."371 Further, the court pointed out the
affirmative defenses available to the employer-defendant, citing the
rulings in the landmark workplace harassment cases of Ellerth and
Faragher.372 The court in Walker did note, however, that it was "not
persuaded that the appellees have shown as a matter of law that they
exercised reasonable care in correcting the racially harassing
behavior," 373 and vacated the summary judgment granted to defendant
at trial on this claim.374
Shuler v. Regency House of Wallingford, Inc., 3 involved an
Africa American female nurse who was subjected to racial harassment
by a co-worker. After reporting the incidents to her supervisor,
plaintiff believed she was retaliated against by being reassigned to
different work during which she suffered a physical injury as well.
Plaintiff Shuler sued for negligent supervision based on supervisor's
failure to prevent co-worker's harassment, and supervisor's-
supervisor for failing to prevent retaliation. Defendant moved to
dismiss, and motions were granted as to all claims except promissory
estoppel with the court ruling that plaintiff "may be able to prove that
representations reasonably induced [plaintiff] to continue reporting
she was not careful;" he made this threat once and again several months later. In Walker's
presence, a fellow employee stated that "her husband wanted to hang [her son's tennis] shoes
from his rear view mirror 'like those niggers."' Id. at 619-20 (alteration added). An internal
company investigation of these incidents found no harassment. The Plaintiff subsequently
filed a complaint with the EEOC. The Plaintiff subsequently resigned from her job, and filed
suit for discrimination in state court, which was removed to federal court - claims under Title
VII, § 1981, and TIED. Id. at 622-24.
371. Walker, 214 F.3d 615, 628 (citation omitted).
372. See Walker, 214 F.3d 615, 626 (stating"[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability
to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.... [h]owever when no
tangible employment action has been shown, and employer is entitled to raise an affirmative
defense to such claim. The two elements of this affirmative defense are: '(a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any racially harassing behavior, and
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."') (citations
omitted) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998))).
373. Walker, 214 F.3d 615, 630.
374. Id. at 627.
375. No. 3:05CV480 (RNC), 2006 WL 118383, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2006).
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discrimination, and that she did so to her detriment."376 Plaintiffs
claim for IIED did not survive a motion to dismiss. 377 The plaintiff in
Mclean v. Patten Cmty., Inc.378 fared better by relying on North
Carolina law. McLean, an African American female employee brought
a claim for racial discrimination under Section 1981, as well as North
Carolina law - public policy prohibiting discrimination, and negligent
retention and supervision (involving a sales manager at the company);
this claim survived summary judgment.3 79
As the above cases indicate, plaintiffs face especially difficult
challenges in bringing harassment lawsuits based on intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Cases alleging negligent infliction of
emotional distress, although logical and defensible, face even stiffer
challenges as noted in the section that follows.
D. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED) and
Restatement (Third) of Torts38 0
The focus of this section is on NIED because it has a
potentially broader legal sweep and may begin to be more accepted by
courts. In addition, some commentators have indicated that the burden
of proving NIED would be less onerous than showing both an
emotional distress injury and intent to do so on the part of the
defendant.381
376. Shuler, 2006 WL 118383, at *3.; see also supra note 66, regarding corporate and
organizational diversity statements - arguably implied promises to employees that they will be
provided a respectful work environment.
377. Shuler, 2006 WL 118383 at *4.
378. 332 F.3d 714 (4th Cir. 2003).
379. Id. at 721. "While Mrs. McLean was employed at Patten, she, and at least some of
the other female employees were subjected to all manner of propositions, indignities, and
insults based on race or sex, or both . . . [these included allegations of the manager] joking
about wanting to have sex with a black woman. As time went on the female employees were
called bitches, whores, sluts, brats, etc. The black employees were referred to as niggers." Id.
at 716 (alteration added). After these employees complained to management, their supervisor
stated that "he wanted Mrs. McLean fired, and . . . told [an employee] to make it hard on her
so she would quit." Id. (alteration added). Applying sexual harassment principles to the racial
harassment in this case, the court held that "[j]ust as we have held and hold in this case that a
North Carolina state cause of action for wrongful discharge is stated by a claim that an
employee is separated from employment because of her sex when the cause of separation is
her refusal of sexual favors to her supervisor, then, when the record indicates, as it does in this
case, that her separation may have been caused because of her race, we are of the opinion and
hold that she has stated a cause of action under the state law of [N.C.] under § 143-422.2."Id.
at 721 (alteration added).
380. See generally 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 877 (2009).
381. See CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 3.12-2 (2008), available at
http://www.jud.state.ct.us/JI/Civil/part3/3.12-2.htm. (stating "There are three elements that the
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The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED)
has three elements that the plaintiff must prove: "1) the defendant
engaged in conduct that the defendant should have realized involved
an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that that
distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily injury; 2)
that the conduct caused emotional distress to the plaintiff; and 3) the
distress was of such a nature as might result in illness or bodily
harm."382 A plaintiff must also show that "(1) the defendant's conduct
is negligent and (2) such conduct caused mental disturbance
accompanied by physical injury, illness, or other physical
consequences."
Cases in state courts have attempted to balance the validity of
NIED claims against existing remedies under state law, particularly
through worker's compensation (WC) statutes. The applicability of
WC statutes can vary from state to state, but some such statutes may
require a showing of physical contact to plaintiff by defendant, going
beyond even racist and degrading verbal comments. Plaintiffs bringing
such claims need to show that these statutes do not specifically bar tort
38431claims for IED. In Chea,385 the Plaintiffs claimed symptoms arising
from a co-worker's verbal and physical assault and from verbal taunts,
plaintiff must prove for a finding of [NIED]: 1) the defendant engaged in conduct that the
defendant should have realized involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress
and that that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily injury; 2) that the
conduct caused emotional distress to the plaintiff; and 3) the distress was of such a nature as
might result in illness or bodily harm ..... If you find that the plaintiff has proved all of the
elements of [NIED], you will find for the plaintiff and award damages on this count as I will
describe in the 'damages' section of these instructions.")
382. CIvIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 3.12-2 (2008) available at,
http://www.jud.state.ct.us/JI/Civil/part3/3.12-2.htm.
383. McNight v. Madison Parish Sch. Bd., No. 07-0030, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42654,
at *22-*23 (W.D. La. May 20, 2009) (citing Moresi v. State, 567 So.2d 1081, 1095 (La.
1990)).
384. See, e.g., Chea v. Men's Wearhouse, Inc., 932 P.2d 1261, 1264-66 (Wash. Ct. App.
1997). Chea involved a claim for NIED for physical and verbal racial harassment. Id. at 1262-
63. The court held that "[NIED] is a cognizable claim in the workplace when it does not arise
solely from racial remarks and does not result from an employer's disciplinary acts or
personality a dispute. . .. [An NIED] claim can exist in an employment context. We have
recognized the claim arising in that context when it was not covered under the [Industrial
Insurance Act's (IIA)] exclusivity provisions and the dominant feature of the negligence claim
was the emotional injury. We recognize that an employer must be accorded latitude in making
decisions regarding employee discipline. This does not mean, however, that an employer
cannot be held responsible when its negligent acts injure an employee, and such acts are not in
the nature of employee discipline and do not give rise to a cognizable IIA claim. . . . The IIA
does not compensate for [NTED] claims arising from workplace harassment, including verbal
harassment or discrimination, so such claims are not barred by the IIA exclusivity provisions."
Id. at 1262, 1264-66 (footnotes omitted).
385. 932 P.2d 1261, 1261 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
2012] ADDRESSING WORKPLACE RACISM 77
which the state's Dept. of Labor and Industries "determined not to be
an injury or occupational disease and, therefore, not compensable,
[were] not barred by the IIA exclusivity provisions."386
1. Claims for Physical Harm under Section Four of the
Restatement Third of Torts
The emotional and psychological harm caused to employees,
and the resultant harms to the workplace, and losses to the employer
caused by race-based impairment or RBTS can be physical, emotional
or both.3 7 The drafts of the Restatement (Third) of Torts proposes that
the gap between these two types of harms be narrowed or closed, and
that emotional harm be recognized as "stand alone." Thus, plaintiff-
employees should be able to recover damages for emotional harm
without showing accompanying or related physical harm."' Some
courts have expanded recovery for emotional harm, requiring some
"'physical manifestation,' which was thought to provide an objective
standard to distinguish valid from invalid claims." This approach has
been rejected in the Third Restatement. 389
In discussing the recommended updates to the Restatement,
Oscar Gray argues that the bright line distinction between "physical"
and "emotional" injury is less useful than exploring the distinction
between "'mere feelings"' and "'injury."'390 Gray's view is consistent
386. Id. at 1266.
387. See Carter, supra note 11, at 88.
388. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 4 cmt. d (2010) ("Since [Restatement
(Second) of Torts], courts have liberalized the rules for recovery for stand-alone emotional
harm. Some of this liberalization has occurred by recognizing a claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress; Chapter 8 of this Restatement reflects those developments. However,
other courts liberalized recovery for emotional harm by characterizing psychic or emotional
harm as bodily harm.. By explicitly providing for claims for negligently inflicted emotional
harm in Chapter 8, this Restatement does not adopt that approach and indeed rejects it.")
389. Id.
390. Oscar S. Gray, Commentary, Commentary, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1193, 1193
(2009). In advocating for a de-emphasis between injuries that are physical and those that are
emotional, Gray posits that, "[m]ore significant than differences in specific outcomes,
however, is the difference in tone that becomes possible with a de-emphasis on distinctions
between 'physical' and 'emotional, ' with a recognition of all illnesses as aspects of bodily
harm, and with the substitution of medical diagnoses of psychiatric disorders to define
freestanding compensable conditions, in place of the vagaries of judicial or jury
understandings about the meaning of the word 'severe' in the term 'severe emotional
disturbance."' Id. at 1195; see also Martha Chamallas, Unpacking Emotional Distress: Sexual
Exploitation, Reproductive Harm, and Fundamental Rights, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1109,
1113 (2009) (arguing that "Section 46(b) of the Restatement (Third) authorizes liability if the
conduct producing the distress 'occurs in the course of specified categories of activities,
undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious
emotional disturbance.' The section thus anticipates a prioritizing of contexts and types of
cases. Significantly, however, the Restatement (Third) does not express an opinion as to which
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with that of the authors, as well as those who have demonstrated
through exhaustive empirical research that there are serious negative
health and mental health effects related to racism and racial
harassment. 39 1 These effects, which could be categorized as "injuries"
in the tort context, are well-documented and comprise an array of
somatic as well as psycho-somatic impacts on the targets of racial
discrimination and racial harassment.392
A recent Kentucky case brought in federal court offered a
viable avenue for an intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
claim, although the negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED)
claim which arose from the same set of workplace incidents was
dismissed. In Laporte v. Harbert Int '.,393 the court noted that the,
"[p]laintiff's complaint does not allege any physical contact or injury,
slight or otherwise, which would support his claim for mental
suffering. Accordingly, his claims for [NIED] are dismissed as to both
B.L. Harbert, [his (] and Stewart, [his supervisor]." 3 The plaintiff s
claim against his supervisor for IIED survived summary judgment,
however, as "Plaintiff alleges a pattern of discrimination and
harassment, including racial and derogatory comments from Stewart,
which was 'so pervasive' as to disrupt Plaintiffs work conditions and
cause him severe distress. Plaintiff also alleges that he suffered
embarrassment and humiliation. The Court finds that this is enough to
survive a motion to dismiss."395 The LaPorte court also stipulated that
plaintiff could recover punitive damages if he was successful on his
IIED claim.39 6
Gregory C. Keating, in his seminal and provocative piece
entitled Is Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress a Freestanding
Tort?,3 97 suggests a framework for understanding negligent infliction
of emotional distress (NIED) grounded in proximate cause rather than
duty - these being two of the four basic elements of negligence
(breach and injury are the other two). Keating states that, for
specific activities, undertakings, or relationships give rise to liability, providing only that they
be of a kind likely to produce serious emotional injury. The crucial work of identifying
specific contexts is left to future courts.")( footnotes omitted).
391. See supra Part II.A.
392. See Carter, supra note 11, at 30-31, 62, 92-93.
393. No. 5:09-CV-219, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37761, at *1, *1 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 16,
2010).
394. Id at *12.
395. Id. at *10-11.
396. Id. at * 13 (citing Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 814 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001)).
397. Gregory C. Keating, Is Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress A Freestanding
Tort?, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1131(2009).
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"plaintiffs who have preexisting relationships with the parties whose
negligence inflicts emotional injury on them ... [a] duty exists
independent of the law of torts." This "pre-existing relationship,"
for purposes of our discussion is the employer-employee relationship.
Keating argues against a "general duty not to inflict reasonably
avoidable emotional distress" as being legally dead-on-arrival. He
advocates, rather, for abandoning "the attempt to conceptualize NIED
cases as duty cases and in reconceptualizing NIED as a doctrine of
proximate cause-not duty."399 By doing so, NIED cases would "focus
on the victim's [i.e. employee's] harm and its relation to the
defendant's [i.e. employer's] already established wrongdoing." 4 00
Essentially, Keating's approach would be to "ask courts to decide
whether liability for a breach of an existing duty ought to extend to the
emotional harm at hand." 40 1
Keating, Gray, and other commentators who offer commentary
on the Restatement and its application to NIED cases are
understandably concerned about a potential "floodgates" argument if
the focus were on creating a broad, general duty of care to not inflict
reasonably foreseeable emotional distress. This "floodgates" concern
seems to have been the basis of recent cases involving plaintiffs suing
employers for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In referring to
Dillon v. Legg, a landmark NIED case involving bystander trauma,
Keating notes that the focus should not be on duty owed, but on
whether the liability for breach of that duty should apply only in cases
of those who suffer severe emotional harm.402 The question is one of
proximate cause.403 The focus should be on the harm suffered by the
plaintiff and whether defendant's liability extends to that harm via
breach of duty, rather than a focus on the existence and character of
the defendant's duty.404
In cases where employee-plaintiffs have suffered race-based
traumatic stress, courts should focus more attention on the plaintiffs
injury than they have to date. At the same time, there should be
recognition that employers need clear guidance on when they may be
liable for RBTS caused by the employer directly, or through its
managers or supervisors - in which case vicarious liability may arise.
398. Id. at 1157.
399. Id. at 1156.
400. Id. at 1157.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Keating, supra note 397 at 1159.
404. Id
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The next section outlines a framework that should be helpful in
informing and guiding both employers and employees, as well as
administrative and judicial bodies that must decide the merits of RBTS
claims brought for racial harassment and discrimination.
V. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTING AND RESPONDING
TO WORKPLACE HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION: EMPLOYER
LIABILITY, AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
There has been an increased sensitivity to the problem
of defining and compensating employees for emotional
distress on the job. Given the initial reluctance of
legislatures to respond to this issue, and the absence of
common law contract theories to provide protection to
employees from arbitrary actions, application of
ephemeral tort theories such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress represented a seemingly cost-free
way to address the problem of workplace abuse.
However, with the increasing array of legislative and
common law protections against such abuse, the utility
of such a tort as an instrument of industrial justice is
questionable at best. Further, the false promise of such
theories may serve to undermine, not enhance, the
development of a coherent regulatory or legal regime
designed to address the real needs of workers as we
move into the twenty-first century.405
A. Overview of the Framework: Law and Policy
Perhaps the "false promise" has in fact been an uneven
application of Title VII law to plaintiffs in racial harassment suits,406
and it is now time to consider the application of tort law, as well, to
limited and specific cases involving employee-plaintiffs who have
experienced RBTS or other forms of emotional and psychological
harm that results in functional impairment as a result of workplace
harassment. This should be the case particularly where the employer
has not exercised their responsibility to prevent, mitigate, and remedy
such harassment. 40 7 The problem may lie not only in how Title VII is
applied to cases of harassment, but in the federal statute in itself which
405. Duffy, supra note 335, at 427.
406. See generally Chew & Kelley, supra note 14.
407. See Duffy, supra note 335, at 420.
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provides an insufficient avenue to redress in racial and sexual
harassment cases. This view is shared by Mark Hager:
Many critics of Title VII anti-harassment law have seen
as flaws what they characterize as insufficient strength
of, zeal in, and fidelity to the anti-discrimination
paradigm. I have tried to suggest that much more
serious problems flow from that paradigm itself. I have
tried to suggest the best response to the sexual harasser
- or any harasser - whose acts are egregious and
-408injurious. Sue him.
A comprehensive framework for and approach to workplace
harassment and discrimination should address issues experienced by
aggrieved employees; but it must also identify and address issues and
challenges experienced by employers, and courts and judges. In
essence, what is needed in relation to the employment setting - in
addition to a change of hearts and minds of business and organization
leaders, employers, supervisors, and fellow employees - is a legal
framework and policy approach that affords aggrieved employees
realistic avenues to redress demonstrable psychological and physical
injury (i.e. trauma) that is based on their race. Such an approach must
be legally sound and clearly articulated, and it must also be reasonable
for a business or organization and its leadership and management to
understand so they can adopt and operationalize measures to minimize
employee trauma/injury and the potential resultant legal claims.
The approach - Employer Liability and Shared Responsibility
for Maintaining Minimal Workplace Standards Regarding Racism,
Harassment, and Discrimination-has both a legal basis and a
practical emphasis. This framework is anchored organizational policies
and practices, informed by tort law principles (i.e., intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional
distress; with the related concepts including duty, and injury). This
framework also draws on, and is complementary to, established and
evolving employment law (i.e. Title VII, § 1981) and the principles of
contract law.4 09 Going beyond purely legal remedies, this framework
includes, from the policy perspective, the adoption of both preventive
and responsive practices by employers, with the backdrop of legal
408. Hager, supra note 335, at 439.
409. See supra Section IV.
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remedies that afford clarity for employer and employee, and recourse
for aggrieved employees.
Employers and employees alike should be aware that there has
been growing agreement for over a decade among many scholars that
broader "status-blind" protections should apply to all victims of
"workplace bullying," which is a form of harassment.411 Protections
that are currently available only to employees who are members of a
protected class. A symposium was held on this topic,412 and more
recently a specific definition of the problem and how to address it has
been developed.413 The Shared Responsibility framework, while more
focused than that espoused by scholars of workplace bullying, is
complementary to workplace bullying scholarship because both seek
to prevent and respond to emotional and psychological harm,
specifically to employees who experience race-based trauma in the
workplace.
A comprehensive framework and approach to workplace
harassment and discrimination should also take into account the
perspective shared by Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins, who
argue that tort law concepts have a legitimate place in discrimination
and harassment jurisprudence. 4 14 Part of the path to harassment-free
workplaces includes a fresh review of the tenets of tort law and their
applicability as viable deterrents to and redress for wrongs -
specifically egregious wrongs that result in trauma to individuals - in
the workplace. Such a review would be both timely and appropriate for
legal scholars, as well as beneficial to practitioners and judges.
Bringing tort law to bear in a focused and thoughtful manner
on a specific category of wrongs to supplement (rather than supplant)
410. This proposal is designed to prevent or minimize the likelihood of administrative
claims as well as litigation for acts of racial harassment and discrimination in the workplace;
with the goal of prevention being paramount. The United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission places much emphasis on preventative measures. See Harassment,
supra note 175.
411. See Yamada, Phenomenon, supra note 143, at 529-30.
412. See generally Suzy Fox & Lamont E. Stallworth, Employee Perceptions of Internal
Conflict Management Programs and ADR Processes for Preventing and Resolving Incidents
of Workplace Bullying: Ethical Challenges for Decision-Makers in Organizations, 8 EMP.
RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 375 (2004).
413. See generally Chaplin, supra note 141; see also Lisa B. Bingham et al., Dispute
System Design and Justice in Employment Dispute Resolution: Mediation at the Workplace,
14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 6 (2009) (arguing"...as a general matter, DSDs [Dispute System
Designs] adopted by disputants through mutual negotiation and those adopted by third parties
for the benefit of disputants are fairer than most one-party designs ... [I]t is possible to create
a fair one-party design if that design returns control over process and outcome to the disputant
at the individual case level.")
414. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 104, at 1-2.
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the existing paths to legal redress, which include claims processes
415
specified in Title VII and § 1981, is part of the Shared
Responsibility framework as well. Serious consideration of tort law in
this context is included for two primary reasons: (1) the logic of doing
so is compelling, and (2) the current methods for legal redress in
matters of racial harassment resulting in trauma and other types of
psychological harm, while occasionally effective, are simply
inadequate as they have been applied.416
All employees should have a right to a decent, civil, and
professionally respectful (albeit imperfect and sometimes
uncomfortable) workplace. Such a reasonable and respectful
workplace environment should be guaranteed to employees under, and
be redressable through, clear legal standards and meaningful causes of
action. In discussing tort claims for workplace harassment, Martha
Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins advocate for courts using a "dignity-
based standard ... informed by civil rights law," to replace an "honor-
based standard" of outrageous conduct, in order to promote social
equality.4 17 The key question for courts, they propose, is "whether a
defendant's conduct should be classified as outrageous in part because
it conforms to a pattern common to civil rights violations, creating the
potential for cumulative harm for targeted victims and the continuation
of persistent social inequalities."418 Unfortunately, they note that "[i]n
line with the case-by-case approach to the intentional infliction tort,
courts have not yet articulated a theory regulating the intersection of
torts and civil rights, beyond noting the important public policies
underlying civil rights laws."419
The Shared Responsibility framework would apply to business
and organizational employers and their managers or supervisors
directly to hold them responsible for harassment in the workplaces
under their control. The framework could also apply to employers
vicariously through their employees, whenever those employees are
tacitly or expressly permitted to engage in harassment against fellow
employees. While proving in a court of law a compensable loss for
415. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
416. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 90-91, noting that in more than four in five
cases brought under Title VII for causes of action involving racial harassment, the plaintiffs
were denied the opportunity to proceed with their cases on the merits.
417. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 104, at 84.
418. Id. at 84. The authors further posit "[w]ith respect to noneconomic damages for pain
and suffering and other intangible losses, we analyze the disproportionate impact legislative
caps on such damages have had on women and racial minorities and argue that noneconomic
losses should be treated on a par with economic losses." Id. at 11.
419. CHAMALLAS & WIGGINS, supra note 104, at 85.
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emotional distress caused by intentional or negligent acts is a
challenging proposition,420 a path to legal redress involving either or
both, as the facts of the situation dictate, is warranted.
This framework is based in part on the approach taken in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, 42 1 and draws on the individual works of
Oscar S. Gray and Gregory C. Keating 422 that were devoted to the new
Restatement. The authors of this article are acutely aware, as are
Keating and Gray, that courts will view with keen scrutiny claims that
compensate plaintiffs for having hurt feelings, or holding employers
accountable for a general duty to provide a stress-free workplace for
employees, including employees of color.423 The Shared
Responsibility framework is articulated with the goal of providing
realistic strategies for employees (and their counsel as well), while
clarifying for employers that this approach is consistent with their
already-existing responsibility to provide a harassment-free, racial
discrimination-free workplace, and with providing internal systems for
preventing and responding to such conduct on the part of their
424
employees, managers, and supervisors.
Advocating that tort law be carefully applied to claims of racial
harassment for individual plaintiffs - given that remedies already exist
for protected classes of employees (including racial minorities) under
425Title VII - has been met with resistance. Nonetheless, the Shared
Responsibility framework is a multi-faceted approach to prevention of
and redress for psychological and emotional harm associated with
race-based traumatic stress (RBTS), capable of being applied to the
particular workplace situation and injury involved. The framework is
based on traditional approaches to seeking redress (e.g. Title VII-
based complaints and lawsuits), which could be integrated into a legal
approach that respects established legal theory and litigation strategies,
but is not limited by them.
420. See, e.g., LaPorte v. B. L. Harbert Int'l, LLC, No. 5:09-CV-219, 2010 WL
1542500, *4-*5 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 16, 2010); Kassem v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 513 F.3d 251,
255-57 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Part V.B.
421. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 2011).
422. See Gray, supra note 390; Keating, supra note 397.
423. The authors recognize and agree with the EEOC standards that, "Petty slights,
annoyances, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not rise to the level of
illegality. To be unlawful, the conduct must create a work environment that would be
intimidating, hostile, or offensive to reasonable people." See HARASSMENT, supra note 175.
424. See supra note 175.
425. See Chamallas, supra note 96, at 2171 (stating "there is still skepticism that tort law
is so inherently individualistic and tied to outmoded gender ideologies that attempts to reshape
it along civil rights lines are bound to be futile.") (internal footnotes omitted).
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A Shared Responsibility approach would go beyond traditional
approaches as necessary, to address the uniqueness, complexity, and
depth of race-based injuries now being experienced and documented
in organizational and psychological research The purpose of doing so
is to foster workplace environments that are free of severe or pervasive
racism, harassment, and/or discrimination, as well as race-based
traumatic stress. Including tort law as a viable, albeit supplemental,
means of employee redress would also serve as a deterrent to those
employers and their supervisors who may be inclined to perpetrate or
permit workplaces in which racial harassment can exist unchecked.
Viable paths to redress are necessary for employees who have been so
aggrieved, have been unsuccessful in pursuing internal employer
complaint processes, and/or have filed a lawsuit and heretofore not had
a legal theory and strategy adequate to advance their claims beyond
the summary judgment stage.
B. The Premises of a Framework to Address Workplace Racial
Harassment/Discrimination
The pronouncements that we have arrived at a "post-racial"
period in America following the election of the current U.S. President
are premature; racism and discrimination, and racial harassment are in
fact still widespread in America, in various settings, including the
workplace. 4 26 This racism, discrimination and harassment, while
sometimes blatant, is often more subtle in its manifestations in the
workplace as reflected in implicit bias.427
In the workplace, racial harassment and discrimination are
sometimes tacitly "approved" by the nonexistent or lax enforcement of
company/organization policies on nondiscrimination, diversity, and
equal opportunity - policies which one would expect employers of any
size to have in place - explicitly in published policies, and implicitly
through the acts of their managers and supervisors. Workplace racial
discrimination and harassment, whether blatant or subtle, can result in
real harm on the emotional and psychological level (i.e. race-based
traumatic stress). This trauma has been well-documented in research
and the current psychological literature, particularly regarding African
Americans. It can have physical manifestations for the employee, and
426. Article Collections: Racial Harassment, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/keyword/racial-harassment?=3.
427. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 14, at 51-52.
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can constitute a compensable injury, which can be confirmed by expert
witnesses in an administrative proceeding or a court of law.428
The legal redress currently available to injured (i.e.
traumatized) employees in practice, while in some cases effective, has
been limited and inadequate to address the range and depth of the
trauma or harm experienced by the employee-plaintiff. Oftentimes, the
cause of action pursued by a plaintiff does not survive the pretrial
motions stage, and ends in a summary judgment for the employer
(defendants) or a dismissal of the lawsuit altogether.429 Those cases
that do proceed to trial are required to demonstrate an extremely high
level of discrimination or harassment - the "severe or pervasive"
standard430 as actually applied in these cases, is often too high a hurdle
for plaintiffs to meet; even plaintiffs who have been demonstrably
injured and are suffering from race-based trauma.
Determination on whether to allow claims to proceed, or
lawsuits to proceed beyond the summary judgment/motion to dismiss
stage should be made in favor of the plaintiff, if the plaintiff can
demonstrate that they have suffered a compensable emotional injury,
i.e. RBTS.
The standard for recovery should be based primarily on an
assessment of the employee's injury (trauma) and whether the
employer's acts of discrimination and harassment were intentional
(IIED) or negligent (NIED) in allowing discrimination and harassment
that they knew or should have known about - and not only on whether
the defendant's acts were "outrageous" or "severe."431
Clarifying and if need be, establishing this legal framework and
approach to legal redress would be of benefit to both employees
(potential plaintiffs) - by providing more effective causes of action
than federal civil rights statutes alone-and employers (potential
defendants) - by making it clear that racial harassment in the
workplace has serious consequences to the harassed and to the
employer's business. The actors in this comprehensive approach
would include: Employers, Employees, and Courts and Judges, and
428. See Carter and Forsyth, A Guide to the Forensic Assessment of Race-based
Traumatic Stress Reactions, supra note 8, at 28-29.
429. See supra Section IV(E).
430. See EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, SECTION 15: RACE & COLOR
DISCRIMINATION (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html.
431. "The employer will be liable for harassment by non-supervisory employees or non-
employees over whom it has control (e.g., independent contractors or customers on the
premises), if it knew, or should have known about the harassment and failed to take prompt
and appropriate corrective action." See Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Harassment, supra
note 175.
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Society. An overview of some of the key stakes and the roles for each
category of actor are highlighted in the table below:
TABLE 2: COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEWING RACIAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
ACTORS STAKES ROLES OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS/
ACTIONS
Ability to attract and Create, maintain, and Review the
Employers etain a diverse, develop a workplace organizations' and
healthy workforce environment that is eaders' written and
Business/organization productive, poken words, and
al success respectful, and ore importantly
Employee engaging for heir actions
productivity mployees sk: What do our
Reputation of Develop and olicies, statements
organization implement clear nd actions say about
Potential legal policies, and educate ur business's or
liability supervisors and organization's
employees on these ormitment to, and
policies, as well as enforcement o
systems for tandards for a
employees to seek espectful workplace
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For the proposed approach to effectively address workplace
discrimination and harassment, as well as the resultant loss to
employers, fellow employees, and society - the actors-must work in
concert, to:
(1) Develop a shared understanding of the problem and
its broader context;
(2) Provide clear preventive measures and viable
methods of redress;
(3) Apply the preventive measures robustly, and the
methods of redress in a just manner; and
(4) Evaluate results, update policies/laws, refine
communications, and adjust actions accordingly.
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C. Framework Specifics: Employer Liability and Shared
Responsibility
Employer Liability and Shared Responsibility for Maintaining
Minimal Workplace Standards Regarding Racism, Harassment, and
Discrimination (herein the Shared Responsibility framework) involves
the application of tort law principles (i.e. intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress) and also
draws on established and evolving employment law (e.g. Title VII, §
1981) and contract law. Fundamentally, however, it is based in
policies and practices that the employer and employee can jointly
engage in, with the primary goal of countering and preventing
harassment and discrimination. The legal framework should only be
used if these internal, shared policy and practice efforts fail to remedy
the injury and correct the situation. 4 32
There is arguably an even greater need for having an
appreciation for these evolving legal standards and approaches during
difficult and uncertain economic times. Issues of workplace fairness
and dignity are more likely to be at risk due to employees' reluctance
to raise concerns - for fear of retaliation or losing their often less-
than-secure jobs.433 The stress resulting from both psychological and
physical trauma is a detriment to the employee and to her organization
or business, but employee stress due to race-based trauma is avoidable
through the exercise of shared responsibility on the part of employee
and management. Conversely, when this trauma is not avoided, the
consequences can include: lower productivity, higher incidence of
error, increased health care claims, and increased workers'
compensation claims.434
432. The authors recognize that it is the employee's right to seek legal redress at any time
after they suffer a traumatic injury in the workplace. Nonetheless, to be most effective in the
workplace itself as well as the legal realm, the authors believe that employees would do well
to seek redress through company or organizational processes first - assuming that these
processes are available and viable.
433. See Thompson v. North American Stainless, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011), a case involving
employer retaliation through the firing of an employee who brought a claim for sexual
harassment against the company. The Supreme Court, in ruling for the petitioners, made it
clear that such employer actions will not be tolerated: "Title VII provides that '[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ...
because he has made a charge' under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The statute permits 'a
person claiming to be aggrieved' to file a charge with the EEOC alleging that the employer
committed an unlawful employment practice, and, if the EEOC declines to sue the employer,
it permits a civil action to 'be brought ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved ... by the
alleged unlawful employment practice.' § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1)." Id. at 867 (alteration in
original).
434. See Carter and Forsyth, supra note 406.
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The specific components of this Shared Responsibility proposal
are outlined below, starting with (1) employer responsibility and
potential liability, and moving to (2) employee responsibility and
redress.
1. Employer's Responsibility and Potential Liability
a. The employer is responsible for having a policy against
racial harassment which is clearly communicated to
employees, and which employees can use to bring internal
complaints and seek redress for harassment.435
b. The employer as a business/organization is directly, and
through its managers and supervisors vicariously,
responsible for providing and maintaining a workplace
environment free of severe or pervasive racism, and racial
harassment or discrimination that may result in the
demonstrable injury of race-based traumatic stress (RBTS)
to employees. In addition to potentially violating federal
law, the employer may be legally liable in tort for failing to
provide/maintain such a workplace environment if that
failure is shown to be the proximate cause of the
- - 436
employee's injury.
c. The employer as a business/organization is directly, and
through its managers and supervisors vicariously,
responsible for responding in a timely and effective fashion
to incidents (overt and subtle) of severe or pervasive
racism, racial harassment, or discrimination that they are
aware of or should be aware of (i.e., "knew or should have
known") in the course of their business operations,
435. See generally Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (specifying
guidelines); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 77 (1998).
436. See Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, supra note 175; see also Staub v. Proctor
Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011), a case involving a claim brought under Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38U. S. C. §4301 et seq., alleging anti-
military (status) animus and discrimination. The Court held "that if a supervisor performs an
act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse
employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action,
then the employer is liable under USERRA." Id. at 1190, 1194 (emphasis in original).
"Needless to say, the employer would be liable only when the supervisor acts within the scope
of his employment, or when the supervisor acts outside the scope of his employment and
liability would be imputed to the employer under traditional agency principles." Id at 1194
n.4 (citing Ellerth, 524 U. S. at 758).
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particularly incidents that may result in RBTS to its
employees. The employer may be legally liable for
violating federal law, and could be liable in tort for failing
to respond to racism, racial harassment, or discrimination if
that failure is shown to be the proximate cause of the
employee's injury.
d. The employer as a business/organization is directly, and
through its managers and supervisors vicariously,
responsible for responding in a timely and definitive
fashion to incidents (overt and subtle) of severe or
pervasive racism, racial harassment, or discrimination that
are explicitly brought to the attention of the employer or its
managers and supervisors, through employees or
managers/supervisors.
e. The expectations and shared responsibility of the employer
(and its managers/supervisors) and the employee, should be
clearly stated and published in appropriate documents and
media (e.g., employment policy manuals, collective
bargaining agreements, emploment contracts, company
websites, recruiting materials).
2. Employee's Responsibility and Redress
a. The employee is responsible for working with the
employer, its managers/supervisors, and their fellow
employees, to maintain a workplace environment free of
severe or pervasive racism, racial harassment or
discrimination by acting in accordance with stated
employer policies and standards, and established legal
standards.
b. The employee is responsible for informing the employer, or
its managers/supervisors (or the appropriate reporting
authority such as an equal opportunity office) in a timely
fashion when they or their fellow employees experience or
observe incidents or actions that constitute racial
harassment or discrimination - both when they are severe
or pervasive, and when the employee has reason to believe
that they will become severe or pervasive - and may result
in race-based traumatic stress.
437. For an excellent reference on developing workplace policy, see EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL, supra note 185.
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c. The employee is responsible for familiarizing him/herself
with the employer's complaint and dispute resolution
policies, and where appropriate and feasible (or required by
contract) engaging in these internal processes before
considering legal action against the employer for racism,
racial harassment or discrimination that has resulted in
race-based traumatic stress to the employee.438
d. If legal action is the aggrieved employee's only viable, or is
the best recourse to address the injury suffered, i.e. race-
based traumatic stress, the employee has the responsibility
to consider bringing a claim under existing federal or state
law, and also to consider, when appropriate, a good faith
action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
(NIED) or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(IIED) against the employer, unless such cause of action is
expressly preempted by state law.439 This cause of action
should be brought to redress the employee's injury
(trauma), and -to correct the destructive behavior in the
employee's workplace. This will benefit the aggrieved
employee and their fellow employees - and the employer
and their stakeholders (including insurers, customers) as
well.
D. A Legal and Policy Framework: Employee's Redress and
Employer's Organizational and Management Practices
A framework for redress of employee race-based traumatic
stress (RBTS) is outlined in this section. This framework can be flexed
to address the particular facts and circumstances of a case. It is based
on traditional approaches to seeking redress (e.g., through Title VII),
and complements them as necessary with related causes of action (i.e.,
tort claim).
Race-based traumatic stress (RBTS) is a profound harm and
detriment to the individuals and groups of employees who experience
it.440 RBTS represents a real detriment to the business or organization
itself in terms of human loss, reputation, and productivity. It injures
both employee and employer in direct and demonstrable ways. The
responsibility for eliminating or mitigating that harm rests with both
employer and employee in a legal - and more importantly human and
438. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
439. See supra Section IV(D).
440. See Carter and Forsyth, supra note 8.
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organizational - sense.4 4 1 With this potential mutual detriment in
mind, we propose, in addition to more robust legal remedies for
aggrieved employees, a pathway to mutual benefit, through prevention
and mitigation of this harm on the part of the employer. More
importantly, this is an approach that should enhance the likelihood that
workplaces will be more positive, respectful, and productive.
1. Employees - Seeking Redress Through Employer Processes
and/or Legal Action
For legal and organizations reasons, employees who believe
that they have been harassed or discriminated against should first
report the incident(s) and seek redress through internal company
processes.442 Title VII claims are also subject to specific administrative
procedures, prior to the employee bringing a lawsuit.443 Informal,
internal procedures, that are properly structured, communicated to
employees and managers, and implemented consistently and fairly are
more likely to produce a desirable outcome for both employees at risk
of harassment (and their fellow employees) and employers and their
supervisors.444
If, after consideration of and attempts to use internal processes
for redress, an aggrieved employee suffering from RBTS seeks to file
a lawsuit, the precise course of legal action undertaken would be
dependent on the specific situation and facts of the case, and could
include one or more of the following causes of action:
Title VII, Section 1981: Using federal law for cases
involving severe and pervasive harassment or
discrimination by the employer.445
441. The authors believe that beginning with the premise that employers and employees
have a "shared responsibility" for a respectful workplace is preferable to relying solely on an
adversarial or legalistic approach focused on determining who is at fault if employees allege
discrimination or harassment. The authors also believe that if employers ignore their
responsibilities, that legal action for redress should not only be possible but may be necessary.
442. Indeed, cases including Ellerth and Faragher would serve to immunize the employer
from employee complaints to the EEOC or state or federal court if the employer had a policy
and the aggrieved employee did not seek redress through it. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765;
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; see HR Guide to the Internet: EEO: Harassment, supra note
175.
443. See supra section IV(C).
444. See Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) template for an anti-
harassment policy,
http://www.shrm.org/TemplatesTools/Samples/Policies/Pages/CMS_01 6849.aspx (last
accessed Apr. 2, 2012).
445. See supra Section IV(C).
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Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED):
Using state law; for cases involving extreme and
outrageous behavior on the part of the employer, and/or
their managers and supervisors, that is determined to be
- - 446intentional.
Negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED):
Using state law; for cases where it can be demonstrated
that the employer had a responsibility to prevent and
respond to harassment, and where their action or
inaction resulted in the employee's injury. A "knew or
should have known" standard, coupled with a
determination of the proximate cause of the employee's
injury, could be employed in these situations.44
Breach of contract: Using state law; for cases where it
can be demonstrated that the employer did not follow
the language of a contract or agreement with the
employee, including the implied contract comprising
employee handbooks and manuals." 8
For employee-plaintiffs pursuing the causes of action above,
legal counsel should check to determine whether state law, such as
workers' compensation statutes or state anti-discrimination statutes,
would apply to preempt or limit causes of action such as tort claims, or
the types of damages (e.g., punitive) that could be sought. 449 Counsel
should also be thoughtful about the timing and order of federal and
state claims (if multiple claims are anticipated), given the complexity
of court rulings on these procedural issues. 450
446. See supra Section IV(D).
447. See supra Section IV(D).
448. See Wooley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985) (noting that a
policy manual is more than "an expression of the company's 'philosophy,' and that it could be
'contractually enforceable."'). Id. at 1264-65 The New Jersey Supreme Court in this case
went on to state that "[tlhe mere fact of the manual's distribution suggests its importance." Id.
at 1265; but see Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 1995), in which
the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a well-written and placed disclaimer, stating that "[t]his
Employee Handbook is not intended to create any contractual rights in favor of you or the
Company . . ." was sufficiently clear as to protect the company from being contractually
obligated to the employee-plaintiff to follow its policy on progressive discipline. Id. at 288-
89; but see Dillon v. Champion Jogbra, Inc., 819 A.2d 703 (Vt. 2002) holding that whether an
employee manual with ambiguous language constitutes an implied contract is a question
properly left to the jury. Id. at 707 08 (internal citations omitted).
449. See supra Section IV(D)
450. See reference to the "spider web" of procedural complexity, supra note 10.
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2. Employers: Practices To Prevent Employee Injury and
Mitigate Legal Liability
Employers should seek to create workplaces that meet not only
the legal minimums, but that can be models of good (or even "best")
practices. The dimensions of this approach include:
eLeadership - commitment to a respectful workplace, as
evidenced in organizational mission/values. Clear direction,
role-modeling, and systems supported by the highest levels of
the business or organization; best done through multiple media,
strong, clear, and repeated statements - backed by action (e.g.,
timely and sensitive response to complaints).451
*Hliring - carefully consider who is being hired, particularly
for management or supervisory positions; ensure that these are
individuals who will embrace the company policy and practices
related to creating and maintaining a positive,
nondiscriminatory, and welcoming workplace environment.452
*Orientation and Training - an introduction to, and setting
expectations for a positive and respectful workplace culture for
all employees. Include specifics on mutual expectations and
responsibilities for employees, managers, the organization.453
oPolicies and Practices on Harassment - including
statements on racial, sexual, and other types of harassment.
Responsive, timely processes for complaints and seeking
redress internally - employer's and employee's roles. Clear,
454
consistent, ongoing communication on these.
451. See EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, BEST PRACTICES FOR EMPLOYERS AND
HUMAN RESOURCES/EEO PROFESSIONALS (2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-
race/bestpractices-employers.cfm.
452. Id.
453. See Workplace Harassment Training, Society for Human Resource Management
(last accessed March 12, 2012), http://www.elearning.shrm.org/workplaceharassment.aspx
which begins with the question: "[w]hat's the price of a few off-color joke emails? Litigation
and government oversight relating to workplace harassment are on the rise, and violators can
pay a devastating price in terms of jury awards, settlements, and/or fines not to mention
reputation, productivity and morale." Video and online training are available via this website.
454. See EEOC Policy and Complaint Procedure, in EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, supra note 344. "It generally is necessary for employers to establish, publicize, and
enforce anti-harassment policies and complaint procedures. As the Supreme Court stated,
'Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of anti-harassment policies and effective
grievance mechanisms.' While the Court noted that this 'is not necessary in every instance as a
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*Risk Management - including an assessment of the
organization's reputational and financial risk issues. This
should be an integral aspect of corporate vision and strategy. 455
*Diversity - including a clear statement of the
business/organization's beliefs about diversity; the richness and
realities of employee diversity (race, age, socioeconomic
status, etc.), and its contributions to the workplace; diversity
action strategies and plans.456 One legal commentator has
espoused the efficacy of "corporate empathy" as a key element
in monitoring the work environment.
matter of law,' failure to do so will make it difficult for an employer to prove that it exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment. An employer should provide every
employee with a copy of the policy and complaint procedure, and redistribute it periodically.
The policy and complaint procedure should be written in a way that will be understood by all
employees in the employer's workforce. Other measures to ensure effective dissemination of
the policy and complaint procedure include posting them in central locations and incorporating
them into employee handbooks. If feasible, the employer should provide training to all
employees to ensure that they understand their rights and responsibilities. An anti-harassment
policy and complaint procedure should contain, at a minimum, the following elements:
A clear explanation of prohibited conduct;
Assurance that employees who make complaints of harassment or provide information related
to such complaints will be protected against retaliation;
A clearly described complaint process that provides accessible avenues of complaint;
Assurance that the employer will protect the confidentiality of harassment complaints to the
extent possible;
A complaint process that provides a prompt, thorough, and impartial investigation; and
assurance that the employer will take immediate and appropriate corrective action when it
determines that harassment has occurred."Id. (citing Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 764 (1998)) (footnotes omitted).
455. Enterprise Risk Management is a comprehensive approach. See BEAUMONT VANCE
& JOANNA MAKOMASKI, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT FOR DUMMIES (2007); see also ERM
Center of Excellence, RIMS, www.RIMS.org/ERM.
456. See, e.g., UPS Code of Business Conduct, UPS.com (2011),
http://www.ups.com/content/corp/code conduct.html. (stating in part the expectation that their
employees will be free from discriminatory harassment: "Prohibited harassment includes
conduct that is intended to interfere or that has the effect of unreasonably interfering with a
fellow employee's work performance or creating an environment that is intimidating, hostile,
or offensive to the individual.") The statement goes on to reference the UPS Professional
Conduct and Anti-Harassment Policy available from their human resources department.
Employers and employees will want to note that these can be construed as implied contracts
between employer and employee. Id. See Dillon, 819 A.2d at 707-08; see generally Wooley v.
Hoffinan-LaRoche, 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985).
457. Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance as Corporate Social Responsibility:
Empathy and Race Discrimination, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1461, 1470-71 (2002) ("Empathy, as used
in this Essay, is defined as the '[i]dentification with and understanding of another's situation,
feelings, and motives.' 'Empathy ... is more than an intellectual predisposition, or belief; it is
a readiness to be engaged in the experience of others.' "Empathy has been variously described
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*Professional Development and Training - continuing
education, especially for managers and supervisors; providing
resources, publications, and professional organization training
and opportunities for networking on these issues. 45 8
*Best Practices - incorporation of excellent workplace
practices into hiring, policies, training. In addition to policies
on non-discrimination and harassment, employers can take
additional steps to foster a positive and productive work
environment for all employees. Statements and practices that
address bias and microaggressions, while not necessarily
legally mandated, can contribute powerfully to the
establishment of such an environment. 459 Engage employees in
460developing and implementing these statements and practices.
*Monitoring the workplace environment - engaging in a
continuous process of raising self- and shared-awareness, for
supervisors and employees, particularly as the workforce
changes and becomes more diverse over time. Include this
responsibility in managers' and supervisors' position
descriptions and expectations.
*Prompt Action on Complaints - Thoughtful, comprehensive
responses to harassing or discriminatory behaviors discovered
as a ... process .. . a mode of observation, and an information-gathering activity.' Initially, I
thought that understanding the situation in which many people of color find themselves in
companies with racially toxic cultures, would lead to effective monitoring of discrimination. I
was drawn to definitions of empathy that described it as a 'process' and an 'information-
gathering activity' because satisfaction of the duty of care is itself a process of information
gathering. Perhaps, I thought, empathy for people of color would inspire adequate monitoring
of corporate compliance with antidiscrimination law, and such monitoring would foster further
understanding of the discrimination faced by people of color. In other words, empathy may
inspire satisfaction of the duty to monitor, and the monitoring may foster further empathy.")
(internal citations omitted) (alteration in original).
458. See Best Practices for Workplace Harassment Prevention, INSPIRED LEARNING (last
accessed March 12, 2012),
http://www.inspiredeleaming.com/harassment/WorkplaceHarassmentBestPractices White
Paper.htm (including a 35-point questionnaire to check compliance with EEOC guidelines).
459. SUE, supra note 93, at 227-30 (outlining in the section entitled "The Way Forward,"
six specific actions employers can take to address bias and microaggressions, including:
Hearing the voices of employees of color, women, and LGBTs in the workplace; building
accountability into the system; and developing a systematic and long-term commitment to
educate the entire workforce ... training is also important to the very top)..
460. See Vanessa Kelly, In Search of Best Practices and Employment Policies-The
Standards Remain Elusive, WHITE PAPERS (2011), available at
http://www.schwartzkelly.com/papers.asp?page=2.
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or reported that are consistent with published policies and
practices. Communicate to all employees the contact
person/office for complaints and the policies and practices to
be followed in making a complaint.
*Assessment, Revision - (including after-action/incident
reviews), which may lead to altering or updating processes to
be even more effective in terms of prevention and response.
*Reducing Employer Liability and Increasing Employee
Satisfaction and Productivity - This can be accomplished by
framing the organizational policies and practices as being as
important as "the law." The goal for the organization (and its
leaders and members) is to: first and foremost - have a positive
workplace environment. Secondly, having such an environment
will reduce the likelihood of complaints or lawsuits. Third, if
complaints or lawsuits ensue - the employer will be in a
461stronger position to prevail.
If employers and employees assume shared responsibility for
engaging in the above practices, they not only will prevent or reduce
traumatic injuries (such as RBTS), but will position themselves to
provide workplaces with greater clarity of expectations, heightened
empathy, and superior productivity.
VI.CONCLUSION
There is no better time than the present to foster positive,
respectful workplaces, through the application of clear, meaningful
workplace policies and legal principles and avenues to redress that
advance basic fairness and equity for all employees. While many
companies and organizations have long realized this, others apparently
have not seen the value of doing so. 4 6 2
It is incumbent on businesses and organizations to develop and
act on missions and values that speak to the importance of mutual
respect, and intolerance of harassment, in the workplace. At a
461. See ANDREW FOOSE, 5 STEPS FOR EMPLOYERS TO REINFORCE ANTI-HARASSMENT
POLICIES, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE, http://www.globalcompliance.com/Resources/5-Steps-for-
Employers-to-Reinforce-Anti-Harassment.aspx.
462. While organizations that do not see value in these principles still often "win"
lawsuits brought against them (see supra cases in Sections III, IV), the fact that they have even
been engaged in the legal system by employees who have experienced racial harassment and
trauma in their workplaces should be a call to action.
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minimum, this should result in RBTS (trauma)-free workplaces in
which employees of various backgrounds, races, and genders can,
without fear, contribute their time and talents - and thrive.
The responsibility for fostering a positive and productive
workplace is a shared one, involving employers, supervisors, and
employees. The consequences of not doing so - arising from employer
ignorance, indifference, or failure to anticipate and respond to
employee complaints arising from racial harassment, or resulting from
employee ignorance or fear in raising such complaints at the earliest
possible point - are profound. On the other hand, the benefits to
businesses and organizations that foster a positive work environment
are clear: happier and more engaged employees, work teams that are
more collaborate and creative, more effective supervisors and
workplaces characterized by lower stress, and fewer harassment and
discrimination claims and lawsuits. These businesses and
organizations and their employees will also reap the benefits of an
enhanced reputation as well as superior productivity.
Author Note: The article originated with the work of the first author.
The legal research, analyses, and discussion were contributed by the
second author with few exceptions.
[see diagram on following page]
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FIGURE 1
Theory: Shared Responsibility and Liability for Maintaining
Minimal Workplace Standards Regarding Racism, Harassment,
and Discrimination
(CARTER, R. AND SCHEUERMANN, T., 2010)
Legal bases:
* Tort law/Infliction of Emotional Distress (negligence/NIED,
intentional torts/IIED)
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